Ms. Martin established precedent, representing herself in her own workplace violence/sexual harassment
case. In 1999, Martin established employer liability for the sexual harassment of an employee by a non-
employee in the workplace, where the employer knew or should have known of the sexual harassment
and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it. Martin v. Howard University and Alice Gresham
Bullock, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516, 81 FEP Cases 964 (BNA), 15 IER Cases 1587 (D.D.C. 1999),
adopting the interpretation of Title VII advocated by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(e). See recent discussions of the importance of this
case to all working women and to stalking victims at:
http://womeninbusiness.about.com/od/smallbusinesslegalissues/a/martinvhoward.htm,
http://remodel4life.blogspot.com,
http://alexisamoore.blogspot.com/2008/05/martin-v-howard-university-personal.html.
http://www.justicewomen.com/guestbook/guestbook.php?row_start=61,
The American Association of University Woman (AAUW) Legal Advocacy Fund,
http://caonlinelaf.blogspot.com/2008/05/gender-profiling.html
The National Association of Women Lawyers ("NAWL") filed an Amicus Brief (friend of the court) in
support of Ms. Martin. NAWL's Brief outlines the issues it believes will affect the rights and safety of
women at work. NAWL is the leading national voluntary organization devoted to the interests of women
lawyers and women's rights. NAWL has historically served as an educational forum and an active voice
for the concerns of women in the legal profession. See also relevant district court decisions.
On March 17, 2008, a three-judge Panel of :the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
(Judges Edwards, Henderson and Williams), heard oral argument in the appeal in the case. Ms. Martin
told the Panel:
“The precedent set by this Court will determine how employers and educational institutions will respond
to stalking and other types of workplace and campus violence – particularly when it is directed against
women. If a woman can be stalked in her workplace, and fired for asking her employer to take
reasonable steps to keep him out of the workplace, then women will be forced to choose between their
safety and their livelihood – a Hobson’s choice.”
Less than two weeks later, the Panel issued a March 31, 2008 unpublished decision.(No individual judge
was credited with authoring the decision.) This decision, disturbingly, allows an employer to fire a
woman for being stalked -- even here, where the harasser is a delusional, serial stalker of African-
American women professors, allowed to roam freely through her workplace -- a law school campus of a
national University touted for its civil rights legacy. See April 30, 2008 Press Release. Panel squarely
placed women in the "Hobson's choice" position warned by Ms. Martin, forcing them to choose between
their jobs and their safety, if they are stalked at work.
Ms. Martin has filed a Petition for Rehearing, En Banc, asking the full court to review the Panel's
decision. She will file a petition for review by the United States Supreme Court, if the March 31, 2008 is
not vacated/reversed. She seeks the support of Women's and Civil Rights Advocacy Groups to
support a petition for review by the U.S. Supreme Court and to file a joint Amicus Brief at that
level.
The Appellate Briefs may be accessed through the links below:
1) Ms. Martin's April 29, 2008 Petition for Rehearing, En Banc
2) Martin Brief, Brief of Appellant, Dawn Martin, Esquire;
3) Amicus Curiae Brief (friend of the Court), by The National Association of Women Lawyers;
4) Howard University Brief; Appellee # 1 Response Brief;
5) Alice Gresham Bullock Brief, Brief of Alice Gresham Bullock, Esquire, Appellee #2 Response Brief; and
6) Martin Reply Brief responding to Appellees' arguments.
The Court's decision adopts -- and actually relies upon.as fact, Howard's blatant, material
misrepresentations of the record -- even though Ms. Martin filed two motions for sanctions against
Howard and its outside counsel for these misrepresentations in its Brief and oral argument. See March
11, 2008 Motion for Sanctions against Howard University for its false representations to the Court of
Appeals in its Brief. On April 1, 2008, Ms. Martin filed a Motion for Sanctions against Brian, Schwalb,
Esquire (see Exhibits) one of Howard's attorneys, and his law firm for his false statements and
misrepresentations of the record during oral argument. Howard made numerous material false factual
representations that were completely unsupported by the evidence and contradicted by Howard's own
admissions in discovery and stipulations and/or by the testimony of its own binding witnesses.
For example, the Court of Appeals adopted Howard's misrepresentation that the stalker, Harrison,
"misidentified" Prof. Martin as his "estranged wife;" but the record is clear that there was never any real
wife. Harrison's letters reveal that there is only Harrison's delusional vision of a woman whom he
wanted to be his wife -- based on a fictional female character in a book. Harrison could not have
"misidentified" Prof. Martin for a woman who does not even exist!
The Court of Appeals also relied on Howard's completely unsupported statement that Harrison "stalked"
males as well as females. Harrison has targeted African-American female professors across the country,
since the mid-1980s, in search of the embodiment of a fictional character, Geneva Crenshaw, in a book,
And we are not Saved, written by the renowned law professor, Prof. Derrrick Bell, who is currently
teaching at NYU Law School. See Harrison's letters: first letter; second letter; January 1998 letter to
another female attorney. In 1990, Harrison threatened the life of Prof. Bell, at Harvard University,
accusing Prof. Bell of concealing the identify of the "real" Prof. Crenshaw from him. See Affidavit of
Prof. Derrick Bell. This one incident, however, does not begin to meet the definition of "stalking," since
"stalking" is legally defined by numerous acts of harassment. Since the trial judge would not allow Prof.
Bell to testify, the only evidence of Harrison's contact with Prof. Bell came from Ms. Martin. Ms. Martin
did not use the word "stalk" in describing what Prof. Bell told her, nor did the behavior described
constitute stalking.
In addition, Ms. Martin's testimony about what Prof. Bell told her was not admitted for its truth, since it
was hearsay. The trial judge ruled that Ms. Martin could testify about what Prof. Bell told her only as
evidence of her own state of mind, on the issue of damages, for the limited purpose of establishing her
continued emotional distress even after leaving Howard. Ms. Martin testified that she still fears that
Harrison could return to stalk her or other women, particularly after receiving reports from others of his
violent propensities. There was therefore, literally, no evidence presented at trial from which the jury
was permitted to conclude that Harrison stalked Prof. Bell or any other male. There was only Howard's
counsel's misrepresentation, in its closing statement, that Harrison stalked Prof. Bell. Since this issue
was not a jury question, and the trial judge would not allow the parties to speak to jurors after trial, there
is no way of knowing whether jurors mistook Howard's misrepresentations for evidence or whether they
discounted it altogether, but were simply confused about the definition of sexual harassment and whether
a plaintiff loses Title VII protection if she complains, in writing, or "a stalker" roaming unfettered in her
workplace, or whether she must specifically call him a "sexual harasser."
When Prof. Martin asked the then Dean of the Law School, Alice Gresham Bullock, to take action to
keep the stalker from the law school premises, the Dean did not even follow the University's own
security policies. Interestingly, in Dean Bullock's July 1, 1998 memo to Howard's General Counsel, in
response to Prof. Martin's EEOC charge, she acknowledged that she and Associate Dean Newsom
perceived Harrison as a serious threat to Prof. Martin and "other women" on campus whom Harrison
might "stalk" or "otherwise harass;" yet, at trial, Prof. Bullock testified that she did not perceive
Harrison's pursuit of Prof. Martin to be based on gender. Neither Howard nor Prof. Bullock's personal
attorney have denied that former Dean Bullock committed perjury at trial. Instead, Howard's Brief
and Bullock's Brief both argue that perjury does not require vacating the jury’s verdict.
In Bullock's July 1, 1998 memo to Howard's General Counsel,the memo, Bullock also claimed that she
took a number of precautionary measures, including involving Howard's campus security force in
developing a plan to protect Prof. Martin and other women at risk on campus; however, when Ms.
Martin was finally permitted to depose Dean Bullock and Howard security officers in 2002, after Howard
defied numerous discovery orders and was held in contempt for withholding discovery, Bullock admitted
that she never even discussed the stalking with the Director of Campus Security or any other security or
police officer, while Prof. Martin was teaching at Howard. Her admissions contradicted her July 1, 1999
written representations to Howard's General Counsel and her December 1, 1997 memo to Prof. Martin,
in response to her November 25, 1997 memo asking for protection from the stalking. The D.C. Police
Department characterized the harassment as "stalking," which is defined by the D.C. Criminal Code as
severe forms of harassment that are threatening or annoying and took filed Prof. Martin's complaint as a
criminal stalking complaint. Howard Campus Security Officer Sirleaf also filed a campus police report.
Instead of following Howard's own security procedures to bar Harrison from the law school, Dean
Bullock ensured that Prof. Martin's teaching contract was not renewed. Ms. Martin had excellent
teaching evaluations and her student protests of her non-renewal. Dean Bullock improperly interfered
with the hiring process by expressing her disfavor with Prof. Martin to the Vice Chair of the
Appointment Committee, Prof. Andrew Taslitz and Associate Dean Michael Newsom; thereafter, Prof.
Taslitz misrepresented the status of Prof. Martin's publications, as well as those of a junior visiting
professor, to make them believe that the junior professor had a superior record of scholarship. The
remaining four members of the Appointments Committee therefore selected the junior professor to teach
the equal employment law that Prof. Martin had been teaching for two years at Howard, and four years
total. Dean Bullock then assigned a new professor to take over her Torts I and II classes.
Additional shocking trial testimony came from Prof. Isaiah Leggett, the then Chair of the Appointments
Committee, now the County Executive for Montgomery County, Maryland and reputed to be a contender
for Governor of the State of Maryland. Ike Leggett attempted to defend against charges of sex
discrimination and retaliation with an admission of age discrimination. He actually testified that he voted
to reject Prof. Martin, in favor of a less experienced applicant, to give the ‘young rookie’ a chance. He
compared law professors to football players. Leggett was the Director of the County Human Rights
Division for ten years and has built his political career on portraying himself as a civil rights advocate;
yet, not only did he participate in covering up Bullock's retaliatory actions against Prof. Martin for
reporting sexual harassment, but he personally admitted to committing illegal age discrimination. Ms.
Martin has therefore asked to amend her Complaint to add in a claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).
It is also worth noting that, while Prof. Martin was removed from the faculty, the same Appointments
Committee, during the same year, granted tenure to Prof. Reginald L. Robinson, despite complaints that
Prof. Robinson's "sexual jokes," which he repeatedly e-mailed to faculty and staff, were offensive and
might cause Howard to be faced with a claim of hostile work environment on the basis of gender. This
and other events at that time reflected Howard Law extreme insensitivity to issues of sex discrimination
and sexual harassment, as well as a disregard for accountability, under the law, for sexual harassment.
The jury found that Harrison's harassment of Prof. Martin was so severe and pervasive that it created a
hostile work environment for her. The jury also concluded that Howard did not take reasonable steps to
end the harassment in her workplace; however, oddly, and contradicting Judge Hogan's finding of law in
his 1999 decision, the jury determined that the harassment was not sexual in nature or based on her
sex/gender. This conclusion led to a jury verdict for the defendant, since Title VII jurisdiction only
applies if the harassment is based on race, sex, color, national origin or religion. The jury was clearly
confused about the definition of sexual harassment and harassment on the basis of sex, as indicated by
its request for additional instruction on the legal definition of sexual harassment. The judge refused to
provide the requested additional instruction.
Martin is the first case considering the concept of “gender profiling” in employment, under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. In 1999, the district
court judge said that it was ‘clear’ that Harrison harassed Prof. Martin based on my sex –but seven years
later, after all of the evidence was presented at trial, the same judge suddenly submitted the question to
the jury. The jurors were clearly confused on the law. They asked the court to give them additional
instruction on the definition of sexual harassment, but the judge would not provide it. Based on what
they understood the law to be, the jurors concluded that Harrison’ stalking was not sexual in nature or
based on Prof. Martin's gender. That meant that there is no statute to protect her from being stalked in
her workplace or from being fired for reporting it.
The Court of Appeals held that Ms. Martin misinterpreted Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision; however, on
October 20, 2003, Magistrate Judge Facciola, to whom Judge Hogan referred the case, specifically
detailed what issues were decided in 1999 and would not be “triable issues of fact” for the jury and what
issues would proceed to a jury at trial. The Court of Appeals discounted MJ Facciola’s interpretation of
Judge Hogan’s decision, stating that he could not overrule Judge Hogan; however, as Ms. Martin
stressed in her Brief, Reply Brief and oral argument, Judge Hogan adopted Judge Facciola’s decision as
his own, on September 16, 2005. This was not, therefore, a question of whether Ms. Martin and/or
Magistrate Facciola corrected interpreted Judge Hogan's decision; by making Magistrate Facciola's
decision his own, he confirmed that Magistrate Facciola had correctly interpreted his 1999 decision as
determining, based on the undisputed facts, Harrison's conduct constituted harassment on the basis of
sex, as a matter of law and that it would not be a triable issue of fact for the jury.
The district court also held that “groping” and “touching” are “typical” indicia of sexual harassment cases
and that since Harrison did not touch Prof. Martin, the jury had reason to find that she was not sexually
harassed.” The Court of Appeals did not address this issue. Since it has not been overturned, this
precedent set by this decision arguably requires that a woman to be assaulted in order to establish that
she was sexually harassed in her workplace.
The Court of Appeals also held that because, on one occasion in 1990, Harrison threatened Prof Bell, this
was enough to defeat Ms. Martin’s claim that Harrison harassed her because of her gender; however,
Ms. Martin repeatedly pointed out that Harrison did not stalk Prof. Bell. The legal definition of “stalking”
requires repeated acts of harassment directed toward the same victim. Harrison contacted Prof. Bell on
only one occasion, and then only to solicit his assistance in identifying the next woman he would stalk --
any woman that he believed might be the “model” for “Geneva Crenshaw.” NAWL's Amicus Brief
argues that Howard’s argument is like saying that John Hinckley did not sexually harass Jodie Foster
when he stalked her because he also attempted to kill President Reagan. NAWL argues that the fact that
a sexually harassing stalker may also have committed a violent act against a man in his lifetime does not
negate the fact that he sexually harassed a woman in another setting.
Martin also presented issues regarding actionable retaliation under Title VII, but the Court of Appeals
deemed these issues moot. Since the Court determined that Howard was free to commit any retaliatory
act against Prof. Martin for being stalked, with no Title VII penalty, the lower court’s definition of acts
that constitute actionable retaliation under Title VII was irrelevant to this case; however, the Court of
Appeals’ failure to reverse the lower court on this issue leaves the lower court’s precedent intact: an
employer may leave positions unfilled, cancel vacancies and/or convert advertised positions to positions
for which an applicant is not the best qualified, even where it is done to prevent the most qualified
applicant from being hired, in retaliation for reporting sexual harassment – or any other EEO violation,
whether based on race, national origin, religion, ethnicity, age or disability.
Ms. Martin also asked the Court to define the circumstances under which Title VII plaintiffs may be
ordered to pay the litigation costs of the defendant. The National Organization of Women (NOW)
recently ran a campaign protesting the 11th Circuit’s assessment of costs against the plaintiff in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear, after the Supreme Court ruled against her in her sex discrimination claim. NOW
and NAWL have argued that such assessments unfairly punish women who file sex discrimination
lawsuits, in good faith, in the public interest. The Court declined to address this issue at this time.
The Court of Appeals also did not explain why Dean Alice Gresham Bullock’s perjury does not require
vacating the verdict. In a July 1, 1999 memorandum to Howard’s General Counsel, Bullock admitted
that she perceived Harrison as a threat to Prof. Martin and “other women” on campus; yet, at trial, she
testified that she never perceived Harrison’s harassment as sexual harassment, or harassment based on
sex/gender. Although both Howard and Bullock's individual lawyer filed separate Briefs, neither Howard
nor her own personal counsel has denied that Bullock committed perjury at trial.
Martin also raised the issue of "gender profiling" in the employment discrimination context. Just as
"racial profiling" targets victims based on race, victims are "profiled" on the basis of their sex when they
are targeted for harassment because they fit a certain "profile" that is dependant upon gender. Just as
"driving while Black" creates a disproportionate risk of arrest for African-Americans, "working while
female" creates a disproportionate risk of being stalked or otherwise harassed in the workplace. This may
occur when a harasser targets a woman because she resembles a character in a book or a celebrity. The
harasser may also target a woman to fulfill a gender specific role, such as "wife," "mother" or
"daughter."
The precedent set in Martin, with respect to gender, will also apply to racial profiling and profiling based
on other protected categories such as race, national origin, age, disability or religion. The implementation
of EEOC Regulation 29 CFR 1604.11(e), affects not just women, with respect to sexual harassment, but
also other racial, ethnic, religious, age and disability groups unprotected where they are targeted for
harassment, in the workplace, by non-employees (e.g., Maupin v. Howard County Board of Education,
Howard County, Maryland Circuit Court (July 2, 2007) (an African-American teacher received
intimidating calls at work from a purported member of Ku Klux Klan and her request for security was
denied).
This case presents the Court with yet another precedent-setting issue. The trial court, via, Chief Judge
Hogan, ordered Ms. Martin to pay Howard University's litigation costs, without notice or opportunity to
be heard on the factors that are to be considered when assessing costs against a Title VII plaintiff. Ms.
Martin filed an Opposition to Defendant's Bill of Costs based on the law of other circuits and related
Supreme Court law. Judge Hogan refused to even consider any arguments against assessing costs
against her. This issue is also on appeal. Ms. Martin and NAWL ask the Court to define the
circumstances under which Title VII plaintiffs may be ordered to pay the litigation costs of the
defendant. The National Organization of Women (NOW) recently ran a campaign protesting the 11th
Circuit’s assessment of costs against the plaintiff in Ledbetter v. Goodyear, after the Supreme Court
ruled against her in her sex discrimination claim. NOW and NAWL have argued that such assessments
unfairly punish women who file sex discrimination lawsuits, in good faith, in the public interest.
Before filing the appeal, Ms. Martin filed motions for judgment on all of her claims, as a matter of law,
asking the Court to set aside the jury verdict. See Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Sexual
Harassment Claim, and Reply; Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Retaliation Claims and Reply;
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Breach of Contract Claim and Reply. Howard has also filed
motions for judgment on all claims, even though the jury verdict was in its favor. See Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on Plaintiff's Sexual Harassment Claim; Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on her Retaliation Claims; Plaintiff's Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on her Breach of Contract Claim. .
This case demonstrates, among other things, the incredible delay that a plaintiff must endure while
awaiting justice and the loss of the quality of life and family while the plaintiff waits for remedial relief.
The case was delayed largely due to Howard University's refusal to produce discovery, which they only
produced after three orders to do so and being held in Contempt of Court. Ms. Martin filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment, accompanied by a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, in October of 2002.
See also Martin's Reply to Howard University's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Statement of
Disputed Material Facts. Ms. Martin moved the Court to Strike Howard's Motion for Summary
Judgment because it relied on testimony specifically excluded from the record; however, the Magistrate
Judge ignored her motion and his own order and considered Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment
relying on precluded testimony. See Martin's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Reply to Howard's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike. Ms. Martin waited three
years for the Court to decide the cross-motions for summary judgment.
The appeals process has also been extraordinarily delayed because the Court Reporter, who is a member
of Judge Hogan's staff, actually withheld transcripts from Ms. Martin that she had paid for in advance,
some of which were completed and docketed, but kept in Judge Hogan's chambers, rather than in the
Clerk's office for the public to access them. See Plaintiff's Motion to Integrate Plaintiff's Direct Trial
Testimony into the Official, Certified Transcript.
Ms. Martin understands what is it like to experience illegal retaliation, having been left to start her
career from the bottom of the ladder, after working for seventeen years to reach the height of her
career. As a single mother who lost her source of support and income at age 40, she understands that,
despite any monetary relief that may eventually be granted, the is no remedy that can restore to plaintiffs
or their families for the lost years of financial hardship and the qualify of life caused by illegal
discrimination.
Martin v. Howard University is cited in numerous treatises, law review articles and websites, dating back
to 1999.
case. In 1999, Martin established employer liability for the sexual harassment of an employee by a non-
employee in the workplace, where the employer knew or should have known of the sexual harassment
and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it. Martin v. Howard University and Alice Gresham
Bullock, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516, 81 FEP Cases 964 (BNA), 15 IER Cases 1587 (D.D.C. 1999),
adopting the interpretation of Title VII advocated by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(e). See recent discussions of the importance of this
case to all working women and to stalking victims at:
http://womeninbusiness.about.com/od/smallbusinesslegalissues/a/martinvhoward.htm,
http://remodel4life.blogspot.com,
http://alexisamoore.blogspot.com/2008/05/martin-v-howard-university-personal.html.
http://www.justicewomen.com/guestbook/guestbook.php?row_start=61,
The American Association of University Woman (AAUW) Legal Advocacy Fund,
http://caonlinelaf.blogspot.com/2008/05/gender-profiling.html
The National Association of Women Lawyers ("NAWL") filed an Amicus Brief (friend of the court) in
support of Ms. Martin. NAWL's Brief outlines the issues it believes will affect the rights and safety of
women at work. NAWL is the leading national voluntary organization devoted to the interests of women
lawyers and women's rights. NAWL has historically served as an educational forum and an active voice
for the concerns of women in the legal profession. See also relevant district court decisions.
On March 17, 2008, a three-judge Panel of :the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
(Judges Edwards, Henderson and Williams), heard oral argument in the appeal in the case. Ms. Martin
told the Panel:
“The precedent set by this Court will determine how employers and educational institutions will respond
to stalking and other types of workplace and campus violence – particularly when it is directed against
women. If a woman can be stalked in her workplace, and fired for asking her employer to take
reasonable steps to keep him out of the workplace, then women will be forced to choose between their
safety and their livelihood – a Hobson’s choice.”
Less than two weeks later, the Panel issued a March 31, 2008 unpublished decision.(No individual judge
was credited with authoring the decision.) This decision, disturbingly, allows an employer to fire a
woman for being stalked -- even here, where the harasser is a delusional, serial stalker of African-
American women professors, allowed to roam freely through her workplace -- a law school campus of a
national University touted for its civil rights legacy. See April 30, 2008 Press Release. Panel squarely
placed women in the "Hobson's choice" position warned by Ms. Martin, forcing them to choose between
their jobs and their safety, if they are stalked at work.
Ms. Martin has filed a Petition for Rehearing, En Banc, asking the full court to review the Panel's
decision. She will file a petition for review by the United States Supreme Court, if the March 31, 2008 is
not vacated/reversed. She seeks the support of Women's and Civil Rights Advocacy Groups to
support a petition for review by the U.S. Supreme Court and to file a joint Amicus Brief at that
level.
The Appellate Briefs may be accessed through the links below:
1) Ms. Martin's April 29, 2008 Petition for Rehearing, En Banc
2) Martin Brief, Brief of Appellant, Dawn Martin, Esquire;
3) Amicus Curiae Brief (friend of the Court), by The National Association of Women Lawyers;
4) Howard University Brief; Appellee # 1 Response Brief;
5) Alice Gresham Bullock Brief, Brief of Alice Gresham Bullock, Esquire, Appellee #2 Response Brief; and
6) Martin Reply Brief responding to Appellees' arguments.
The Court's decision adopts -- and actually relies upon.as fact, Howard's blatant, material
misrepresentations of the record -- even though Ms. Martin filed two motions for sanctions against
Howard and its outside counsel for these misrepresentations in its Brief and oral argument. See March
11, 2008 Motion for Sanctions against Howard University for its false representations to the Court of
Appeals in its Brief. On April 1, 2008, Ms. Martin filed a Motion for Sanctions against Brian, Schwalb,
Esquire (see Exhibits) one of Howard's attorneys, and his law firm for his false statements and
misrepresentations of the record during oral argument. Howard made numerous material false factual
representations that were completely unsupported by the evidence and contradicted by Howard's own
admissions in discovery and stipulations and/or by the testimony of its own binding witnesses.
For example, the Court of Appeals adopted Howard's misrepresentation that the stalker, Harrison,
"misidentified" Prof. Martin as his "estranged wife;" but the record is clear that there was never any real
wife. Harrison's letters reveal that there is only Harrison's delusional vision of a woman whom he
wanted to be his wife -- based on a fictional female character in a book. Harrison could not have
"misidentified" Prof. Martin for a woman who does not even exist!
The Court of Appeals also relied on Howard's completely unsupported statement that Harrison "stalked"
males as well as females. Harrison has targeted African-American female professors across the country,
since the mid-1980s, in search of the embodiment of a fictional character, Geneva Crenshaw, in a book,
And we are not Saved, written by the renowned law professor, Prof. Derrrick Bell, who is currently
teaching at NYU Law School. See Harrison's letters: first letter; second letter; January 1998 letter to
another female attorney. In 1990, Harrison threatened the life of Prof. Bell, at Harvard University,
accusing Prof. Bell of concealing the identify of the "real" Prof. Crenshaw from him. See Affidavit of
Prof. Derrick Bell. This one incident, however, does not begin to meet the definition of "stalking," since
"stalking" is legally defined by numerous acts of harassment. Since the trial judge would not allow Prof.
Bell to testify, the only evidence of Harrison's contact with Prof. Bell came from Ms. Martin. Ms. Martin
did not use the word "stalk" in describing what Prof. Bell told her, nor did the behavior described
constitute stalking.
In addition, Ms. Martin's testimony about what Prof. Bell told her was not admitted for its truth, since it
was hearsay. The trial judge ruled that Ms. Martin could testify about what Prof. Bell told her only as
evidence of her own state of mind, on the issue of damages, for the limited purpose of establishing her
continued emotional distress even after leaving Howard. Ms. Martin testified that she still fears that
Harrison could return to stalk her or other women, particularly after receiving reports from others of his
violent propensities. There was therefore, literally, no evidence presented at trial from which the jury
was permitted to conclude that Harrison stalked Prof. Bell or any other male. There was only Howard's
counsel's misrepresentation, in its closing statement, that Harrison stalked Prof. Bell. Since this issue
was not a jury question, and the trial judge would not allow the parties to speak to jurors after trial, there
is no way of knowing whether jurors mistook Howard's misrepresentations for evidence or whether they
discounted it altogether, but were simply confused about the definition of sexual harassment and whether
a plaintiff loses Title VII protection if she complains, in writing, or "a stalker" roaming unfettered in her
workplace, or whether she must specifically call him a "sexual harasser."
When Prof. Martin asked the then Dean of the Law School, Alice Gresham Bullock, to take action to
keep the stalker from the law school premises, the Dean did not even follow the University's own
security policies. Interestingly, in Dean Bullock's July 1, 1998 memo to Howard's General Counsel, in
response to Prof. Martin's EEOC charge, she acknowledged that she and Associate Dean Newsom
perceived Harrison as a serious threat to Prof. Martin and "other women" on campus whom Harrison
might "stalk" or "otherwise harass;" yet, at trial, Prof. Bullock testified that she did not perceive
Harrison's pursuit of Prof. Martin to be based on gender. Neither Howard nor Prof. Bullock's personal
attorney have denied that former Dean Bullock committed perjury at trial. Instead, Howard's Brief
and Bullock's Brief both argue that perjury does not require vacating the jury’s verdict.
In Bullock's July 1, 1998 memo to Howard's General Counsel,the memo, Bullock also claimed that she
took a number of precautionary measures, including involving Howard's campus security force in
developing a plan to protect Prof. Martin and other women at risk on campus; however, when Ms.
Martin was finally permitted to depose Dean Bullock and Howard security officers in 2002, after Howard
defied numerous discovery orders and was held in contempt for withholding discovery, Bullock admitted
that she never even discussed the stalking with the Director of Campus Security or any other security or
police officer, while Prof. Martin was teaching at Howard. Her admissions contradicted her July 1, 1999
written representations to Howard's General Counsel and her December 1, 1997 memo to Prof. Martin,
in response to her November 25, 1997 memo asking for protection from the stalking. The D.C. Police
Department characterized the harassment as "stalking," which is defined by the D.C. Criminal Code as
severe forms of harassment that are threatening or annoying and took filed Prof. Martin's complaint as a
criminal stalking complaint. Howard Campus Security Officer Sirleaf also filed a campus police report.
Instead of following Howard's own security procedures to bar Harrison from the law school, Dean
Bullock ensured that Prof. Martin's teaching contract was not renewed. Ms. Martin had excellent
teaching evaluations and her student protests of her non-renewal. Dean Bullock improperly interfered
with the hiring process by expressing her disfavor with Prof. Martin to the Vice Chair of the
Appointment Committee, Prof. Andrew Taslitz and Associate Dean Michael Newsom; thereafter, Prof.
Taslitz misrepresented the status of Prof. Martin's publications, as well as those of a junior visiting
professor, to make them believe that the junior professor had a superior record of scholarship. The
remaining four members of the Appointments Committee therefore selected the junior professor to teach
the equal employment law that Prof. Martin had been teaching for two years at Howard, and four years
total. Dean Bullock then assigned a new professor to take over her Torts I and II classes.
Additional shocking trial testimony came from Prof. Isaiah Leggett, the then Chair of the Appointments
Committee, now the County Executive for Montgomery County, Maryland and reputed to be a contender
for Governor of the State of Maryland. Ike Leggett attempted to defend against charges of sex
discrimination and retaliation with an admission of age discrimination. He actually testified that he voted
to reject Prof. Martin, in favor of a less experienced applicant, to give the ‘young rookie’ a chance. He
compared law professors to football players. Leggett was the Director of the County Human Rights
Division for ten years and has built his political career on portraying himself as a civil rights advocate;
yet, not only did he participate in covering up Bullock's retaliatory actions against Prof. Martin for
reporting sexual harassment, but he personally admitted to committing illegal age discrimination. Ms.
Martin has therefore asked to amend her Complaint to add in a claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).
It is also worth noting that, while Prof. Martin was removed from the faculty, the same Appointments
Committee, during the same year, granted tenure to Prof. Reginald L. Robinson, despite complaints that
Prof. Robinson's "sexual jokes," which he repeatedly e-mailed to faculty and staff, were offensive and
might cause Howard to be faced with a claim of hostile work environment on the basis of gender. This
and other events at that time reflected Howard Law extreme insensitivity to issues of sex discrimination
and sexual harassment, as well as a disregard for accountability, under the law, for sexual harassment.
The jury found that Harrison's harassment of Prof. Martin was so severe and pervasive that it created a
hostile work environment for her. The jury also concluded that Howard did not take reasonable steps to
end the harassment in her workplace; however, oddly, and contradicting Judge Hogan's finding of law in
his 1999 decision, the jury determined that the harassment was not sexual in nature or based on her
sex/gender. This conclusion led to a jury verdict for the defendant, since Title VII jurisdiction only
applies if the harassment is based on race, sex, color, national origin or religion. The jury was clearly
confused about the definition of sexual harassment and harassment on the basis of sex, as indicated by
its request for additional instruction on the legal definition of sexual harassment. The judge refused to
provide the requested additional instruction.
Martin is the first case considering the concept of “gender profiling” in employment, under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. In 1999, the district
court judge said that it was ‘clear’ that Harrison harassed Prof. Martin based on my sex –but seven years
later, after all of the evidence was presented at trial, the same judge suddenly submitted the question to
the jury. The jurors were clearly confused on the law. They asked the court to give them additional
instruction on the definition of sexual harassment, but the judge would not provide it. Based on what
they understood the law to be, the jurors concluded that Harrison’ stalking was not sexual in nature or
based on Prof. Martin's gender. That meant that there is no statute to protect her from being stalked in
her workplace or from being fired for reporting it.
The Court of Appeals held that Ms. Martin misinterpreted Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision; however, on
October 20, 2003, Magistrate Judge Facciola, to whom Judge Hogan referred the case, specifically
detailed what issues were decided in 1999 and would not be “triable issues of fact” for the jury and what
issues would proceed to a jury at trial. The Court of Appeals discounted MJ Facciola’s interpretation of
Judge Hogan’s decision, stating that he could not overrule Judge Hogan; however, as Ms. Martin
stressed in her Brief, Reply Brief and oral argument, Judge Hogan adopted Judge Facciola’s decision as
his own, on September 16, 2005. This was not, therefore, a question of whether Ms. Martin and/or
Magistrate Facciola corrected interpreted Judge Hogan's decision; by making Magistrate Facciola's
decision his own, he confirmed that Magistrate Facciola had correctly interpreted his 1999 decision as
determining, based on the undisputed facts, Harrison's conduct constituted harassment on the basis of
sex, as a matter of law and that it would not be a triable issue of fact for the jury.
The district court also held that “groping” and “touching” are “typical” indicia of sexual harassment cases
and that since Harrison did not touch Prof. Martin, the jury had reason to find that she was not sexually
harassed.” The Court of Appeals did not address this issue. Since it has not been overturned, this
precedent set by this decision arguably requires that a woman to be assaulted in order to establish that
she was sexually harassed in her workplace.
The Court of Appeals also held that because, on one occasion in 1990, Harrison threatened Prof Bell, this
was enough to defeat Ms. Martin’s claim that Harrison harassed her because of her gender; however,
Ms. Martin repeatedly pointed out that Harrison did not stalk Prof. Bell. The legal definition of “stalking”
requires repeated acts of harassment directed toward the same victim. Harrison contacted Prof. Bell on
only one occasion, and then only to solicit his assistance in identifying the next woman he would stalk --
any woman that he believed might be the “model” for “Geneva Crenshaw.” NAWL's Amicus Brief
argues that Howard’s argument is like saying that John Hinckley did not sexually harass Jodie Foster
when he stalked her because he also attempted to kill President Reagan. NAWL argues that the fact that
a sexually harassing stalker may also have committed a violent act against a man in his lifetime does not
negate the fact that he sexually harassed a woman in another setting.
Martin also presented issues regarding actionable retaliation under Title VII, but the Court of Appeals
deemed these issues moot. Since the Court determined that Howard was free to commit any retaliatory
act against Prof. Martin for being stalked, with no Title VII penalty, the lower court’s definition of acts
that constitute actionable retaliation under Title VII was irrelevant to this case; however, the Court of
Appeals’ failure to reverse the lower court on this issue leaves the lower court’s precedent intact: an
employer may leave positions unfilled, cancel vacancies and/or convert advertised positions to positions
for which an applicant is not the best qualified, even where it is done to prevent the most qualified
applicant from being hired, in retaliation for reporting sexual harassment – or any other EEO violation,
whether based on race, national origin, religion, ethnicity, age or disability.
Ms. Martin also asked the Court to define the circumstances under which Title VII plaintiffs may be
ordered to pay the litigation costs of the defendant. The National Organization of Women (NOW)
recently ran a campaign protesting the 11th Circuit’s assessment of costs against the plaintiff in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear, after the Supreme Court ruled against her in her sex discrimination claim. NOW
and NAWL have argued that such assessments unfairly punish women who file sex discrimination
lawsuits, in good faith, in the public interest. The Court declined to address this issue at this time.
The Court of Appeals also did not explain why Dean Alice Gresham Bullock’s perjury does not require
vacating the verdict. In a July 1, 1999 memorandum to Howard’s General Counsel, Bullock admitted
that she perceived Harrison as a threat to Prof. Martin and “other women” on campus; yet, at trial, she
testified that she never perceived Harrison’s harassment as sexual harassment, or harassment based on
sex/gender. Although both Howard and Bullock's individual lawyer filed separate Briefs, neither Howard
nor her own personal counsel has denied that Bullock committed perjury at trial.
Martin also raised the issue of "gender profiling" in the employment discrimination context. Just as
"racial profiling" targets victims based on race, victims are "profiled" on the basis of their sex when they
are targeted for harassment because they fit a certain "profile" that is dependant upon gender. Just as
"driving while Black" creates a disproportionate risk of arrest for African-Americans, "working while
female" creates a disproportionate risk of being stalked or otherwise harassed in the workplace. This may
occur when a harasser targets a woman because she resembles a character in a book or a celebrity. The
harasser may also target a woman to fulfill a gender specific role, such as "wife," "mother" or
"daughter."
The precedent set in Martin, with respect to gender, will also apply to racial profiling and profiling based
on other protected categories such as race, national origin, age, disability or religion. The implementation
of EEOC Regulation 29 CFR 1604.11(e), affects not just women, with respect to sexual harassment, but
also other racial, ethnic, religious, age and disability groups unprotected where they are targeted for
harassment, in the workplace, by non-employees (e.g., Maupin v. Howard County Board of Education,
Howard County, Maryland Circuit Court (July 2, 2007) (an African-American teacher received
intimidating calls at work from a purported member of Ku Klux Klan and her request for security was
denied).
This case presents the Court with yet another precedent-setting issue. The trial court, via, Chief Judge
Hogan, ordered Ms. Martin to pay Howard University's litigation costs, without notice or opportunity to
be heard on the factors that are to be considered when assessing costs against a Title VII plaintiff. Ms.
Martin filed an Opposition to Defendant's Bill of Costs based on the law of other circuits and related
Supreme Court law. Judge Hogan refused to even consider any arguments against assessing costs
against her. This issue is also on appeal. Ms. Martin and NAWL ask the Court to define the
circumstances under which Title VII plaintiffs may be ordered to pay the litigation costs of the
defendant. The National Organization of Women (NOW) recently ran a campaign protesting the 11th
Circuit’s assessment of costs against the plaintiff in Ledbetter v. Goodyear, after the Supreme Court
ruled against her in her sex discrimination claim. NOW and NAWL have argued that such assessments
unfairly punish women who file sex discrimination lawsuits, in good faith, in the public interest.
Before filing the appeal, Ms. Martin filed motions for judgment on all of her claims, as a matter of law,
asking the Court to set aside the jury verdict. See Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Sexual
Harassment Claim, and Reply; Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Retaliation Claims and Reply;
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Breach of Contract Claim and Reply. Howard has also filed
motions for judgment on all claims, even though the jury verdict was in its favor. See Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on Plaintiff's Sexual Harassment Claim; Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on her Retaliation Claims; Plaintiff's Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on her Breach of Contract Claim. .
This case demonstrates, among other things, the incredible delay that a plaintiff must endure while
awaiting justice and the loss of the quality of life and family while the plaintiff waits for remedial relief.
The case was delayed largely due to Howard University's refusal to produce discovery, which they only
produced after three orders to do so and being held in Contempt of Court. Ms. Martin filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment, accompanied by a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, in October of 2002.
See also Martin's Reply to Howard University's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Statement of
Disputed Material Facts. Ms. Martin moved the Court to Strike Howard's Motion for Summary
Judgment because it relied on testimony specifically excluded from the record; however, the Magistrate
Judge ignored her motion and his own order and considered Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment
relying on precluded testimony. See Martin's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Reply to Howard's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike. Ms. Martin waited three
years for the Court to decide the cross-motions for summary judgment.
The appeals process has also been extraordinarily delayed because the Court Reporter, who is a member
of Judge Hogan's staff, actually withheld transcripts from Ms. Martin that she had paid for in advance,
some of which were completed and docketed, but kept in Judge Hogan's chambers, rather than in the
Clerk's office for the public to access them. See Plaintiff's Motion to Integrate Plaintiff's Direct Trial
Testimony into the Official, Certified Transcript.
Ms. Martin understands what is it like to experience illegal retaliation, having been left to start her
career from the bottom of the ladder, after working for seventeen years to reach the height of her
career. As a single mother who lost her source of support and income at age 40, she understands that,
despite any monetary relief that may eventually be granted, the is no remedy that can restore to plaintiffs
or their families for the lost years of financial hardship and the qualify of life caused by illegal
discrimination.
Martin v. Howard University is cited in numerous treatises, law review articles and websites, dating back
to 1999.
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| Law Offices of Dawn V. Martin Martin v. Howard University |
Prof. Martin was harassed by a serial
campus stalker who was looking for
his ideal "wife" -- modeled after a
fictional female character in a book.
Her contract was “not renewed” after
she asked the university to implement
its own security procedures to bar the
stalker from the law school. Students
circulated petitions and wrote letters of
protest to then Dean Alice Gresham
Bullock when Prof. Martin's contract
was not renewed. You can hear Ms.
Martin tell her story, in her own voice,
by clicking on to the tape recordings of
her guest appearances on the radio
shows of Bernie McCain, on WOL/FM
and Ambrose Lane, on WPFW/FM by
clicking onto the icons below.
campus stalker who was looking for
his ideal "wife" -- modeled after a
fictional female character in a book.
Her contract was “not renewed” after
she asked the university to implement
its own security procedures to bar the
stalker from the law school. Students
circulated petitions and wrote letters of
protest to then Dean Alice Gresham
Bullock when Prof. Martin's contract
was not renewed. You can hear Ms.
Martin tell her story, in her own voice,
by clicking on to the tape recordings of
her guest appearances on the radio
shows of Bernie McCain, on WOL/FM
and Ambrose Lane, on WPFW/FM by
clicking onto the icons below.
Prof. Martin is pictured with some of her students at Howard
Law School, in 1998.
Law School, in 1998.