Page Title

See also Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on Plaintiff's Claim of Sexual Harassment

As discussed under MartinvHowardU, trial was finally held from April 3-28, 2006. The jury found that Prof.
Martin was harassed by the homeless, delusional stalker in her workplace, but oddly, and contradicting
Judge Hogan's finding of law in his 1999 decision, found that the found that the harassment was not based
on her sex The is set for was not "sexual" or on the basis of her sex. This conclusion led to a jury verdict for
the defendant, since Title VII jurisdiction only applies if the harassment is based on race, sex, color, national
origin or religion. Ms. Martin has filed motions for judgment on all of her claims, as a matter of law, asking
the Court to set aside the jury verdict. See Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Sexual Harassment Claim,
and Reply; Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Retaliation Claims and Reply; Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
on her Breach of Contract Claim and Reply. Howard has also filed motions for judgment on all claims, even
though the jury verdict was in its favor. See Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on
Plaintiff's Sexual Harassment Claim; Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on her
Retaliation Claims; Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on her Breach of Contract Claim.

If Chief Judge Hogan does not set aside the jury verdict, Ms. Martin will appeal this decision. The verdict
clearly reflects a misunderstanding by the jury as to what constitutes sexual harassment or harassment on
the basis of sex. Judge Hogan held, in 1999 "It is clear from Mr. Harrison's own description of his search for
'Geneva Crenshaw" or 'Valerie Edwards' that he targeted women other than Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that Mr.
Harrison's pursuit of her as his 'wife' was inherently sexual in nature since it was clear that she would not
have been sought by Mr. Harrison as his wife if she were a man. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that she was
being stalked by Harrison and that stalking is primarily a crime against women, with sexual connotations ....
In this case, it is clear that Plaintiff was only the object of Mr. Harrison's attention because she was a female;
therefore, the alleged stalking activities do appear to have been "because of sex" eve if they were not
inherently sexual in nature." For Chief Judge Hogan's precedent-setting 1999 decision, see
Martin_v_HU_1999 and MartinvHUPressRelease.

Martin v. Howard University
Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Sexual
Harassment Claim

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____
                          )
Dawn V. Martin,                        )
                          )
v.                                 )
                          )        Case No. 1:99CV01175
Howard University, et. al.                )        Judge: TFH
                          )

PLAINTIFF’S         REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM

I.        Howard Argues that it should Prevail, Based on Bullock’s Perjured Testimony, in Violation of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(3) and 11, and the Evidence of Record

A.        Howard Improperly Asks this Court to Uphold a Verdict Founded on Bullock’s Perjury
As discussed in May 8, 2006 Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment (Docket # 461), pages 20-22, and her May 23, 2006
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment (Docket # 472), pages 8-12, Howard’s former Law School
Dean, Alice Gresham Bullock, perjured herself at trial when she testified that she did not perceive Harrison’s
stalking or Prof. Martin on campus as “harassment” or based on her gender or status as a woman. In a July 1,
1999 memorandum to Howard’s General Counsel (Plaintiff’s Trial Ex. 8b), page 1, Bullock admitted that she
was specifically aware, by no later than December 1, 1997, that Harrison posed the threat that he might “stalk”
or “harass” Prof. Martin and “other women” on campus.
Howard makes absolutely no apology or excuse for Dean Bullock’s blatant perjury. Howard has implicitly
admitted that Bullock perjured herself.   Howard then argues that the Court should ignore Bullock’s perjury! On
page 16 of its Opposition, Howard demands that the Court “must not consider” Plaintiff’s Trial Ex. 8b – the very
document that demonstrates that Bullock’s trial testimony constituted perjury because it was not admitted into
the record. As discussed below, Howard’s statement is false; however, even if it were true, the Court may not
ignore Bullock’s perjury. The former Dean, and a current law professor, of a nationally recognized law school,
has perjured herself in order to obtain a verdict for the law school! Howard now asks the Court to allow the
verdict –founded on this perjured testimony – to stand, rewarding Bullock’s perjury and Howard’s attorneys’
Rule 11 violations!
As discussed in Plaintiff’s Motion, pages 2-3, 18, 30, and Plaintiff’s Opposition (# 472), pages 2, 12, a party may
obtain relief from a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), based upon the adverse party’s commission of
fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct. Any such misrepresentation to the Court simultaneously
constitutes a violation of Fed. Civ. R. P. 11 (b)(1). Rule 60(b) prohibits a judgment based on a jury award
derived from perjured testimony.   The jury’s verdict must therefore be set aside.
B.        Howard Falsely Claims that Bullock’s July 1, 1999 Memorandum to Howard’s General Counsel was not
Admitted into the Record

Howard falsely claims that Plaintiff’s Trial Ex. 8B, Dean Alice Gresham Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memorandum to
Norma Leftwich, General Counsel for Howard University, was not admitted into the record. Contrary to Howard’
s assertion, the Court confirmed that Plaintiff’s Trial Ex. 8b was admitted into evidence at trial. Howard is
feigning confusion with a related exhibit, “8a” which was apparently not offered into evidence.
The Court did take time to search the record for clarification on this exhibit before Plaintiff could present her
“Chart of Howard’s Changing Defenses” to the jury during closing argument. Because the record did not reflect
the admission of Exhibit 8(a), Plaintiff had to “cover up” references to Ex. 8a in her chart.   Plaintiff was permitted,
however, to leave in all references – and even write in references – to Ex. 8b, which the Court determined had
been admitted in to the record. Plaintiff specifically used and referenced the charts, including references to Ex.
8b, in her closing argument.
C.        Howard Ignored the Undisputed Testimony of Dean Newsom and Plaintiff
On page 16 of its Opposition, Howard argues that the Court “must not consider Plaintiff’s argument that Deans
Bullock and Newsom recognized Harrison as a threat to Plaintiff and other women because this evidence was
not presented at trial.” In addition to Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 8(b), Howard is completely ignoring the testimony of
both Plaintiff and Dean Newsom, both in their depositions and at trial, that Newsom expressed his belief to her
that Harrison posed a threat to her and “other women” on campus. Plaintiff’s Motion at 16-18, 20-22; See Pl.’s
MSJ at 12. The evidence is clear and undisputable, that Deans Bullock and Newsom, as well as Howard’s
additional agent, Howard University Campus Officer Sirleaf and Prof. Taslitz, always understood that Prof. Martin’
s memoranda entitled “Security Problem on Campus” and her conversations with them about Harrison,
constituted complaints of harassment, based on her sex.
D.        Howard Ignores Taslitz’ Admissions and Misstates Sirleaf’s Testimony
Howard has not addressed the fact that Prof. Taslitz, whom Howard has designated a binding agent, advised
Prof. Martin to call the police, telling her “Howard’s security is for sh-t. You’ll be raped and killed right in front of
that security booth.”   (Emphasis added) Clearly, by using the word “rape,” Prof. Taslitz understood Harrison to
pose a threat of sexual assault to Prof. Martin.
On page 4 of its Opposition, Howard falsely states that Officer Sirleaf testified that he believed that Harrison’s
conduct was a “’criminal matter’ and not motivated by sex or Plaintiff’s gender.” Howard has blatantly
misrepresented Officer Sirleaf’s testimony. Officer Sirleaf testified, clearly, both in his deposition and at trial,
that he understood Harrison’s pursuit of Prof. Martin, as his desired “wife” to be both sexual in nature and
based on her gender, or status as a woman. In fact, Howard contradicts itself, by acknowledging, on page 11,
that Sirleaf found Harrison’s pursuit of Prof. Martin as his “wife” to be inherently sexual in nature. Although
Howard has not designated Officer Sirleaf as a “binding” agent of the University, with respect to all of his
statements, he was an agent of Howard, in the context of respondeat superior. Officer Sirleaf was the first
Howard employee who recorded Plaintiff’s complaint in a written report.
As discussed in Plaintiff’s Motion, pages 16-18, and her Opposition to Defendant’s Motion, pages 3, 10-11,
Mrs. Bruner and even Howard’s law students understood Harrison’s stalking of Prof. Martin to be harassment
based on her status as a woman.
E.        Howard Ignores Plaintiff’s March 6, 1998 Memorandum
Harrison’s own January 12, 1998 letter to the Valerie Edwards in Toronto states his pursuit of the embodiment
of “Geneva Crenshaw” as a pursuit of various women – specifically African-American women – who meet the
profile of this fictional character. In addition to Harrison’s own description of his objects of desire, Prof. Martin
made repeated references to Harrison’s pursuit of her as a woman – as did Dean Newsom and Officer Sirleaf.
Howard has again misrepresented the record, on page 15 of its Opposition, where it states:
Plaintiff “never notified the University, between November, 1997, and April, 1998, that she perceived or
characterized Harrison’s conduct as sexual harassment or violative of Title VII until after it became clear to
Plaintiff, in April , 1998, that HUSL would not reappoint her to the law school faculty – and that’s when Plaintiff
filed her EEOC charge (May 1998).

In fact, Prof. Martin explicitly identified his pursuit of her not just as a woman, but as an African-American
women, as is documented in her March 6, 1998 Memorandum, page 2, fn. 1. (Ex. A) March 6, 1998 was a full
month and a half prior to Howard’s April 20, 1998 rejection of Prof. Martin for a faculty position. Her March 6,
1998 memorandum expressed what she had consistently been expressing verbally since the stalking began.
II.        Howard Refuses to Acknowledge that Crimes may also Constitute Sexual Harassment
On pages 2-6 and 15 of its Opposition, Howard insists upon pretending that it does not grasp the well
established conclusion of law that criminal acts may also constitute violations of civil law. As discussed in
Plaintiff’s Motion, pages 16-18, and her Opposition to Defendant’s Motion, page 16, criminal acts, including
stalking, may certainly constitute sexual harassment, in violation of Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act,
when they take place in the workplace.
As discussed on page 15 of her Motion and 16 of her Opposition, the D.C. statute defining stalking specifically
describes it as a severe form of harassment, using the terms and “harass” and “harassment.” Since Howard
repeatedly told jurors that Prof. Martin did not even allege harassment because she did not use the word
“harassment,” but used the word “stalking” instead, it was important for the jury to understand that term
“stalking” actually necessarily included the acts of “harassment.” A stalking complaint is a harassment
complaint – indeed, it is a complaint of harassment so severe that it rises to the level of being a crime.
III.        Howard Falsely Represents that Prof. Martin “Admittedly” Failed to Notify Howard of Conduct Constituting
Sexual Harassment

On page 5 of its Opposition, Howard repeats is false assertion that Prof. Martin “admittedly” failed to Howard’s
administration on notice that she perceived Harrison as pursuing her on the basis of sex. Plaintiff has
absolutely never made any such admission. To the contrary, she has repeatedly and consistently testified and
alleged that she always perceived Harrison’s pursuit of her as his wife as sexual in nature and based on her
sex. Plaintiff has also testified that, based on the responses of all of Howard’s employees – Deans,
professors, security officers and the Director of Faculty Services, Mrs. Bruner, that everyone who heard the story
of Harrison also perceived his pursuit of her as sexual in nature and/or based on her sex.
Howard further repeats its false claim that Prof. Martin did not comply with Howard’s EEO policy. As Plaintiff has
repeatedly pointed out, Howard’s own policy states that an employee may make a sexual harassment
complaint to the EEO officer or to his or her direct supervisor. There is no question that Prof. Martin reported
Harrison’s conduct to both of her supervisors – the Dean and Associate Deans of the law school. It would have
been ludicrous for her to go to main campus, miles away, and report to the EEO officer that a non-employee
was stalking her in her workplace. The EEO officer would have no one to charge unless and until it was clear
that the Dean would not take appropriate action and/or that the Dean was retaliating against her. When this
became clear to Prof. Martin, she appropriately filed her EEO charges. Prof. Martin filed both and EEOC charge
and an internal grievance, including EEO charges, on May 14 and 15, 1998, respectively.
It was only once it became clear that Dean Bullock was not taking the action she claimed, in writing, she was
taking, and that Howard’s security was not following its own policies and procedures with respect to barring the
harasser from campus, that Prof. Martin could file an internal EEO claim or an external EEOC charge. Prof.
Martin could not file an EEO charge against Harrison – a non-employee. The EEO claim against the University
only arose after it became clear that the University failed and refused to take the reasonable steps necessary to
end the hostile work environment. In this case, the reasonable means to ending that hostile work environment
was by keeping Harrison out of the workplace and holding him for police if he showed up on campus. These
reasonable means would have been accomplished by Campus Security – not an EEO officer on main campus,
miles away.
On page 6 of its Opposition, Howard strains to attribute thoughts to Teresa Guerrant, Esquire, that she never
said or implied. Howard claimed that Ms. Guerrant “did not counsel or urge her friend to file a sexual
harassment complaint with or against the University.” Howard omits any time frame or distinction between
filing a charge “within” or “against” the agency. Howard’s attorneys never asked Ms. Guerrant whether she
counseled her friend, Prof. Martin to file these charges or whether Prof. Martin informed her that she intended to
file these charges. The question was limited to the period of time that Prof. Martin was attempting to work with
Howard’s administration to provide the requested security to keep Harrison out of her workplace. Howard’s
attorneys clearly avoided asking Ms. Guerrant whether she counseled her friend to file an EEOC charge at any
time or whether Prof. Martin discussed her May 14 and 15, 1998 EEO and EEOC charges with Ms. Guerrant
before she filed them. Clearly, Howard’s attorneys realized that Prof. Martin very likely did discuss these
charges with her closest friend, also an attorney with expertise in EEO law. Howard’s attorneys therefore chose
not to ask that question.
The administration’s response was, instead, retaliation against Prof. Martin, in the form of efforts to further
harass her and to remove her from the faculty. As this became clear, Prof. Martin first attempted to appeal to
Dean Bullock, her colleagues and even University President Swygart, in March and April of 1998, before taking
formal action against the University. When all else failed, Prof. Martin filed the timely charge and grievance, in
May of 1998.
Plaintiff was under no obligation to file the charge or grievance any sooner and acted reasonably in first trying to
work the matter out without litigation. Certainly, this is not a reason to fault her to strip her of the right to
ultimately sue, as she did.
IV.        Howard’s Argument that Plaintiff’s Fear Should have Ended on January 12, 1998 is Baseless
On page 6 of its Opposition, Howard takes the ridiculous position that Prof. Martin should have taken Harrison
at his “face-value” word, in his letter to Valerie Edwards, Esquire, in Toronto, that he would no longer pursue
her. Howard ignores the fact that all information provided to Prof. Martin about Harrison – from himself, from
police, and from the homeless shelter here he lived – indicated that Harrison is a delusional, unstable stalker
with a criminal record and a history of violence. Such a person cannot reasonably be expected to keep his word
or even to have honestly expressed his intent, let alone, not to “change his mind” about what African-American
female law professor might be the physical embodiment of the fictional character, Geneva Crenshaw, after all. If
Harrison ran out of additional candidates, there was no reason to believe that he would not return to a previous
fixation.
This was not a case of “mistaken identity” as Howard insists upon pretending. There was never a real person
to identify. There was no physical description and Harrison pursued African-American women who bore no
resemblance to each other. Harrison had a fixation on a woman created from imagination, and who embodied
certain intellectual characteristics and political beliefs. This “amorphous” description – and his own belief that
the “real” Geneva would not necessarily know that she was the real Geneva, could certainly cause a man like
Harrison to return to convince a woman he deemed to be Geneva that she was, in fact, the model for the
character and thus, his “natural wife.”
Harrison’s January 12, 2998 letter was frightening – not comforting, as Howard suggests. Not only did Prof.
Martin find it frightening, but Dean Newsom responded to the Toronto letter by exclaiming, “Oh shit!” Newsom
added that Harrison could come back not just for Prof. Martin, but also for Profs. Cunningham or Crooms, who
also wrote and taught in areas touching on issues of critical race theory.   Despite Newsom’s exclamation of
concern, Howard did absolutely nothing to keep Harrison out of the workplace after January 12, 1998. Still, no
Alert Notices were posted, no Bar Notice was issued, no memos were circulated among faculty, students or
staff, and no announcements were made at faculty or other meetings regarding Harrison. Howard took
absolutely no measures to keep Harrison from freely entering the law school premises at any time, without
warning.
V.        Howard Misrepresents the Court’s 1999 Decision and Issues Identified to be Decided by a Jury
On page 8 of its Opposition, Howard has flagrantly misrepresented the Court’s “preamble” as stating that:
“whether Harrison’s conduct towards Plaintiff constituted sexual harassment was to be ‘decided by a jury.’” In
fact, the preamble absolutely does not identify the issue of whether Harrison’s conduct constituted sexual
harassment, or harassment on the basis of sex, as one of the issues left to be decided by a jury. The
“preamble,” or introduction, actually states:
On all other counts, Defendants' Motion will be denied because those claims present material issues of fact
which must be decided by a jury

Martin v. Howard University, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *1-2 (D.D.C. 1999).
As discussed in Plaintiff’s Motion, pages 11-13, and her Opposition, pages 11-12, Chief Judge Hogan held:
It is clear from Mr. Harrison's own description of his search for "Geneva Crenshaw" or "Valerie Edwards" that he
targeted women other than Plaintiff: "the only method available to me as far as finding Valerie was the most
primitive means of choosing the name 'Valerie' from within the vast array of academic category and pursuing it.
Eventually, I had lost even the name 'Valerie' and pursued others." Plaintiff argues that Mr. Harrison's pursuit of
her as his "wife" was inherently sexual in nature since it was clear that Plaintiff was being pursued as a woman
and that she would not have been sought by Mr. Harrison as his wife if she were a man. Moreover, Plaintiff
claims that she was being stalked by Mr. Harrison and that stalking is primarily a crime against women, with
sexual connotations.

A hostile work environment may be established if the harassment is "because of sex," even if not sexual in
nature. Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1999); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 971 (10th Cir.
1991); Hall v. Gus Const. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988). In this case, it is clear that Plaintiff was only
the object of Mr. Harrison's attention because she was a female; therefore, the alleged stalking activities do
appear to have been "because of sex" even if they were not inherently sexual in nature. (Emphasis added)

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *8-11.

Howard ignores Judge Hogan’s language, “it is clear …” that Harrison only focused on Plaintiff because she
was female – but this is the language that he used, whether Howard acknowledges it or not. Judge Hogan did
not usurp the province of the jury by deciding this issue, as a matter of law. Howard never disputed that Plaintiff
received the letters that she alleged that she received from Harrison or from the law firm in Toronto. Howard did
not dispute that Harrison existed, that he was fixated on the Geneva Crenshaw character, or that he claimed, in
his letters, that he was pursuing Prof. Martin in the hopes that she would be his “wife.” It was never a disputed
fact that Harrison was “enamored” with the legs of a former object of his pursuit, Valerie Edwards, or that he
was making comparisons about between Prof. Martin and his original “Valerie Edwards,” referring to Prof.
Martin as “this Valier Edwards look-alike” who was “prettier” and more “voluptuous” than he remembered the
original Valerie Edwards.
Judge Hogan had every right, based on the undisputed facts, to make the determination of law that Harrison’s
pursuit of Prof. Martin and other women, as the physical embodiment of Geneva Crenshaw, whom he believed
was his “natural wife,” constituted pursuit that was sexual in nature and/or based on Prof. Martin’s sex/gender or
status as a woman.
As discussed in Plaintiff’s Motion, pages 18-20, and her Opposition, pages 17-18, 11, the issues of fact that
Chief Judge Hogan did identify to be determined by a jury were: 1) whether Harrison’s conduct constituted
harassment so severe and pervasive that it created a hostile work environment for Prof. Martin; and 2) whether
Howard took reasonable steps to eliminate the hostile work environment. These are, in fact, the issues that the
jury decided – both in Plaintiff’s favor. These factual determinations entitle Plaintiff to judgment, as a matter of
law.
VI.        Howard Purports to Know What Judge Hogan was Thinking During Trial
As discussed in Plaintiff’s Motion, at 10, 12-13, that the Court stopped Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Otey, from
continuing a line of questioning of Officer Sirleaf, to whether he perceived Plaintiff’s complaint regarding
Harrison as one that was “sexual in nature” or based on her sex.   Since Officer Sirleaf was an agent of Howard,
and the first Howard employee who recorded Plaintiff’s complaint in a written report, his understanding of
Plaintiff’s complaint as sexual, or based on her sex, is imputed to the University. Officer Sirleaf testified that he
did interpret Harrison’s conduct to be sexual in nature because he pursued her as his “wife.” As Officer Sirleaf
began to elaborate on his perception of a husband and wife relationship as inherently sexual, the Court
interrupted the witness and Plaintiff’s counsel, saying, “It’s obvious, move on.”
On page 11 of its Opposition, Howard purports to read Judge Hogan’s mind and struggles to twist his words at
trial, claiming that Judge Hogan actually meant something other than what he actually said. Howard argues:
This Court admonished Plaintiff’s counsel to move on with his questioning because counsel was belaboring a
point that had already been made by the witness. In this case, the Court may have stated that the point that
Officer Sirleaf as making as a witness was “obvious and to move on.” … Here, this statement by the Court, for
Plaintiff’s counsel to move on, was an effort by the Court to urge Plaintiff to efficiently prosecute her case, which
took more than three weeks to present.

First, Dr. Sirleaf was the fourth witness in this trial.   Dr. Sirleaf testified on the first full day of witness testimony.
The first three witnesses had limited testimony and were finished quickly.    Dr. Sirleaf’s testimony was not
“belabored” or unnecessarily extended. Dr. Sirleaf was a key witness who set the stage for the entire trial and
established the commencement of the relationship between Prof. Martin, Howard campus security, the D.C.
Police Department, Howard’s administration, and the roles that each of them initially assumed and maintained
with respect to Prof. Martin’s complaint that Harrison was harassing her in her workplace.
Second, the question of whether Harrison’s conduct was perceived by Howard personnel as “based on sex,”
and whether Prof. Martin reported it to Howard personnel in terms that conveyed to them that she understood
Harrison’s conduct to be based on sex, actually determined the outcome in this case; accordingly, even if
Plaintiff’s counsel had been “belaboring” it, it was apparently a point worth belaboring and he should have been
permitted to pursue it.
VII.        Juror Confusion on the Law, Regarding, “Wife,” Gender and Sexual Harassment
A.        Juror Confusion on the Definition of “Wife”
On page 10 of its Opposition (see also page 14), Howard states:
According to Plaintiff, “wife” is defined as a married woman.” This argument lacks merits (sic) and cannot be
squared with the facts that were presented at trial.

Of course, it is not simply “according to Plaintiff,” that “wife” is defined as a married woman.” It is the definition
provided by English language dictionaries, as Plaintiff stated in her motion. To erase any doubt and to ensure
that the record is complete on the plain English language definition of “wife,” Plaintiff has provided definitions of
the word from the Cambridge University Press Dictionary, 2006, the Merriam-Webster On line Dictionary, 2006
and The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, copyright 2006 (collectively
submitted as Ex. B) These dictionaries define “wife” as:
1)        “the woman to whom a man is married” (Cambridge University Press);
2)        “a woman joined to a man in marriage; a female spouse” (American Heritage)
3)        “1 a dialect: WOMAN b: a woman acting in a specified capacity – used in combination <fishwife> 2: a
female partner in marriage” (Merriam-Webster).
Although Howard argues that the definition of “wife” does not restrict the person to a woman, or female, Howard
has provided no definition or authority for a definition that does not definite the term “wife” as a woman or
female. On page 13 of is Opposition, fn. 4, Howard states:
The statement by the jurors, “wives are typically female,” clearly show that the jurors understood that wives may
not necessarily or conclusively be female. (Emphasis added)

Howard’s footnote actually makes Plaintiff’s point: the jury misunderstood the meaning of the word “wife” and
was confused about the legal analysis to be applied to issues involving gender, harassment based on sex and
sexual harassment, as exhibited by its repeated request for additional instructions on these issues. In addition,
the jury did not apply the term “wife” to the facts of this case or as used by Harrison himself.   Even if another
harasser had his own definition of “wife” – which clearly showed that he defined “wife” as male or as either
male or female, the harasser in this case, Leonard Harrison, perceived his wife as female and only female. He
pursued only women to fulfill this role and or fantasy for him.
Howard argues that since Harrison confronted Prof. Derrick Bell and threatened his life, the jury could have
concluded that Harrison stalked both men and women African-American professors; however, as Plaintiff
discussed in her Motion, page 7. fn. 3 and her May 8, 2006 Motion for Judgment on her Breach of Contract
Claim (Docket # 463), page 29, Harrison did not create a hostile work environment for Prof. Bell. Harrison’s
conduct did not permeate Bell’s workplace. Harrison confronted Bell on one occasion. Harrison certainly did
not pursue Bell personally as his “wife.” Harrison did not refer to Prof. Bell’s “legs” or other physical attributes.
Harrison did not indicate, in any way, that Prof. Bell was “voluptuous” or otherwise sexually desirable to
Harrison. There was nothing sexual in nature about his confrontation with Bell. Instead, Harrison attempted to
enlist Prof. Bell in his quest for finding the woman that could be his Geneva Crenshaw or natural wife. Prof. Bell
did not indicate feeling threatened sexually, or that he was targeted as a man, as contrasted with Prof. Martin,
who did feel sexually threatened and who reasonably believed that she was targeted by Harrison as a woman –
as all others who heard the story also believed.
As discussed in Plaintiff’s Motion, page 7, and her Motion for Summary Judgment, pages _- -__, Prof. Bell’s
affidavit (Ex. C), proposed testimony and Martin’s recounting of what Prof. Bell told her was relevant to this case
in two ways: 1) Bell’s description of his encounter with Harrison portrays him as a violent, radical, dangerous,
delusional man, corroborating and adding to reports that she had received from the D.C. Metropolitan police
department and the homeless shelter; and 2) Bell shed additional light on Harrison’s fixation with the Geneva
Crenshaw character and his extended quest to identify the woman he believed was the model for the character
to make her his “wife.”
B.        Juror Confusion on the Law, Regarding Gender and Sexual Harassment
When the jury requested additional instructions regarding the legal definition of sexual harassment, Plaintiff
respectfully asked Judge Kessler to provide the jury with the verbatim definition stated by Judge Hogan in this
very case, in his 1999 published decision.
Specifically, a court should consider the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance; and the effect on the employee's psychological well-being. Id.

Martin v. Howard University, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at 6-7.

Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision was more comprehensive than the final jury instructions, particularly because it
would have specifically instructed the jury to consider “the effect on the employee's psychological well-being.”
Judge Hogan’s 1999 definition of sexual harassment would have been helpful to the jury because it would have
negated Howard’s repeated and “belabored” cross examination questions and closing argument stressing that
Harrison never physically assaulted Prof. Martin or otherwise physically touched her. Howard’s arguments may
well have left the jury confused about a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case had to be physically assaulted in
order to prevail on her claim.
On pages 6-7 of its Opposition, Howard argues, as it has done throughout this case and argued at trial, that
since Harrison never actually touched Plaintiff, she was not sexually harassed and no harm was done. Howard
has deliberately attempted to mislead this Court and the jury in to believing that touching, or a sexual assault,
would be necessary to prove sexual harassment in the workplace. Of course, neither Title VII nor the D.C.
Human Rights Act requires a sexual assault, or any touching of any kind, in order to establish a case of sexual
harassment.   Howard may well have confused the jury with respect to the legal requirements of a negligence
case versus a sexual harassment case.
On page 14 of its Opposition, Howard misrepresents that Judge Kessler:
concluded that the jury instructions on sexual harassment was (sic) very comprehensive, and that it was
inappropriate to add to the instructions by using phrases from Chief Judge Hogan’s 1999 opinion after the
parties had been given the opportunity, before deliberations, to draft instructions.

Actually, Judge Kessler expressly stated that Plaintiff was correct in pointing out that Judge Hogan’s definition of
sexual harassment in his 1999 published decision was more comprehensive than was his instruction to the
jury; however, Judge Kessler hesitated to add to Judge Hogan’s instruction since he did not provide the full
instruction in the first place. Plaintiff did draft proposed instructions on sexual harassment, and did include, in
her proposed instructions, excerpts from Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision. Judge Hogan elected not to use
Plaintiff’s proposed instructions.
Plaintiff objected to final instructions and particularly, the absence of instructions defining stalking and stating
the law regarding conditions under which stalking also constitutes sexual harassment in the workplace, in
violation of Title VII. Judge Hogan rejected these proposed instructions. Plaintiff could only object so many
times on so many days to the instructions drafted by the Court – particularly if since they were not clearly in error,
but could have been more incomplete.
On page 14 of its Opposition, Howard argues that that Judge Kessler was “very familiar” with the issues in this
case and had “prepared herself” to substitute for Judge Hogan. Not only does Howard purport to read Judge
Hogan’s mind (see pages 10-11, above), but it purports to read Judge Kessler’s mind as well.   Howard
purports to know how much preparation Judge Kessler had time to accomplish on this case – where Judge
Kessler announced to the parties that Judge Hogan had only asked for her potential assistance the previous
night. Moreover, Judge Kessler could not possibly have know the testimony heard over the previous four weeks,
with no transcript, nor could she have known all of the arguments made by the parties over the eight years that
this case has been litigated.
Judge Kessler could not possibly have had the history on the case that Judge Hogan had, having only a few
hours, in that, to familiarize herself with the case. In addition, Judge Kessler was clearly hesitant to add anything
to Judge Hogan’s instructions, whereas Judge Hogan did not appear to have any problem adding to his own
instructions when asked for additional guidance on the previous day. It does not appear that Judge Hogan was
consulted by telephone, or in any way notified of the jury’s specific questions for his input. The jurors needed
more direction on the law than they were provided -- which is why they requested additional instructions. They
did not receive the additional guidance they requested. They were confused on the law and their verdict reflects
that confusion.
Ironically, and the jury received its determinative instruction from a judge who had not presided over the four
weeks of trial, had presumably not read the extensive cross motions for summary judgment and responses or
the motions for judgment, as a matter of law, filed before the verdict. Judge Hogan’s unavailability to answer
these determinative questions, unduly prejudiced Plaintiff.
VIII.        Howard Misrepresents Plaintiff’s Understanding of “Protected Activity”
In its Opposition, page 10, fn. 2, Howard claims that “Plaintiff fails to understand the basic distinctions between
the law of sexual harassment and retaliation…. Here, the jury could have easily found, without ruling in Plaintiff’
s favor on the sexual harassment claim, that there was a good faith basis to believe that Plaintiff had engaged
in legitimate, protected activity, and that the University retaliated against Plaintiff for invoking her Title VII rights.

As Plaintiff discussed, citing supporting case law, in her May 8, 2006 Motion for Judgment on her Retaliation
Claims, pages 8-9, filed simultaneously with the instant motion, Plaintiff is well aware that a good faith Title VII
complaint constitutes protected activity under Title VII, as she so argued; however, in this case, the jury was not
given any instruction on this issue and no such instruction was proposed by any attorney for any party, nor was it
proposed by the Court.
In light of the undisputed evidence of record, as well as the Court’s 1999 decision, it appears that no one
involved in this case anticipated that the jury would actually determine that Harrison’s harassment of Prof. Martin
was not sexual in nature or based on her gender or that the “good faith” complaint basis of protected activity
would ever be an issue. Based on the admissions of Dean Bullock and Dean Newsom, Prof. Taslitz, and all of
the facts of record, the testimony of Officer Sirleaf, Plaintiff and all other witnesses, it is undisputed that all of
Howard’s representatives clearly understood that Harrison was pursuing Prof. Martin as a woman, and that he
would not have been pursuing her as his “wife,” or describing her as “pretty” or “voluptuous” if she were a man
or if his interest in her were not sexual.
The facts relevant to this issue were so clearly undisputed that, in 1999, Judge Hogan decided, as a matter of
law, that the undisputed facts, “it is clear” that Harrison only pursued Plaintiff because she was female. Judge
Hogan held that it “appeared” that Harrison’s pursuit of Plaintiff was “sexual in nature” – but then he went
further. Judge Hogan unequivocally held that, even if a jury could conceivably conclude that Harrison’s pursuit
was not sexual in nature, “it is clear that Plaintiff was only the object of Mr. Harrison's attention because she was
a female.” 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at 11.
IX.        Howard has not Disputed Plaintiff’s Argument Regarding Bifurcation
As discussed in Plaintiff’s Motion, pages 29-30, the Court’s decision not to bifurcate the trial by claim, as
Plaintiff requested, resulted in an overburdened, confused jury. The jury was not able to focus on the legal
questions involved in the first claim, overwhelmed by thousands of pages and hundreds of exhibits, primarily
related to the second claim. The jury needed to focus, issue by issue, on the law and the facts to clearly
understand them and to apply the relevant law to them. Howard has offered no rebuttal to this argument;
accordingly, Howard should be deemed to have conceded that the jury was overwhelmed by deciding all of the
issues together and that bifurcation would have substantially reduced the confusion.
X.        Howard has not Disputed Plaintiff’s Argument Regarding Punitive Damages
As discussed in Plaintiff’s Motion, pages 26-29, if this case is retried, the jury should have the option of
awarding punitive damages, in addition to compensatory damages. Howard has offered no rebuttal to this
argument; accordingly, Howard should be deemed to have conceded that punitive damages may be
appropriate in this case, pursuant to the case law developed under Title VII and D.C. Human Rights Act.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment, as a matter of law, on her sexual harassment claim,
should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Dawn V. Martin, Esquire
                  Law Offices of Dawn V. Martin
1090 Vermont Avenue, N.W, Suite 800
                  Washington, D.C. 20005
                  (202) 408-7040 telephone
(703) 642-0208 facsimile
DVMARTINLAW@yahoo.com
www.firms.findlaw.com/dvmartinlaw