As discussed under MartinvHowardU, trial was finally held from April 3-28, 2006. The jury found that Prof.
Martin was harassed by the homeless, delusional stalker in her workplace, but oddly, and contradicting Judge
Hogan's finding of law in his 1999 decision, found that the harassment was not based on her sex and was not
"sexual" in nature. This conclusion led to a jury verdict for the defendant, since Title VII jurisdiction only applies
if the harassment is based on race, sex, color, national origin or religion. Ms. Martin has filed motions for
judgment on all of her claims, as a matter of law, asking the Court to set aside the jury verdict. See Plaintiff's
Motion for Judgment on her Sexual Harassment Claim, and Reply; Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her
Retaliation Claims and Reply; Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Breach of Contract Claim and Reply.
Howard has also filed motions for judgment on all claims, even though the jury verdict was in its favor. See
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on Plaintiff's Sexual Harassment Claim; Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on her Retaliation Claims; Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Judgment on her Breach of Contract Claim.
If Chief Judge Hogan does not set aside the jury verdict, Ms. Martin will appeal this decision. The verdict clearly
reflects a misunderstanding by the jury as to what constitutes sexual harassment or harassment on the basis
of sex. Judge Hogan held, in 1999 "It is clear from Mr. Harrison's own description of his search for 'Geneva
Crenshaw" or 'Valerie Edwards' that he targeted women other than Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that Mr. Harrison's
pursuit of her as his 'wife' was inherently sexual in nature since it was clear that she would not have been
sought by Mr. Harrison as his wife if she were a man. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that she was being stalked by
Harrison and that stalking is primarily a crime against women, with sexual connotations .... In this case, it is
clear that Plaintiff was only the object of Mr. Harrison's attention because she was a female; therefore, the
alleged stalking activities do appear to have been "because of sex" eve if they were not inherently sexual in
nature." For Chief Judge Hogan's precedent-setting 1999 decision, see Martin_v_HU_1999 and
MartinvHUPressRelease.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____
)
Dawn V. Martin, )
)
v. )
) Case No. 1:99CV01175
Howard University, et. al. ) Judge: TFH/AK
)
)
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT, AFTER VERDICT, ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIM
Plaintiff hereby opposes Defendant’s motion for judgment, as a matter of law. Plaintiff incorporates, by reference, all
arguments made in her own pending May 8, 2006 Motions for Judgment.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
I. Legal Standard
A. Rule 50(B)
When assessing a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment after a jury verdict, the issue is whether there was sufficient evidence upon
which the jury could base its verdict. Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 752-753 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Although the
court cannot substitute its view for that of the jury, and can assess neither the credibility nor weight of the evidence, the
jury's verdict can only stand if the evidence in support of it is "significantly probative" and "more than merely colorable."
Scott at 752-753, citing Mackey v. United States, 303 U.S. App. D.C. 422, 8 F.3d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1993), (citing McNeal
v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 826 F.2d 637, 640-41 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ferguson v. F.R. Winkler GMBH & Co., 79 F.3d
1221, 1224 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 136 L. Ed. 2d 252, 117 S. Ct. 360 (1996); see also Siegel v. Mazda Motor Corp., 878 F.
2d 435, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The D.C. Circuit’s analysis is consistent with that of the U.S. Supreme Court. Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
The Court may grant judgment as a matter of law, after trial, where the facts are undisputed and/or no reasonable juror could
find for the opposing party. This standard is the same standard used in the context of motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is also appropriate where “no reasonable juror” could determine the facts in favor of the opposing party,
in light of the evidence presented. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Woodfield v. Providence Hospital,
779A.2d 933, 936 (D.C. 2001). As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has recently reaffirmed, where there is no
genuine dispute as to material facts, there are no facts for a jury to determine and this case can be decided as a matter of law.
Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889 (D.C. C. 2006).
A. Rule 59(a) and (e)
A party may also obtain relief from a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) and (e). New trials granted under Rule 59
are based on errors of law, evidentiary errors, and/or error may have influenced the jury’s decision. Ashcraft and Gerel v.
Coady, 244 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The standard for whether a new trial should be granted, pursuant to Rule 59, is
whether there was “a clear miscarriage of justice.” Warren v. Thompson, 224 F.R.D. 236, 238 (D.D.C. 2004), citing Webb v.
Hyman, 861 F. Supp. 1094, 1109-110 (D.D.C. 1994); Nyman v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp 1562, 1569 (D.D.C. 1997), quoting
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986).
B. Rule 60(b)(3)
A party may also obtain relief from a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), based upon the adverse party’s
commission of fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct. Any such misrepresentation to the Court simultaneously
constitutes a violation of Fed. Civ. R. P. 11 (b)(1), which prohibits a party from: 1) making representations to the court “for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or needless increase in the cost of litigation;” 2)
asserting “claims and defenses and other legal contentions” that are not “warranted by existing law” or are frivolous; 3)
asserting “allegations and other factual contentions” that have no “evidentiary support;” and 4) denying “factual contentions”
that are not “warranted on the evidence.”
II. Summary of Argument
Defendant’s motion for judgment is completely unsupported by the record. In addition, the jury’s verdict is contrary to all
of the undisputed evidence of record, including: 1) Judge Hogan’s rulings of law (oral and written), that Harrison’s conduct
constitutes harassment on the basis of sex; 2) admissions of Howard’s binding witnesses, Deans Bullock and Newsom, that
they fully recognized, from Plaintiff’s initial complaint, that Harrison was harassing Prof. Martin on the basis of her sex and
posed a danger to her and “other women;” and 3) statements by Prof. Taslitz, Officer Sirleaf and Mrs. Bruner, demonstrating
that they also perceived Prof. Martin’s complaints about Harrison to be complaints of harassment, based on her sex or
gender. The jury also overlooked the specific and common meaning of the word “wife,” defined in English language
dictionaries as “a married woman.” Not only must Defendant’s motion be denied, but the verdict must be set aside and
judgment granted for Plaintiff on the issue of sexual harassment/hostile work environment.
As set forth in Plaintiff’s October 9, 2002 Motion for Summary Judgment (see also electronic version, filed November 1,
2005, Docket # 330), incorporated by reference herein, the undisputed facts of record demonstrate that no reasonable juror
could conclude that Harrison’s conduct did not rise to a level creating a hostile work environment or that Howard took
reasonable steps to eliminate this hostile work environment. The jury did determine that Harrison’s harassment rose to the
level of a hostile work environment and that Howard failed to take reasonable measures to eliminate it.
There is now no question that Plaintiff endured severe and pervasive harassment in her workplace, stalked by a delusional,
violent homeless stranger with a criminal record. It is an open question as to whether Howard removed her from the faculty,
through non-renewal as a law professor, in retaliation for her requests for protection in her workplace; however, by
concluding that Harrison’s harassment was not based on Plaintiff’s gender, or sexual in nature, the jury left Plaintiff with
absolutely no remedy for wrong that it acknowledged Howard committed and the injury that the jury acknowledged she
suffered. The verdict results in substantial injustice to Plaintiff, with no remedy for egregious harm. .
III. Facts as Set Forth in Chief Judge Hogan’s 1999 Decision
Chief Judge Hogan denied Howard’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Martin v. Howard
University, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516; 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 964; 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1587 (D.D.C. 1999).
Judge Hogan summarized the facts, as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, as follows.
Plaintiff Dawn Martin was a Visiting Associate Professor at Howard University School of Law from July 1996 through May
1998.
….
Plaintiff alleges that she has been the victim of hostile work environment sexual harassment as a result of the conduct of Mr.
Leonard Harrison, a homeless person who resided in a shelter and was neither an employee nor a student of the University
but who regularly used Howard University's Law School library. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants knowingly
allowed Mr. Harrison, a man characterized by the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department as a "stalker" with a criminal record
and history of violence, free access to the law school campus and buildings, thereby facilitating his sexual harassment of
Plaintiff in her workplace. Due to this alleged inaction, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have violated both Title VII and the
DCHRA as well as caused her intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff also claims that due to her complaints,
Defendant Bullock took retaliatory measures, on five different occasions, to ensure that Plaintiff was not offered a permanent
professorship or a renewed visitorship at the Law School. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Howard University
and Howard University School of Law breached their contract with Plaintiff in failing to renew her contract or selecting her
for a tenure-track position in violation of Professor Taslitz's alleged oral promise to Plaintiff that she would placed into a
tenure track position as soon as one became available. And finally, Plaintiff claims that she was forcefully and prematurely
evicted from her office in retaliation for her filing of a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"). (Emphasis added)
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *2-4.
Judge Hogan elaborated on the facts setting forth Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Harrison sent her two letters, left three voice mail messages for her and attempted three
personal visits to Plaintiff's office, all due to his conviction that she was his "wife." Plaintiff contends that these interactions
with Mr. Harrison convinced her that this "mentally unstable homeless stranger" had conducted research on her since he
knew her middle name and the name of a course which she taught in Cleveland. Moreover, Plaintiff refers to a letter written
by Mr. Harrison to Attorney Valerie Edwards in Canada as evidence that Mr. Harrison's pursuit of Plaintiff was sexual in
nature: "Verily, it appeared that this Valerie Edwards look-alike was actually a taller, more youthful, prettier and (forgive me
for saying) more voluptuous woman than the Valerie Edwards whom I had met and known at Lakeside. . . .The truth is, I had
never looked at Valerie Edwards full in the face, on account of painful bashfulness -- while enamored by her person and both
distracted and infatuated with her legs -- and so was not aware of her exact features." (Emphasis added)
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *9-10.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges eight instances of sexual harassment: two letters, hand-delivered to Plaintiff's office; three phone
calls to Plaintiff's direct line which were picked up by her voice mail; and three personal visits to Plaintiff's office, although
Plaintiff was out of her office during the first two visits and the Security Officer chased Mr. Harrison from her office at the
third visit.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *12.
At trial, and even in the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the facts as alleged above were well-established by the
testimony of Howard’s own security officers, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department records and testimony, Plaintiff’s
testimony, letters written by Harrison, and even Howard’s Law School Dean and Associate Dean. The facts, as stated above,
were completely undisputed by any evidence presented by Howard. Not only must Howard’s motion for judgment be
denied, but the jury’s verdict cannot stand. The verdict is not only unsupported by the undisputed evidence of record, but
the evidence expressly and directly contradicts the verdict, as well as Judge Hogan’s conclusions of law.
IV. The Jury Verdict and Juror Questions for Court Reflect Confusion on the Law
A. The Jury’s Verdict Form
The jury verdict form included the following questions and the following jury answers:
1. Did the Plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
a) Mr. Harrison subjected her to conduct that was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
her employment?
__X___ YES ______ NO
b) Mr. Harrison’s conduct was unwelcome?
__X___ YES ______ NO
c) Mr. Harrison’s conduct was sexual in nature or because of Plaintiff’s gender?
______ YES __X___ NO
d) Howard University knew or should have know of the alleged conduct?
__X___ YES ______ NO
e) Howard University failed to take proper remedial action that was reasonably calculated to end the harassment?
__X___ YES ______ NO
The jury’s response to “1C” directly contradicts:
1) Judge Hogan’s 1999 conclusions of law;
2) Judge Hogan’s judicial notice during trial that the term “wife” has sexual implications;
3) the dictionary definition of the term “wife;” and
4) Howard’s own admissions that when Prof. Martin reported Leonard Harrison’s stalking of her on campus, Howard
understood Harrison’s conduct to pose the threat that Harrison would “stalk” or “harass” not only Prof. Martin, but also
“other women” on Howard’s campus.
B. The Jury’s Request for Additional Instructions on Sexual Harassment Demonstrates the Jurors’ Confusion over the
Law
The jury’s conclusion that Harrison’s conduct was not based on sex was based on its misunderstanding of the law with
respect to sexual harassment, as evidenced by the questions it sent to the Court requesting more detailed definitions and
instructions on the law.
On April 27, 2006, at 12:00 p.m., the jurors sent a note to the Court stating:
Jurors want an explanation under hostile work environment, 1.a.
(1) what is meant by “the terms and conditions of her employment”?
(2) p. 23 # 4 what constitutes “damages.” (sic)
The parties agreed on a definition of “damages” as “harm or injury, whether psychological, emotional, financial, or physical.”
This Court accepted this instruction and read it to the jury. The parties disagreed on the instructions for the terms and
conditions of employment. The Court modified this instruction to “The terms and conditions of her employment means the
performance of duties/work performance and her work environment,” without an explanation of the meaning of “work
environment.”
On April 28, 2006, at 11:30 p.m., the jurors sent a note to the Court stating:
“(1) Wives are typically female. Is # 1c an automatic ‘yes’ just because plaintiff is
female. (sic)
(2) Please define sexual harassment.”
The parties disagreed sharply on the instructions to be given the jury in response to both questions. Chief Judge Hogan was
not present because he was presiding over a judicial conference out of the District of Columbia. Judge Kessler presided in
Judge Hogan’s absence. When the parties arrived in Court, Judge Kessler had already written her proposed responses to the
jury questions as follows:
(1) “No, it is not an automatic “yes.” You must base your decision on the evidence presented to you;” and
(2) “Refer back to Instruction # 23, defining sexual harassment.”
Plaintiff opposed both of these instructions, pointing out that:
1) Judge Hogan held, as a matter of law, in his 1999 decision, that Harrison’s pursuit of Plaintiff as his “wife,” constituted
pursuit on the basis of sex or gender;
2) the dictionary definition of “wife” is “a married woman” – thus, female by definition;
3) an appropriate answer might instruct the jurors that if they found that Harrison pursued both men and women as his
“wife,” then the answer to #1C would be “no,” but if they found that Harrison pursued only women, or primarily women as
his “wife,” then the answer would be “yes;” and
4) Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision included a more specific and clearer definition of sexual harassment than was provided to the
jury as Instruction # 23 and the jury’s question indicated that Instruction # 23 was not clear enough and needed to be
supplemented.
Judge Kessler rejected Plaintiff’s suggestions.
Less than two hours after the jury received Judge Kessler’s instruction (referring them back to the instruction the jurors had
already deemed inadequate for them to resolve their differences), the jury returned a verdict for defendant, holding that
Harrison’s conduct, though creating a hostile work environment for Prof. Martin, which Howard failed to take reasonable
steps to eliminate, the harassment was not sexual in nature or based on Plaintiff’s sex/gender. This conclusion was clearly
based on a misunderstanding of the question and the law.
Judge Kessler may have misunderstood the jury’s questions, without the benefit of the background in this case over its eight
year saga, the lengthy cross-motions for summary judgment, trial and deposition testimony, the hundreds of exhibits
produced at trial, or Judge Hogan’s comments at trial amounting to judicial notice. The jury prefaced its question with a
factual statement, “Wives are typically female,” indicating that the jury found, as a matter of fact, that Harrison pursued
Prof. Martin based on his desire for her to be his “wife.” Having reached this factual determination, it appears that at least
some jurors believed that their job was done because pursuit of a woman as a potential wife necessarily constitutes pursuit of
her based on her gender. Apparently, there was dissention in the jury on this point, leading the jurors to ask the Court for
clarification. After Judge Kessler’s response that the answer to #1c was not “automatic,” the jurors may well have perceived
this instruction to invalidate Judge Hogan’s comment from the bench and to imply the answer that pursuit of a woman as one’
s wife does not constitute pursuit on the basis of sex.
V. Dean Bullock, Dean Newsom and other Howard Agents, Expressly Recognized that Harrison’s Harassment was
Based on Sex and/or Sexual, and that Harrison Posed a Threat to Plaintiff and “Other Women” on Campus
In her July 1, 1998 memorandum to Norma Leftwich, General Counsel for Howard University, provided as an attachment to
Howard’s Position Statement to the EEOC in response to Plaintiff’s EEOC charge of sexual harassment/hostile work
environment and retaliation, Dean Bullock admitted that she was specifically aware, by no later than December 1, 1997, that
Harrison posed a threat of stalking and harassment to Prof. Martin and “other women” on campus.
Associate Dean Newsom advised me that he thought that MPD should be called in to provide more manpower in tracking
down the individual not only to benefit Professor Martin, but also to prevent harm to other women whom this person might
stalk or otherwise harass. (Emphasis added)
Pl.’s Trial Ex. 8B and Ex. KKK-1 of Pl.’s October 9, 2002 Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ), re-filed electronically on
November 1, 2005, Docket # 330. Howard adopted Dean Bullock’s statement in its December 8, 1998 Position Statement to
the EEOC (Exhibit KKK-2 of Pl.’s M SJ ). On page 2 of the same July 1, 1997 memorandum, Dean Bullock acknowledged
that she was aware, as of December 1, 1997, that Harrison had been characterized a “dangerous” and “crazy” and should only
be approached by the police or University Security. Dean Newsom specifically admitted, both at trial and in his deposition,
that Harrison’s pursuit of Prof. Martin caused him concern about not only Prof. Martin’s safety, but also the safety of other
women on campus. See Pl.’s MSJ at 12.
At trial, Howard fraudulently argued, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, and without any evidentiary support, that neither
Deans Bullock nor Newsom, nor any other of its agents, understood Prof. Martin’s reports to indicate her belief that she was
being “harassed” or that such harassment was sexual in nature or based on her gender.
Howard has repeatedly, and fraudulently described Harrison as “a gentleman” who was in search of his “estranged wife” and
that his pursuit of Prof. Martin was a case of “mistaken identity;” yet, Howard’s administrators were well aware that this
was no “gentleman,” that there was no “estranged wife,” and that there could be no “mistaken identify” because there was no
real person, but only a fictional character in a book, to “identify.”
At trial, Howard wasted Court time attempting to elicit false testimony from witnesses to prove what it knew to be false.
At trial, Dean Bullock even testified that she did not perceive Harrison’s pursuit of Prof. Martin as sexual in nature or based
on her gender. Deans Bullock and Newsom had already acknowledged, years earlier, in their EEOC statements and
depositions, that Harrison’s conduct constituted harassment on the basis of sex. Indeed, Howard has wasted Plaintiff’s, the
EEOC’s and the Court’s time, for the past eight years, while draining Plaintiff of her limited financial resources, depriving her
of returning to her teaching career, and depriving her of the reputation and income that she enjoyed prior to her termination
from Howard, which allowed her to properly provide for her daughter during the remaining years of her childhood and
through college and graduate school.
The evidence is clear and undisputable, that Deans Bullock and Newsom, as well as Howard’s additional agent, Howard
University Campus Officer Sirleaf and Prof. Taslitz, always understood that Prof. Martin’s memoranda entitled “Security
Problem on Campus” and her conversations with them about Harrison, constituted complaints of harassment, based on her
sex.
Howard Campus Security Officer Sirleaf was an agent of Howard and the first Howard employee who recorded Plaintiff’s
complaint in a written report. His knowledge is therefore imputed to the University. Officer Sirleaf testified that he did
interpret Harrison’s conduct to be sexual in nature because he pursued her as his “wife.” Plaintiff’s undisputed testimony at
trial was that Prof. Taslitz was the first professor that she showed Harrison’s letters to, on November 20, 1997 and that
Prof. Taslitz told her, “Howard’s security is for sh-t. You’ll be raped and killed right in front of that security booth.”
(Emphasis added) Prof. Taslitz then advised Prof. Martin to call the police. Clearly, by using the word “rape,” Prof. Taslitz
understood Harrison to pose a threat of sexual assault to Prof. Martin. Mrs. Bruner also testified that she understood
Harrison’s pursuit of Prof. Martin to be sexual in nature and based on her gender. Mrs. Bruner testified that, once the
stalking began, Prof. Martin asked her to watch the Ladies’ room when she used it. Even Howard’s law students understood
Harrison’s stalking of Prof. Martin to be harassment based on her status as a woman.
There was no reason for Prof. Martin to state the “obvious” conclusion that everyone was already stating – that Harrison
posed a threat to her, as a woman, as well as to other women on campus. As Judge Hogan set forth in his 1999 decision,
there are no “magic words” to invoke Title VII. It is enough that the victim convey to his or her employer the facts that
constitute sexual harassment. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at 18. There was no need for Prof. Martin to use the legal term
“sexual harassment” in her November 5, 1997 or December 1, 1997 memos to Dean Bullock, or make any legal arguments
setting forth her potential sexual harassment claims against the University, any more than it would have been appropriate for
her to set forth the legal arguments for her potential claims of negligence, premises liability or intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Prof. Martin’s November 5, 1997 and December 1, 1997 memos were not intended to be “legal briefs” or
to threaten a lawsuit against the University. Her memos stated the facts to provide the administration with the information
necessary to stop Harrison’s stalking and the potential and/or physical and other harm to her, other women on campus,
students near her, or any other member of the University who might be hurt as “collateral damage” if this delusional,
homeless, violent stranger decided to attack her, in response to her refusal to be his “wife.”
Deans Bullock and Newsom responded to Prof. Martin’s memos by acknowledging the University’s obligation to take the
necessary actions to keep Harrison out of the workplace. Dean Bullock wrote, by memo dated December 1, 1997, that she
was discussing the matter with Director of Security Lawrence Dawson. Dean Newsom wrote, by memo dated December 22,
1997, that he was requesting that Security post an “Alert Notice” to enforce a bar notice that Prof. Martin had previously
been told was issued. Prof. Martin had no knowledge, at that time, that Dean Bullock’s written statement was false, and that
she had never discussed the stalking or Harrison with Mr. Dawson or any other member of Howard Security. Prof. Martin
did not know that the requested Bar Notice for Harrison had never even been issued, despite Officer Sirleaf’s
recommendation, as well as the recommendation of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, that a Bar Notice be issued
and enforced. Prof. Martin reasonably allowed the administration time to take the action that it promised to take and
represented that it was taking before she filed a sexual harassment charge.
The administration responded to Prof. Martin’s requests for protection, not only by concealing Harrison’s stalking from the
law school community and failing to follow its own security barring procedures, but also by retaliating against Prof. Martin
for requesting the protection from Harrison on campus, actually removing her from the faculty, despite her excellent teaching
evaluations, outstanding academic and professional credentials, scholarly publications and student protests of her non-
renewal. At this point, it was abundantly clear that Dean Bullock had no intention of providing any protection for Prof.
Martin against Harrison, but was addressing “the problem” by “getting rid” of Harrison’s “target” on campus – Prof. Martin.
Dean Bullock’s admission, repeating Dean Newsom’s admission that both Deans perceived Harrison’s stalking of Prof.
Martin on campus as “harass[ment]” that was directed as Prof. Martin and “other women” as women, demonstrates,
absolutely, that Howard’s entire “defense” was made in bad faith, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, constituting fraud,
misrepresentation and/or misconduct justifying a new trial or amended judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(B)(3). Not
only is Howard precluded from judgment as a matter of law, but Plaintiff is entitled to judgment, as a matter of law. In
addition, Rule 11 sanctions against Howard are merited, including up to a default judgment against the Defendant.
VI. Judge Hogan’s Rulings of Law, that Plaintiff’s Conduct was Based of Sex, Precludes the Jury’s Verdict by Res
Judicata and the Law of the Case
A. Judge Hogan Held that “it is Clear that Plaintiff was only the Object of Mr. Harrison's Attention because she was a
Female”
The verdict requires re-examination of Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision, the questions that it set for a jury trial and the
conclusions of law that it reached prior to trial. Judge Hogan identified Howard’s defenses, distinguishing the factual issues
to be decided by a jury from the issue that he was about to decide, as a matter of law, namely, that Harrison’s conduct, as
alleged, was based on Prof. Martin’s gender.
In this case, Defendants admit that the sufficiency of the University's response is a factual question for the jury but they
contend that Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case
of hostile work environment under Title VII. Specifically, Defendants claim that Plaintiff cannot show that Mr. Harrison's
conduct was based on sex and that Mr. Harrison's conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *8.
Judge Hogan then proceeded to address Howard’s claim that Plaintiff’s allegations did not establish that Harrison’s conduct
was sexual in nature or on the basis of sex.
Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed solely at discrimination because
of sex. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998). Workplace
harassment is not automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations. Id. "The critical issue is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Id.
It is clear from Mr. Harrison's own description of his search for "Geneva Crenshaw" or "Valerie Edwards" that he targeted
women other than Plaintiff: "the only method available to me as far as finding Valerie was the most primitive means of
choosing the name 'Valerie' from within the vast array of academic category and pursuing it. Eventually, I had lost even the
name 'Valerie' and pursued others." Plaintiff argues that Mr. Harrison's pursuit of her as his "wife" was inherently sexual in
nature since it was clear that Plaintiff was being pursued as a woman and that she would not have been sought by Mr.
Harrison as his wife if she were a man. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that she was being stalked by Mr. Harrison and that
stalking is primarily a crime against women, with sexual connotations.
A hostile work environment may be established if the harassment is "because of sex," even if not sexual in nature. Spain v.
Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1999); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 971 (10th Cir. 1991); Hall v. Gus Const.
Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988). In this case, it is clear that Plaintiff was only the object of Mr. Harrison's attention
because she was a female; therefore, the alleged stalking activities do appear to have been "because of sex" even if they were
not inherently sexual in nature. (Emphasis added)
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *8-11.
B. The Jury Verdict Contradicts Judge Hogan’s Judicial Notice During Trial
As Judge Hogan held in 1999, Harrison's pursuit of Plaintiff as his "wife" was inherently sexual, since the relationship
between a husband and a wife is expected to include sex. This fact was so “obvious” that the Court stopped Plaintiff’s
counsel, Mr. Otey, from continuing a line of questioning of Officer Sirleaf, to whether he perceived Plaintiff’s complaint
regarding Harrison as one that was “sexual in nature” or based on her sex. As Officer Sirleaf began to elaborate on his
perception of a husband and wife relationship as inherently sexual, the Court interrupted the witness and Plaintiff’s counsel,
saying, “It’s obvious, move on.”
VII. Criminal Stalking may Constitute Sexual Harassment under Title VII
Howard argued that “stalking” is a criminal matter and does not constitute sexual harassment; however, most criminal acts are
also actionable in civil law, under comparable civil theories. If an employee is sexually assaulted in her workplace, certainly,
it is a crime; however, the employer is not permitted to dismiss it as a criminal matter and allow the employee who
committed the sexual assault to continue to work with the person whom he assaulted. The employer still has a duty, under
Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act, to eliminate the sexual harassment in the workplace.
Courts have recognized that stalking is considered one of the most severe forms of sexual harassment, within the meaning of
Title VII, where it is based on sex and the victim reasonably perceives the stalker to have created a “hostile or abusive
environment” in her workplace. Crowley v. L.L. Bean, 303 F.3d 387, 396, 401-403 (Cir. 2002). Similarly, in Frazier v.
Delco Electronics Corporation, 263 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2001), the Seventh Circuit recognized that that “stalking”
constituted sexual harassment and created a hostile work environment for the plaintiff. The Eight Circuit found that where
sexual harassment was particularly severe, it could “almost” be called “stalking.” Whitmore v. O’Connor Management, Inc.,
156 F.3d 796, 798 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103, 1108 (8th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff
felt that her co-worker “was harassing her, actually, stalking her”). The First Circuit held that the plaintiff endured a hostile
work environment, based on sexual harassment that included “stalking.” Angeles-Sanchez v. Alvarado, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXUS 10509 (1st Cir. 1993).
Federal District courts have ruled consistently with the Circuit Courts. As in the present case, the plaintiff in Ramirez v.
New York Presbyterian Hospital, 129 F. Supp. 2d 676, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), appropriately used the term “stalking” to
describe acts of sexual harassment/hostile work environment. In Dolman v. Williamette University, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7772 (D. Or. 2001), in a University setting similar to the present case, the plaintiff employee of a University was stalked by
a former student, constituting sexual harassment. In Spina v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 764,
772 (D. Ill. 2002), the court held that stalking was one of the more severe and “disturbing” allegations of sexual harassment.
Chontos v. Rhea and Indiana University, 29 F. Supp. 931, 937 (N. Dist. Ind. 1998).
The D.C. Metropolitan Police Department’s characterization of Harrison’s sexual harassment of Prof. Martin as criminal
stalking highlights the severity of the sexual harassment – it certainly does not nullify it, as Howard argued. Sexual
harassment that rises to the level of criminal activity has been recognized as the most extreme form of sexual harassment in
the workplace. In Little v. Windemere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2001), the court found that where an
employee was raped by a client after a business meeting, this one incident was severe enough to create a hostile work
environment for the plaintiff in her workplace. See also Turnbull v. Topeka State Hospital, 255 F.3d 1238, 1243-1244 (10th
Cir. 2001) (a single incident of sexual assault was “abusive, dangerous and humiliating,” creating a hostile work environment
for the plaintiff, within the meaning of Title VII); Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Just as every
murder is also a battery, every rape committed in the employment setting is also discrimination on the basis of the employee’
s sex.”)
The legal definition of criminal “stalking,” as codified in D.C. Code Ann. § 22-404 (b) is:
(b) Any person who on more than one occasion … willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person,
is guilty of the crime of stalking. (Emphasis added)
(e) For purposes of this section, the term “harassing” means engaging in a course of conduct either in person, by telephone, or
in writing, directed at a specific person, which seriously alarms, annoys, frightens, or torments the person, or engaging in a
course of conduct either in person, by telephone, or in writing, which would cause a reasonable person to be seriously
alarmed, annoyed, frightened or tormented.
If the jurors had realized that the D.C. stalking statute specifically incorporates “harassment” as part of its definition, the
jury would have clearly understood that Plaintiff first alleged that she was being harassed by Harrison, as his prospective
“wife,” no later than November 21, 1997, when she filed a “stalking” complaint against Harrison with the D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department. This realization would also have bolstered Plaintiff’s credibility with the jury, with respect to all of her
claims, since Plaintiff testified that she characterized Harrison’s behavior as “harassment” when she first reported it to Dean
Newsom and Officer Sirleaf on November 20, 1997. At that time, she had not yet met with the D.C. police officers and they
had not yet classified the harassment as stalking.
Without the definition of “stalking,” the jurors were without the legal reference to intelligently evaluate Howard’s repeated
false “distinctions” between stalking and harassment, and Howard’s specific accusations that Plaintiff never raises issues of
“harassment” prior to Howard’s December 18, 1997 decision not to offer her a permanent position or a renewed visitorship
on its law school faculty. In fact, in closing arguments, Howard’s outside counsel, Mr. Shwalb, accused Plaintiff of “playing
the sexual harassment card,” after she was rejected for a permanent position on December 18, 1997, never having previously
mentioned sexual harassment. Mr. Shwalb falsely stated that Prof. Martin never even used the word “harassment” until she
filed her EEOC charge in May of 1998 and that the administration had no reason to believe that the stalking was based on sex,
despite Dean Alice Gresham Bullock and her Associate Dean, Michael Newson expressly recognized that Harrison’s
“harassment” was based on sex.
VIII. The Jury’s Answers to Factual Questions Posed by Chief Judge Hogan’s 1999 Decision Require Judgment for
Plaintiff
In sharp contrast to Plaintiff’s examination and dissection of the jury verdict, explaining the jury’s misunderstanding with
respect to sexual harassment, as a matter of law, Howard has simply renewed its pre-verdict motion for judgment, with
absolutely no discussion of any error by the jury or the court that would justify, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), setting
aside the jury’s factual conclusions that Plaintiff did endure a hostile work environment at Howard and that Howard failed to
take reasonable measures designed to eliminate the hostile work environment. Since Howard has not alleged any juror error
on these conclusions, the jury’s factual determinations on these issues should not be disturbed. Notwithstanding Howard’s
procedural failure to challenge the jury’s factual determinations, below, Plaintiff sets forth the evidence compelling the jury’s
factual findings.
The jury answered the two questions posed by Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision by finding that:
1) Harrison’s harassment was severe and pervasive, causing a hostile work environment for Prof. Martin; and 2) Howard
failed to take reasonable steps to end the hostile work environment. These are the precise questions framed by Judge Hogan
when he permitted this case to proceed to trial for a jury to determine the determining facts in this case: 1) whether Harrison’
s conduct was severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment for the Plaintiff; and 2) whether Howard
University knew or should have known of Harrison’s creation of a hostile work environment and failed to take proper
remedial action. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *7-8, 14.
A. The Jury Properly Found that Plaintiff Endured a Hostile Work Environment
Judge Hogan set out the criteria to determine whether Plaintiff endured a hostile work environment.
Plaintiff has alleged, and the Defendants do not appear to dispute, that she subjectively felt threatened by Mr. Harrison's
behavior; however, to prevail on a sexual harassment claim, Plaintiff must also show that a reasonable female would have
found these actions to be severely hostile or abusive. Whether or not Mr. Harrison intended his behavior to be abusive or
threatening is irrelevant to this inquiry. See Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1029 ("The reasonable victim standard classifies conduct
as unlawful sexual harassment even when harassers do not realize that their conduct creates a hostile work environment. . . .
Therefore, the alleged harasser's intent is unimportant and "compliments" are not a defense.")
The alleged incidents in this case may or may not be sufficiently severe or pervasive to amount to actionable sexual
harassment. However, they certainly amount to more than the "mere utterance of an epithet." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 ("mere
utterance of an. . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee would not affect the conditions of employment
to a sufficient degree to violate Title VII). Whether or not a reasonable victim would find them sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of Plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working environment is appropriately an
issue of fact for the jury, not one which this Court can summarily adjudicate. See Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1029 (holding that
whether two incidents of verbal abuse -- "great tits" and "great legs" -- and three incidents of staring by non-employees
constituted sexual harassment of plaintiff was a triable issue of fact).
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *7-8.
Therefore, since the Court finds that Mr. Harrison's conduct could be considered sexual harassment and that the question of
whether this behavior was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable is a jury question, and since Defendants admit that
there is a material dispute regarding whether the University took appropriate actions in connection with Mr. Harrison, the
Court must deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment with regard to the Hostile Work
Environment claim.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *14.
Judge Hogan clarified the analysis for establishing a “hostile work environment” claim.
To be actionable, a plaintiff must establish that the sexual harassment is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. In determining
whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive," the court should consider the totality of the circumstances. Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). Specifically, a court should consider the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance; and the effect on the employee's
psychological well-being. Id.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *7-8; see also *14.
The severity or seriousness of the alleged conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct; in
other words, "one act may be sufficient if it is particularly severe while less intense incidents may be sufficient if numerous."
See Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1029 (D. Nev. 1992). Moreover, the Court must consider both the
victim's subjective impressions of this activity and whether the alleged actions would constitute unlawful sexual harassment
from the perspective of a reasonable victim.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *11-12.
The jury properly found that Prof. Martin endured a hostile work environment. As discussed in IV (A), federal courts have
held that stalking is one of the most severe forms of sexual harassment. In this case, the D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department characterized Harrison’s behavior as criminal stalking, making it clear that Harrison’s conduct was not trivial, but
merited serious attention and perhaps even arrest and prosecution. Both D.C. police and the campus police officer who
received Prof. Martin’s complaint, agreed that Howard’s own policies and procedures required that Harrison be barred from
campus and held for police if he showed up on campus again, so that he could be arrested for stalking.
Deans Bullock and Newsom stated that they took Prof. Martin’s complaints seriously and feared for her, as well as for
“other women” on campus. See Section IV (B), above. Dean Bullock even told the EEOC that “anyone” in Prof. Martin’s
circumstances, being pursued by Harrison would feel “mental anguish” in her workplace. Pl.’s October 9, 2002 Motion for
Summary Judgment at 5 and accompanying Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 65 (Docket # 330). All of the
witnesses and all of the documentary evidence demonstrated that everyone involved believed that Prof. Martin’s fear of
Harrison was well-founded. Howard did not present one witness or iota of other evidence to indicate that Prof. Martin
overacted or otherwise acted unreasonably under the circumstances. The jury’s factual conclusion that Prof. Martin did
endure a hostile work environment while a law professor at Howard is therefore not only supported by the evidence, but is
compelled by the undisputed evidence of record.
B. The Jury Properly Found that Howard Failed to Take Reasonable Measures to Eliminate the Hostile Work
Environment
In her July 1, 1998 memorandum to Howard’s General Counsel, Dean Bullock made several statements regarding her
purported efforts to eliminate the hostile work environment for Prof. Martin – all of which were demonstrated to be false,
during trial.
I learned that Dawn Martin believed she was being “stalked” on December 1, 1997, upon reading her memorandum dated
November 25, 1997, I immediately contacted Dean Newsom to determine what he knew of the matter. He told me that he
had advised Ms. Martin to contact the University Security Office and the Metropolitan Police Department regarding what
she should do in connection with her personal safety.
Exhibit KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 1, , adopted in Howard’s EEOC Position Statement, page 3 (KKK-2 of Pl.’s M SJ ) (See
Docket # 330).
At trial, however, Dean Bullock never claimed that she called Dean Newsom or asked him anything about the matter.
Instead, Dean Bullock testified only that she placed a call to Security Director Lawrence Dawson and left a voicemail message
for him which was never returned. Dean Bullock admitted that she never called Dawson again about the matter. Mr.
Dawson testified that he never received a message from Dean Bullock.
Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:
Associate Dean Newsom advised me that he thought that MPD should be called in to provide more manpower in tracking
down the individual not only to benefit Professor Martin, but also to prevent harm to other women whom this person might
stalk or otherwise harass. In that regard Associate Dean Newsom arranged a meeting in the West Campus security office
with Professor Martin, representatives of Campus Security and of MPD, and himself. Campus Security and MPD stated
that they would take the necessary action to end the harassment. (Emphasis added)
Exhibit KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 1.
At trial, former Officer Sirleaf, Plaintiff and Dean Newsom all testified that Plaintiff and Officer Sirleaf, not Dean Newsom,
called the police. Plaintiff testified, unchallenged, that Dean Newsom refused to assist her in calling the police. Both
Plaintiff and former Officer Sirleaf testified, unchallenged, that Officer Sirleaf was the only representatives of Campus
Security present at the meeting with the police. Plaintiff and Officer Sirleaf testified, unchallenged, that Plaintiff called Dean
Newsom while MPD was present on campus and convinced him to appear for a portion of the meeting.
Plaintiff testified, unchallenged, that Newsom refused to file any complaint on behalf of the University, but left Plaintiff to
file the complaint alone, and that Newsom yelled at Plaintiff in the security office on November 21, 1997, with her students
looking on through the glass encasing of the Security Office. Both Officer Sirleaf and Plaintiff testified, unchallenged, that
Dean Newsom stayed only approximately ten minutes. Dean Newsom testified that he had no contact with MPD or
discussions with any Howard Security Officer about the matter after his brief appearance on November 21, 1997.
Both Plaintiff and Officer Sirleaf testified, unchallenged, that the result of the November 21, 1997 meeting was the agreement
and expectation that Howard would issue a Bar Notice, banning Harrison from campus, and that if he returned to campus, he
would be detained for police and arrested, pursuant to the stalking complaint taken by MPD officers. Officer Dowdy
testified that no Bar Notice was issued for Harrison and that he escorted Harrison off campus, on November 25, 1997,
because he did not know that Harrison was stalking Prof. Martin or that a stalking complaint had been taken by MPD.
Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:
On or about the following day, I transmitted a copy of Ms. Martin’s report and my response to her to Mr. Dawson,
Director of Security via a memorandum asking him to advise law school security officers of the need to be alert to Ms.
Martin’s concerns.
Exhibit KKK-1of Pl.’s M SJ, page 2.
At trial, former Dean Bullock admitted that she never made any attempt to contact Mr. Dawson beyond her purported
December 1, 1997 voicemail message, which Dawson never returned. Howard never produced any memorandum from
Dean Bullock to Mr. Dawson or to any other member of Howard’s security force, referring, in any way, to Prof. Martin or
to Leonard Harrison, let alone any specific request to “advise law school security officers to be alert to Ms. Martin’s
concerns.” Mr. Dawson testified that Dean Bullock never told him anything about Prof. Martin or Leonard Harrison and that
he had no knowledge of the stalking at all while it was occurring in 1997-1998. Howard has offered absolutely no explanation
for why this purported memo was never produced. Clearly, then, Dean Bullock never wrote such a memo.
In her July 1, 1997 memorandum, former Dean Bullock claimed that, in response to Prof. Martin’s December 2, 1997
memorandum documenting Harrison’s attempt to enter her office on December 1, 1997, and Officer Dowdy’s “chase” of
Harrison, from her office, down five flights of steps, out of the building, off campus and into the woods, she took the
following action.
I asked the security officer on duty what were they doing regarding the “stalker.” I am not certain, but I believe it was
Officer Sirleaf that I spoke to. He told me that the day before (or there about) another officer ran after the man believed to
have been “the stalker.” The officer had chased after the man down to and across Connecticut Avenue, I believe Sirleaf told
me. He also advised me that the security office had advised Ms. Martin to let them know when she would be on campus and
they would accompany her to class and guard her office while she was on campus.
Exhibit KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 2-3.
At trial, Dean Bullock admitted that she never had this or any other conversation with Officer Sirleaf or any other security
officer regarding Prof. Martin, Leonard Harrison, the “stalker” or any chase by Officer Dowdy. At trial, Dean Bullock
never made any claim that she ever had any belief that security was to provide Prof. Martin with a guard in her office or
while she was teaching or otherwise while she was on campus.
Dean Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:
Within a few days of speaking with the security officer I telephoned Mr. Dawson’s office and left a message (he was not in)
that I was calling about security issues at the law school.
KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 3.
Again, at trial, Dean Bullock never even alleged that she made any attempt to contact Mr. Dawson beyond the one message
that she claimed she left him on December 1, 1997 (which Mr. Dawson denied receiving). On the stand, Dean Bullock
admitted that she never did anything in response to Prof. Martin’s December 2, 1997 memorandum.
Dean Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:
My office – I and Associate Dean Newsom – gave written and oral notice of Ms. Martin’s stalking report to University
Security and requested security assistance for her. Apparently neither Campus Security nor MPD posted notices in the
security office or in the library describing the stalker, and Associate Dean Newsom requested the Campus Security Office to
post notices. Since he did not have a description of the stalker and Professor Martin did, he asked her to prepare a
description to be included in notices to be posted. My efforts were directed at getting security assistance because no one else
at the law school is equipped to protect an employee who may be in danger.
KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 3).
At trial, Dean Bullock or Newsom admitted that she never spoke to anyone in Howard Security about Prof. Martin or
Leonard Harrison. Dean Newsom admitted that, other than his brief appearance in the Security Office on November 21,
1997, in response to Prof. Martin’s request that he be present, he never spoke to anyone in Howard Security about Prof.
Martin or Leonard Harrison or asked for “security assistance” for Prof. Martin. Dean Bullock admitted that she never asked
for “security assistance” for Prof. Martin, other than her one time instruction to her assistant, Barbara Smith, on December 1,
1997, when Plaintiff refused to return to her office or her classroom without protection, due to the frightening voicemail
message that she had just received from Harrison, announcing his plans to visit her in her office that afternoon. Dean Bullock’
s testimony again raises ethical questions. See fn. 13.
Officer Dowdy testified that he had seen and talked with Harrison -- and checked his homeless shelter identification – on
November 25, 1997, when he escorted him off campus, not knowing that there was a stalking complaint on him or that
Officer Sirleaf had requested that a Bar Notice be issued against him. Prof. Martin had already provided Deans Bullock and
Newsom with all of the information that she had gathered on Harrison, in her memoranda of November 25 and December 2,
1997. Since she had only seen Harrison for a second, before Officer Dowdy chased him from her office on December 1, 1997,
Officer Dowdy was in a much better position to provide a description of Harrison than was Prof. Martin.
Contrary to Dean Bullock’s assertion, Dean Newsom did not just ask Prof. Martin for a written description of Harrison, but
asked her to draft the Alert Notice herself, to be posted, despite her statement that she did not know the format used by
Howard’s security for such notices and that it would be best drafted by Security. Neither Dean Newsom nor Dean Bullock
ever requested that Security draft an Alert Notice for Harrison. Again, Bullock’s testimony raises ethical questions. See fn.
13. In addition, Deans Newsom and Bullock did not have to “ascertain” that no notices were posted because they were the
persons who would post or and/or approve the posting any notice posting on the West Campus, otherwise known as the law
school, which stands alone on Van Ness Street, off of Connecticut Avenue, far from the main campus on Georgia Avenue
where Dean Newsom purportedly sent the request to post the notice.
The December 22, 1997 memorandum purportedly sent by Dean Newsom to Campus Security was entitled “Stalking of
Prof. Dawn Martin, Vagrants in the Lounge and Missing Printer in the West Campus.” (Joint Trial Exhibit 80 and Exhibit
GG in Pl.’s MSJ) In Dean Newsom’s estimation, then, the stalking of Prof. Martin was equated with a missing printer and
was not even worth of its own memo. Deans Bullock and Newsom admitted that they never received any response from
Security to the Notice, that they never called Security to follow up on the purportedly sent memo and that the Notice was
never posted, although they could easily have posted the notice themselves on the law school premises rather than sending it
across town to main campus to request that someone from main campus come across town to post the notice. Finally,
Howard’s Security former Director, Mr. Dawson, and the Deputy Chief, Mr. Armstrong, testified that they never saw this
memo before being deposed in this case. Howard never produced the memo as part of the Security Office files and Mr.
Armstrong testified, in his deposition, that in his search of the Security files, he did not find any such memo from Dean
Newsom.
Dean Bullock knowingly, callously and recklessly refused to provide the reasonable protection from Harrison that Howard’s
own security policy mandated. Bullock even lied by stating, in writing, that she was consulting with the Director of
Security, Lawrence Dawson, when, in fact, she had never consulted with Dawson or any other Howard University Security
Officer or D.C. Metropolitan Police Department officer regarding Prof. Martin or Harrison. As set forth in Pl. MSJ at 16,
Dean Bullock made specific statements exhibiting extreme hostility toward Plaintiff in response to her requests that Howard
take reasonable steps to bar a serial stalker, with a criminal record, from the law school. Dean Bullock told the EEOC:
Martin did not seem satisfied with my response. I was left with the impression that she wanted me to wrestle the stalker
down. (Emphasis added)
Dean Bullock not only callously and deliberately decided not to provide Prof. Martin with the very protection that Howard’s
security policies and procedures required, but she mocked Prof. Martin and trivialized the stalking, even more than a year
later, to the EEOC, after Prof. Martin filed her charges of sexual harassment and retaliation. Dean Bullock demonstrated
extreme animosity toward Prof. Martin after the stalking and made plain to the most influential and active member of the
APT Committee, her desire to remove Prof. Martin from the faculty. Dean Bullock told APT Committee Vice Chair, Prof.
Taslitz, that Prof. Martin had “bad judgment,” but would not provide even one example of such alleged bad judgment, even
though Prof. Taslitz asked for one, several times. MSJ at 18. Dean Bullock told Prof. Taslitz that she was having a “bad
day” and had “a lot to do” with respect to Prof. Martin’s complaints about being stalked by Harrison at the law school (Pl.
MSJ at 16-17); yet, Bullock did not even take the most basic steps to keep Harrison from Martin in her workplace.
Under these circumstances, not only did the jury properly find that Howard failed to take reasonable measures to end the
hostile work environment created by Harrison for Prof. Martin in her workplace, but the undisputed evidence of record
compelled this factual conclusion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion must be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Dawn V. Martin, Esquire
Law Offices of Dawn V. Martin
1090 Vermont Avenue, N.W, Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 408-7040 telephone
(703) 642-0208 facsimile
DVMARTINLAW@yahoo.com
www.firms.findlaw.com/dvmartinlawfound that the harassment was not based on her sex and was not "sexual" in
nature.
Martin was harassed by the homeless, delusional stalker in her workplace, but oddly, and contradicting Judge
Hogan's finding of law in his 1999 decision, found that the harassment was not based on her sex and was not
"sexual" in nature. This conclusion led to a jury verdict for the defendant, since Title VII jurisdiction only applies
if the harassment is based on race, sex, color, national origin or religion. Ms. Martin has filed motions for
judgment on all of her claims, as a matter of law, asking the Court to set aside the jury verdict. See Plaintiff's
Motion for Judgment on her Sexual Harassment Claim, and Reply; Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her
Retaliation Claims and Reply; Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Breach of Contract Claim and Reply.
Howard has also filed motions for judgment on all claims, even though the jury verdict was in its favor. See
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on Plaintiff's Sexual Harassment Claim; Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on her Retaliation Claims; Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Judgment on her Breach of Contract Claim.
If Chief Judge Hogan does not set aside the jury verdict, Ms. Martin will appeal this decision. The verdict clearly
reflects a misunderstanding by the jury as to what constitutes sexual harassment or harassment on the basis
of sex. Judge Hogan held, in 1999 "It is clear from Mr. Harrison's own description of his search for 'Geneva
Crenshaw" or 'Valerie Edwards' that he targeted women other than Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that Mr. Harrison's
pursuit of her as his 'wife' was inherently sexual in nature since it was clear that she would not have been
sought by Mr. Harrison as his wife if she were a man. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that she was being stalked by
Harrison and that stalking is primarily a crime against women, with sexual connotations .... In this case, it is
clear that Plaintiff was only the object of Mr. Harrison's attention because she was a female; therefore, the
alleged stalking activities do appear to have been "because of sex" eve if they were not inherently sexual in
nature." For Chief Judge Hogan's precedent-setting 1999 decision, see Martin_v_HU_1999 and
MartinvHUPressRelease.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____
)
Dawn V. Martin, )
)
v. )
) Case No. 1:99CV01175
Howard University, et. al. ) Judge: TFH/AK
)
)
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT, AFTER VERDICT, ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIM
Plaintiff hereby opposes Defendant’s motion for judgment, as a matter of law. Plaintiff incorporates, by reference, all
arguments made in her own pending May 8, 2006 Motions for Judgment.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
I. Legal Standard
A. Rule 50(B)
When assessing a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment after a jury verdict, the issue is whether there was sufficient evidence upon
which the jury could base its verdict. Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 752-753 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Although the
court cannot substitute its view for that of the jury, and can assess neither the credibility nor weight of the evidence, the
jury's verdict can only stand if the evidence in support of it is "significantly probative" and "more than merely colorable."
Scott at 752-753, citing Mackey v. United States, 303 U.S. App. D.C. 422, 8 F.3d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1993), (citing McNeal
v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 826 F.2d 637, 640-41 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ferguson v. F.R. Winkler GMBH & Co., 79 F.3d
1221, 1224 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 136 L. Ed. 2d 252, 117 S. Ct. 360 (1996); see also Siegel v. Mazda Motor Corp., 878 F.
2d 435, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The D.C. Circuit’s analysis is consistent with that of the U.S. Supreme Court. Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
The Court may grant judgment as a matter of law, after trial, where the facts are undisputed and/or no reasonable juror could
find for the opposing party. This standard is the same standard used in the context of motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is also appropriate where “no reasonable juror” could determine the facts in favor of the opposing party,
in light of the evidence presented. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Woodfield v. Providence Hospital,
779A.2d 933, 936 (D.C. 2001). As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has recently reaffirmed, where there is no
genuine dispute as to material facts, there are no facts for a jury to determine and this case can be decided as a matter of law.
Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889 (D.C. C. 2006).
A. Rule 59(a) and (e)
A party may also obtain relief from a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) and (e). New trials granted under Rule 59
are based on errors of law, evidentiary errors, and/or error may have influenced the jury’s decision. Ashcraft and Gerel v.
Coady, 244 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The standard for whether a new trial should be granted, pursuant to Rule 59, is
whether there was “a clear miscarriage of justice.” Warren v. Thompson, 224 F.R.D. 236, 238 (D.D.C. 2004), citing Webb v.
Hyman, 861 F. Supp. 1094, 1109-110 (D.D.C. 1994); Nyman v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp 1562, 1569 (D.D.C. 1997), quoting
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986).
B. Rule 60(b)(3)
A party may also obtain relief from a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), based upon the adverse party’s
commission of fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct. Any such misrepresentation to the Court simultaneously
constitutes a violation of Fed. Civ. R. P. 11 (b)(1), which prohibits a party from: 1) making representations to the court “for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or needless increase in the cost of litigation;” 2)
asserting “claims and defenses and other legal contentions” that are not “warranted by existing law” or are frivolous; 3)
asserting “allegations and other factual contentions” that have no “evidentiary support;” and 4) denying “factual contentions”
that are not “warranted on the evidence.”
II. Summary of Argument
Defendant’s motion for judgment is completely unsupported by the record. In addition, the jury’s verdict is contrary to all
of the undisputed evidence of record, including: 1) Judge Hogan’s rulings of law (oral and written), that Harrison’s conduct
constitutes harassment on the basis of sex; 2) admissions of Howard’s binding witnesses, Deans Bullock and Newsom, that
they fully recognized, from Plaintiff’s initial complaint, that Harrison was harassing Prof. Martin on the basis of her sex and
posed a danger to her and “other women;” and 3) statements by Prof. Taslitz, Officer Sirleaf and Mrs. Bruner, demonstrating
that they also perceived Prof. Martin’s complaints about Harrison to be complaints of harassment, based on her sex or
gender. The jury also overlooked the specific and common meaning of the word “wife,” defined in English language
dictionaries as “a married woman.” Not only must Defendant’s motion be denied, but the verdict must be set aside and
judgment granted for Plaintiff on the issue of sexual harassment/hostile work environment.
As set forth in Plaintiff’s October 9, 2002 Motion for Summary Judgment (see also electronic version, filed November 1,
2005, Docket # 330), incorporated by reference herein, the undisputed facts of record demonstrate that no reasonable juror
could conclude that Harrison’s conduct did not rise to a level creating a hostile work environment or that Howard took
reasonable steps to eliminate this hostile work environment. The jury did determine that Harrison’s harassment rose to the
level of a hostile work environment and that Howard failed to take reasonable measures to eliminate it.
There is now no question that Plaintiff endured severe and pervasive harassment in her workplace, stalked by a delusional,
violent homeless stranger with a criminal record. It is an open question as to whether Howard removed her from the faculty,
through non-renewal as a law professor, in retaliation for her requests for protection in her workplace; however, by
concluding that Harrison’s harassment was not based on Plaintiff’s gender, or sexual in nature, the jury left Plaintiff with
absolutely no remedy for wrong that it acknowledged Howard committed and the injury that the jury acknowledged she
suffered. The verdict results in substantial injustice to Plaintiff, with no remedy for egregious harm. .
III. Facts as Set Forth in Chief Judge Hogan’s 1999 Decision
Chief Judge Hogan denied Howard’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Martin v. Howard
University, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516; 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 964; 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1587 (D.D.C. 1999).
Judge Hogan summarized the facts, as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, as follows.
Plaintiff Dawn Martin was a Visiting Associate Professor at Howard University School of Law from July 1996 through May
1998.
….
Plaintiff alleges that she has been the victim of hostile work environment sexual harassment as a result of the conduct of Mr.
Leonard Harrison, a homeless person who resided in a shelter and was neither an employee nor a student of the University
but who regularly used Howard University's Law School library. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants knowingly
allowed Mr. Harrison, a man characterized by the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department as a "stalker" with a criminal record
and history of violence, free access to the law school campus and buildings, thereby facilitating his sexual harassment of
Plaintiff in her workplace. Due to this alleged inaction, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have violated both Title VII and the
DCHRA as well as caused her intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff also claims that due to her complaints,
Defendant Bullock took retaliatory measures, on five different occasions, to ensure that Plaintiff was not offered a permanent
professorship or a renewed visitorship at the Law School. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Howard University
and Howard University School of Law breached their contract with Plaintiff in failing to renew her contract or selecting her
for a tenure-track position in violation of Professor Taslitz's alleged oral promise to Plaintiff that she would placed into a
tenure track position as soon as one became available. And finally, Plaintiff claims that she was forcefully and prematurely
evicted from her office in retaliation for her filing of a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"). (Emphasis added)
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *2-4.
Judge Hogan elaborated on the facts setting forth Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Harrison sent her two letters, left three voice mail messages for her and attempted three
personal visits to Plaintiff's office, all due to his conviction that she was his "wife." Plaintiff contends that these interactions
with Mr. Harrison convinced her that this "mentally unstable homeless stranger" had conducted research on her since he
knew her middle name and the name of a course which she taught in Cleveland. Moreover, Plaintiff refers to a letter written
by Mr. Harrison to Attorney Valerie Edwards in Canada as evidence that Mr. Harrison's pursuit of Plaintiff was sexual in
nature: "Verily, it appeared that this Valerie Edwards look-alike was actually a taller, more youthful, prettier and (forgive me
for saying) more voluptuous woman than the Valerie Edwards whom I had met and known at Lakeside. . . .The truth is, I had
never looked at Valerie Edwards full in the face, on account of painful bashfulness -- while enamored by her person and both
distracted and infatuated with her legs -- and so was not aware of her exact features." (Emphasis added)
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *9-10.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges eight instances of sexual harassment: two letters, hand-delivered to Plaintiff's office; three phone
calls to Plaintiff's direct line which were picked up by her voice mail; and three personal visits to Plaintiff's office, although
Plaintiff was out of her office during the first two visits and the Security Officer chased Mr. Harrison from her office at the
third visit.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *12.
At trial, and even in the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the facts as alleged above were well-established by the
testimony of Howard’s own security officers, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department records and testimony, Plaintiff’s
testimony, letters written by Harrison, and even Howard’s Law School Dean and Associate Dean. The facts, as stated above,
were completely undisputed by any evidence presented by Howard. Not only must Howard’s motion for judgment be
denied, but the jury’s verdict cannot stand. The verdict is not only unsupported by the undisputed evidence of record, but
the evidence expressly and directly contradicts the verdict, as well as Judge Hogan’s conclusions of law.
IV. The Jury Verdict and Juror Questions for Court Reflect Confusion on the Law
A. The Jury’s Verdict Form
The jury verdict form included the following questions and the following jury answers:
1. Did the Plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
a) Mr. Harrison subjected her to conduct that was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
her employment?
__X___ YES ______ NO
b) Mr. Harrison’s conduct was unwelcome?
__X___ YES ______ NO
c) Mr. Harrison’s conduct was sexual in nature or because of Plaintiff’s gender?
______ YES __X___ NO
d) Howard University knew or should have know of the alleged conduct?
__X___ YES ______ NO
e) Howard University failed to take proper remedial action that was reasonably calculated to end the harassment?
__X___ YES ______ NO
The jury’s response to “1C” directly contradicts:
1) Judge Hogan’s 1999 conclusions of law;
2) Judge Hogan’s judicial notice during trial that the term “wife” has sexual implications;
3) the dictionary definition of the term “wife;” and
4) Howard’s own admissions that when Prof. Martin reported Leonard Harrison’s stalking of her on campus, Howard
understood Harrison’s conduct to pose the threat that Harrison would “stalk” or “harass” not only Prof. Martin, but also
“other women” on Howard’s campus.
B. The Jury’s Request for Additional Instructions on Sexual Harassment Demonstrates the Jurors’ Confusion over the
Law
The jury’s conclusion that Harrison’s conduct was not based on sex was based on its misunderstanding of the law with
respect to sexual harassment, as evidenced by the questions it sent to the Court requesting more detailed definitions and
instructions on the law.
On April 27, 2006, at 12:00 p.m., the jurors sent a note to the Court stating:
Jurors want an explanation under hostile work environment, 1.a.
(1) what is meant by “the terms and conditions of her employment”?
(2) p. 23 # 4 what constitutes “damages.” (sic)
The parties agreed on a definition of “damages” as “harm or injury, whether psychological, emotional, financial, or physical.”
This Court accepted this instruction and read it to the jury. The parties disagreed on the instructions for the terms and
conditions of employment. The Court modified this instruction to “The terms and conditions of her employment means the
performance of duties/work performance and her work environment,” without an explanation of the meaning of “work
environment.”
On April 28, 2006, at 11:30 p.m., the jurors sent a note to the Court stating:
“(1) Wives are typically female. Is # 1c an automatic ‘yes’ just because plaintiff is
female. (sic)
(2) Please define sexual harassment.”
The parties disagreed sharply on the instructions to be given the jury in response to both questions. Chief Judge Hogan was
not present because he was presiding over a judicial conference out of the District of Columbia. Judge Kessler presided in
Judge Hogan’s absence. When the parties arrived in Court, Judge Kessler had already written her proposed responses to the
jury questions as follows:
(1) “No, it is not an automatic “yes.” You must base your decision on the evidence presented to you;” and
(2) “Refer back to Instruction # 23, defining sexual harassment.”
Plaintiff opposed both of these instructions, pointing out that:
1) Judge Hogan held, as a matter of law, in his 1999 decision, that Harrison’s pursuit of Plaintiff as his “wife,” constituted
pursuit on the basis of sex or gender;
2) the dictionary definition of “wife” is “a married woman” – thus, female by definition;
3) an appropriate answer might instruct the jurors that if they found that Harrison pursued both men and women as his
“wife,” then the answer to #1C would be “no,” but if they found that Harrison pursued only women, or primarily women as
his “wife,” then the answer would be “yes;” and
4) Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision included a more specific and clearer definition of sexual harassment than was provided to the
jury as Instruction # 23 and the jury’s question indicated that Instruction # 23 was not clear enough and needed to be
supplemented.
Judge Kessler rejected Plaintiff’s suggestions.
Less than two hours after the jury received Judge Kessler’s instruction (referring them back to the instruction the jurors had
already deemed inadequate for them to resolve their differences), the jury returned a verdict for defendant, holding that
Harrison’s conduct, though creating a hostile work environment for Prof. Martin, which Howard failed to take reasonable
steps to eliminate, the harassment was not sexual in nature or based on Plaintiff’s sex/gender. This conclusion was clearly
based on a misunderstanding of the question and the law.
Judge Kessler may have misunderstood the jury’s questions, without the benefit of the background in this case over its eight
year saga, the lengthy cross-motions for summary judgment, trial and deposition testimony, the hundreds of exhibits
produced at trial, or Judge Hogan’s comments at trial amounting to judicial notice. The jury prefaced its question with a
factual statement, “Wives are typically female,” indicating that the jury found, as a matter of fact, that Harrison pursued
Prof. Martin based on his desire for her to be his “wife.” Having reached this factual determination, it appears that at least
some jurors believed that their job was done because pursuit of a woman as a potential wife necessarily constitutes pursuit of
her based on her gender. Apparently, there was dissention in the jury on this point, leading the jurors to ask the Court for
clarification. After Judge Kessler’s response that the answer to #1c was not “automatic,” the jurors may well have perceived
this instruction to invalidate Judge Hogan’s comment from the bench and to imply the answer that pursuit of a woman as one’
s wife does not constitute pursuit on the basis of sex.
V. Dean Bullock, Dean Newsom and other Howard Agents, Expressly Recognized that Harrison’s Harassment was
Based on Sex and/or Sexual, and that Harrison Posed a Threat to Plaintiff and “Other Women” on Campus
In her July 1, 1998 memorandum to Norma Leftwich, General Counsel for Howard University, provided as an attachment to
Howard’s Position Statement to the EEOC in response to Plaintiff’s EEOC charge of sexual harassment/hostile work
environment and retaliation, Dean Bullock admitted that she was specifically aware, by no later than December 1, 1997, that
Harrison posed a threat of stalking and harassment to Prof. Martin and “other women” on campus.
Associate Dean Newsom advised me that he thought that MPD should be called in to provide more manpower in tracking
down the individual not only to benefit Professor Martin, but also to prevent harm to other women whom this person might
stalk or otherwise harass. (Emphasis added)
Pl.’s Trial Ex. 8B and Ex. KKK-1 of Pl.’s October 9, 2002 Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ), re-filed electronically on
November 1, 2005, Docket # 330. Howard adopted Dean Bullock’s statement in its December 8, 1998 Position Statement to
the EEOC (Exhibit KKK-2 of Pl.’s M SJ ). On page 2 of the same July 1, 1997 memorandum, Dean Bullock acknowledged
that she was aware, as of December 1, 1997, that Harrison had been characterized a “dangerous” and “crazy” and should only
be approached by the police or University Security. Dean Newsom specifically admitted, both at trial and in his deposition,
that Harrison’s pursuit of Prof. Martin caused him concern about not only Prof. Martin’s safety, but also the safety of other
women on campus. See Pl.’s MSJ at 12.
At trial, Howard fraudulently argued, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, and without any evidentiary support, that neither
Deans Bullock nor Newsom, nor any other of its agents, understood Prof. Martin’s reports to indicate her belief that she was
being “harassed” or that such harassment was sexual in nature or based on her gender.
Howard has repeatedly, and fraudulently described Harrison as “a gentleman” who was in search of his “estranged wife” and
that his pursuit of Prof. Martin was a case of “mistaken identity;” yet, Howard’s administrators were well aware that this
was no “gentleman,” that there was no “estranged wife,” and that there could be no “mistaken identify” because there was no
real person, but only a fictional character in a book, to “identify.”
At trial, Howard wasted Court time attempting to elicit false testimony from witnesses to prove what it knew to be false.
At trial, Dean Bullock even testified that she did not perceive Harrison’s pursuit of Prof. Martin as sexual in nature or based
on her gender. Deans Bullock and Newsom had already acknowledged, years earlier, in their EEOC statements and
depositions, that Harrison’s conduct constituted harassment on the basis of sex. Indeed, Howard has wasted Plaintiff’s, the
EEOC’s and the Court’s time, for the past eight years, while draining Plaintiff of her limited financial resources, depriving her
of returning to her teaching career, and depriving her of the reputation and income that she enjoyed prior to her termination
from Howard, which allowed her to properly provide for her daughter during the remaining years of her childhood and
through college and graduate school.
The evidence is clear and undisputable, that Deans Bullock and Newsom, as well as Howard’s additional agent, Howard
University Campus Officer Sirleaf and Prof. Taslitz, always understood that Prof. Martin’s memoranda entitled “Security
Problem on Campus” and her conversations with them about Harrison, constituted complaints of harassment, based on her
sex.
Howard Campus Security Officer Sirleaf was an agent of Howard and the first Howard employee who recorded Plaintiff’s
complaint in a written report. His knowledge is therefore imputed to the University. Officer Sirleaf testified that he did
interpret Harrison’s conduct to be sexual in nature because he pursued her as his “wife.” Plaintiff’s undisputed testimony at
trial was that Prof. Taslitz was the first professor that she showed Harrison’s letters to, on November 20, 1997 and that
Prof. Taslitz told her, “Howard’s security is for sh-t. You’ll be raped and killed right in front of that security booth.”
(Emphasis added) Prof. Taslitz then advised Prof. Martin to call the police. Clearly, by using the word “rape,” Prof. Taslitz
understood Harrison to pose a threat of sexual assault to Prof. Martin. Mrs. Bruner also testified that she understood
Harrison’s pursuit of Prof. Martin to be sexual in nature and based on her gender. Mrs. Bruner testified that, once the
stalking began, Prof. Martin asked her to watch the Ladies’ room when she used it. Even Howard’s law students understood
Harrison’s stalking of Prof. Martin to be harassment based on her status as a woman.
There was no reason for Prof. Martin to state the “obvious” conclusion that everyone was already stating – that Harrison
posed a threat to her, as a woman, as well as to other women on campus. As Judge Hogan set forth in his 1999 decision,
there are no “magic words” to invoke Title VII. It is enough that the victim convey to his or her employer the facts that
constitute sexual harassment. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at 18. There was no need for Prof. Martin to use the legal term
“sexual harassment” in her November 5, 1997 or December 1, 1997 memos to Dean Bullock, or make any legal arguments
setting forth her potential sexual harassment claims against the University, any more than it would have been appropriate for
her to set forth the legal arguments for her potential claims of negligence, premises liability or intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Prof. Martin’s November 5, 1997 and December 1, 1997 memos were not intended to be “legal briefs” or
to threaten a lawsuit against the University. Her memos stated the facts to provide the administration with the information
necessary to stop Harrison’s stalking and the potential and/or physical and other harm to her, other women on campus,
students near her, or any other member of the University who might be hurt as “collateral damage” if this delusional,
homeless, violent stranger decided to attack her, in response to her refusal to be his “wife.”
Deans Bullock and Newsom responded to Prof. Martin’s memos by acknowledging the University’s obligation to take the
necessary actions to keep Harrison out of the workplace. Dean Bullock wrote, by memo dated December 1, 1997, that she
was discussing the matter with Director of Security Lawrence Dawson. Dean Newsom wrote, by memo dated December 22,
1997, that he was requesting that Security post an “Alert Notice” to enforce a bar notice that Prof. Martin had previously
been told was issued. Prof. Martin had no knowledge, at that time, that Dean Bullock’s written statement was false, and that
she had never discussed the stalking or Harrison with Mr. Dawson or any other member of Howard Security. Prof. Martin
did not know that the requested Bar Notice for Harrison had never even been issued, despite Officer Sirleaf’s
recommendation, as well as the recommendation of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, that a Bar Notice be issued
and enforced. Prof. Martin reasonably allowed the administration time to take the action that it promised to take and
represented that it was taking before she filed a sexual harassment charge.
The administration responded to Prof. Martin’s requests for protection, not only by concealing Harrison’s stalking from the
law school community and failing to follow its own security barring procedures, but also by retaliating against Prof. Martin
for requesting the protection from Harrison on campus, actually removing her from the faculty, despite her excellent teaching
evaluations, outstanding academic and professional credentials, scholarly publications and student protests of her non-
renewal. At this point, it was abundantly clear that Dean Bullock had no intention of providing any protection for Prof.
Martin against Harrison, but was addressing “the problem” by “getting rid” of Harrison’s “target” on campus – Prof. Martin.
Dean Bullock’s admission, repeating Dean Newsom’s admission that both Deans perceived Harrison’s stalking of Prof.
Martin on campus as “harass[ment]” that was directed as Prof. Martin and “other women” as women, demonstrates,
absolutely, that Howard’s entire “defense” was made in bad faith, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, constituting fraud,
misrepresentation and/or misconduct justifying a new trial or amended judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(B)(3). Not
only is Howard precluded from judgment as a matter of law, but Plaintiff is entitled to judgment, as a matter of law. In
addition, Rule 11 sanctions against Howard are merited, including up to a default judgment against the Defendant.
VI. Judge Hogan’s Rulings of Law, that Plaintiff’s Conduct was Based of Sex, Precludes the Jury’s Verdict by Res
Judicata and the Law of the Case
A. Judge Hogan Held that “it is Clear that Plaintiff was only the Object of Mr. Harrison's Attention because she was a
Female”
The verdict requires re-examination of Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision, the questions that it set for a jury trial and the
conclusions of law that it reached prior to trial. Judge Hogan identified Howard’s defenses, distinguishing the factual issues
to be decided by a jury from the issue that he was about to decide, as a matter of law, namely, that Harrison’s conduct, as
alleged, was based on Prof. Martin’s gender.
In this case, Defendants admit that the sufficiency of the University's response is a factual question for the jury but they
contend that Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case
of hostile work environment under Title VII. Specifically, Defendants claim that Plaintiff cannot show that Mr. Harrison's
conduct was based on sex and that Mr. Harrison's conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *8.
Judge Hogan then proceeded to address Howard’s claim that Plaintiff’s allegations did not establish that Harrison’s conduct
was sexual in nature or on the basis of sex.
Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed solely at discrimination because
of sex. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998). Workplace
harassment is not automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations. Id. "The critical issue is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Id.
It is clear from Mr. Harrison's own description of his search for "Geneva Crenshaw" or "Valerie Edwards" that he targeted
women other than Plaintiff: "the only method available to me as far as finding Valerie was the most primitive means of
choosing the name 'Valerie' from within the vast array of academic category and pursuing it. Eventually, I had lost even the
name 'Valerie' and pursued others." Plaintiff argues that Mr. Harrison's pursuit of her as his "wife" was inherently sexual in
nature since it was clear that Plaintiff was being pursued as a woman and that she would not have been sought by Mr.
Harrison as his wife if she were a man. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that she was being stalked by Mr. Harrison and that
stalking is primarily a crime against women, with sexual connotations.
A hostile work environment may be established if the harassment is "because of sex," even if not sexual in nature. Spain v.
Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1999); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 971 (10th Cir. 1991); Hall v. Gus Const.
Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988). In this case, it is clear that Plaintiff was only the object of Mr. Harrison's attention
because she was a female; therefore, the alleged stalking activities do appear to have been "because of sex" even if they were
not inherently sexual in nature. (Emphasis added)
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *8-11.
B. The Jury Verdict Contradicts Judge Hogan’s Judicial Notice During Trial
As Judge Hogan held in 1999, Harrison's pursuit of Plaintiff as his "wife" was inherently sexual, since the relationship
between a husband and a wife is expected to include sex. This fact was so “obvious” that the Court stopped Plaintiff’s
counsel, Mr. Otey, from continuing a line of questioning of Officer Sirleaf, to whether he perceived Plaintiff’s complaint
regarding Harrison as one that was “sexual in nature” or based on her sex. As Officer Sirleaf began to elaborate on his
perception of a husband and wife relationship as inherently sexual, the Court interrupted the witness and Plaintiff’s counsel,
saying, “It’s obvious, move on.”
VII. Criminal Stalking may Constitute Sexual Harassment under Title VII
Howard argued that “stalking” is a criminal matter and does not constitute sexual harassment; however, most criminal acts are
also actionable in civil law, under comparable civil theories. If an employee is sexually assaulted in her workplace, certainly,
it is a crime; however, the employer is not permitted to dismiss it as a criminal matter and allow the employee who
committed the sexual assault to continue to work with the person whom he assaulted. The employer still has a duty, under
Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act, to eliminate the sexual harassment in the workplace.
Courts have recognized that stalking is considered one of the most severe forms of sexual harassment, within the meaning of
Title VII, where it is based on sex and the victim reasonably perceives the stalker to have created a “hostile or abusive
environment” in her workplace. Crowley v. L.L. Bean, 303 F.3d 387, 396, 401-403 (Cir. 2002). Similarly, in Frazier v.
Delco Electronics Corporation, 263 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2001), the Seventh Circuit recognized that that “stalking”
constituted sexual harassment and created a hostile work environment for the plaintiff. The Eight Circuit found that where
sexual harassment was particularly severe, it could “almost” be called “stalking.” Whitmore v. O’Connor Management, Inc.,
156 F.3d 796, 798 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103, 1108 (8th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff
felt that her co-worker “was harassing her, actually, stalking her”). The First Circuit held that the plaintiff endured a hostile
work environment, based on sexual harassment that included “stalking.” Angeles-Sanchez v. Alvarado, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXUS 10509 (1st Cir. 1993).
Federal District courts have ruled consistently with the Circuit Courts. As in the present case, the plaintiff in Ramirez v.
New York Presbyterian Hospital, 129 F. Supp. 2d 676, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), appropriately used the term “stalking” to
describe acts of sexual harassment/hostile work environment. In Dolman v. Williamette University, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7772 (D. Or. 2001), in a University setting similar to the present case, the plaintiff employee of a University was stalked by
a former student, constituting sexual harassment. In Spina v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 764,
772 (D. Ill. 2002), the court held that stalking was one of the more severe and “disturbing” allegations of sexual harassment.
Chontos v. Rhea and Indiana University, 29 F. Supp. 931, 937 (N. Dist. Ind. 1998).
The D.C. Metropolitan Police Department’s characterization of Harrison’s sexual harassment of Prof. Martin as criminal
stalking highlights the severity of the sexual harassment – it certainly does not nullify it, as Howard argued. Sexual
harassment that rises to the level of criminal activity has been recognized as the most extreme form of sexual harassment in
the workplace. In Little v. Windemere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2001), the court found that where an
employee was raped by a client after a business meeting, this one incident was severe enough to create a hostile work
environment for the plaintiff in her workplace. See also Turnbull v. Topeka State Hospital, 255 F.3d 1238, 1243-1244 (10th
Cir. 2001) (a single incident of sexual assault was “abusive, dangerous and humiliating,” creating a hostile work environment
for the plaintiff, within the meaning of Title VII); Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Just as every
murder is also a battery, every rape committed in the employment setting is also discrimination on the basis of the employee’
s sex.”)
The legal definition of criminal “stalking,” as codified in D.C. Code Ann. § 22-404 (b) is:
(b) Any person who on more than one occasion … willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person,
is guilty of the crime of stalking. (Emphasis added)
(e) For purposes of this section, the term “harassing” means engaging in a course of conduct either in person, by telephone, or
in writing, directed at a specific person, which seriously alarms, annoys, frightens, or torments the person, or engaging in a
course of conduct either in person, by telephone, or in writing, which would cause a reasonable person to be seriously
alarmed, annoyed, frightened or tormented.
If the jurors had realized that the D.C. stalking statute specifically incorporates “harassment” as part of its definition, the
jury would have clearly understood that Plaintiff first alleged that she was being harassed by Harrison, as his prospective
“wife,” no later than November 21, 1997, when she filed a “stalking” complaint against Harrison with the D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department. This realization would also have bolstered Plaintiff’s credibility with the jury, with respect to all of her
claims, since Plaintiff testified that she characterized Harrison’s behavior as “harassment” when she first reported it to Dean
Newsom and Officer Sirleaf on November 20, 1997. At that time, she had not yet met with the D.C. police officers and they
had not yet classified the harassment as stalking.
Without the definition of “stalking,” the jurors were without the legal reference to intelligently evaluate Howard’s repeated
false “distinctions” between stalking and harassment, and Howard’s specific accusations that Plaintiff never raises issues of
“harassment” prior to Howard’s December 18, 1997 decision not to offer her a permanent position or a renewed visitorship
on its law school faculty. In fact, in closing arguments, Howard’s outside counsel, Mr. Shwalb, accused Plaintiff of “playing
the sexual harassment card,” after she was rejected for a permanent position on December 18, 1997, never having previously
mentioned sexual harassment. Mr. Shwalb falsely stated that Prof. Martin never even used the word “harassment” until she
filed her EEOC charge in May of 1998 and that the administration had no reason to believe that the stalking was based on sex,
despite Dean Alice Gresham Bullock and her Associate Dean, Michael Newson expressly recognized that Harrison’s
“harassment” was based on sex.
VIII. The Jury’s Answers to Factual Questions Posed by Chief Judge Hogan’s 1999 Decision Require Judgment for
Plaintiff
In sharp contrast to Plaintiff’s examination and dissection of the jury verdict, explaining the jury’s misunderstanding with
respect to sexual harassment, as a matter of law, Howard has simply renewed its pre-verdict motion for judgment, with
absolutely no discussion of any error by the jury or the court that would justify, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), setting
aside the jury’s factual conclusions that Plaintiff did endure a hostile work environment at Howard and that Howard failed to
take reasonable measures designed to eliminate the hostile work environment. Since Howard has not alleged any juror error
on these conclusions, the jury’s factual determinations on these issues should not be disturbed. Notwithstanding Howard’s
procedural failure to challenge the jury’s factual determinations, below, Plaintiff sets forth the evidence compelling the jury’s
factual findings.
The jury answered the two questions posed by Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision by finding that:
1) Harrison’s harassment was severe and pervasive, causing a hostile work environment for Prof. Martin; and 2) Howard
failed to take reasonable steps to end the hostile work environment. These are the precise questions framed by Judge Hogan
when he permitted this case to proceed to trial for a jury to determine the determining facts in this case: 1) whether Harrison’
s conduct was severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment for the Plaintiff; and 2) whether Howard
University knew or should have known of Harrison’s creation of a hostile work environment and failed to take proper
remedial action. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *7-8, 14.
A. The Jury Properly Found that Plaintiff Endured a Hostile Work Environment
Judge Hogan set out the criteria to determine whether Plaintiff endured a hostile work environment.
Plaintiff has alleged, and the Defendants do not appear to dispute, that she subjectively felt threatened by Mr. Harrison's
behavior; however, to prevail on a sexual harassment claim, Plaintiff must also show that a reasonable female would have
found these actions to be severely hostile or abusive. Whether or not Mr. Harrison intended his behavior to be abusive or
threatening is irrelevant to this inquiry. See Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1029 ("The reasonable victim standard classifies conduct
as unlawful sexual harassment even when harassers do not realize that their conduct creates a hostile work environment. . . .
Therefore, the alleged harasser's intent is unimportant and "compliments" are not a defense.")
The alleged incidents in this case may or may not be sufficiently severe or pervasive to amount to actionable sexual
harassment. However, they certainly amount to more than the "mere utterance of an epithet." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 ("mere
utterance of an. . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee would not affect the conditions of employment
to a sufficient degree to violate Title VII). Whether or not a reasonable victim would find them sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of Plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working environment is appropriately an
issue of fact for the jury, not one which this Court can summarily adjudicate. See Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1029 (holding that
whether two incidents of verbal abuse -- "great tits" and "great legs" -- and three incidents of staring by non-employees
constituted sexual harassment of plaintiff was a triable issue of fact).
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *7-8.
Therefore, since the Court finds that Mr. Harrison's conduct could be considered sexual harassment and that the question of
whether this behavior was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable is a jury question, and since Defendants admit that
there is a material dispute regarding whether the University took appropriate actions in connection with Mr. Harrison, the
Court must deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment with regard to the Hostile Work
Environment claim.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *14.
Judge Hogan clarified the analysis for establishing a “hostile work environment” claim.
To be actionable, a plaintiff must establish that the sexual harassment is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. In determining
whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive," the court should consider the totality of the circumstances. Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). Specifically, a court should consider the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance; and the effect on the employee's
psychological well-being. Id.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *7-8; see also *14.
The severity or seriousness of the alleged conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct; in
other words, "one act may be sufficient if it is particularly severe while less intense incidents may be sufficient if numerous."
See Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1029 (D. Nev. 1992). Moreover, the Court must consider both the
victim's subjective impressions of this activity and whether the alleged actions would constitute unlawful sexual harassment
from the perspective of a reasonable victim.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *11-12.
The jury properly found that Prof. Martin endured a hostile work environment. As discussed in IV (A), federal courts have
held that stalking is one of the most severe forms of sexual harassment. In this case, the D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department characterized Harrison’s behavior as criminal stalking, making it clear that Harrison’s conduct was not trivial, but
merited serious attention and perhaps even arrest and prosecution. Both D.C. police and the campus police officer who
received Prof. Martin’s complaint, agreed that Howard’s own policies and procedures required that Harrison be barred from
campus and held for police if he showed up on campus again, so that he could be arrested for stalking.
Deans Bullock and Newsom stated that they took Prof. Martin’s complaints seriously and feared for her, as well as for
“other women” on campus. See Section IV (B), above. Dean Bullock even told the EEOC that “anyone” in Prof. Martin’s
circumstances, being pursued by Harrison would feel “mental anguish” in her workplace. Pl.’s October 9, 2002 Motion for
Summary Judgment at 5 and accompanying Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 65 (Docket # 330). All of the
witnesses and all of the documentary evidence demonstrated that everyone involved believed that Prof. Martin’s fear of
Harrison was well-founded. Howard did not present one witness or iota of other evidence to indicate that Prof. Martin
overacted or otherwise acted unreasonably under the circumstances. The jury’s factual conclusion that Prof. Martin did
endure a hostile work environment while a law professor at Howard is therefore not only supported by the evidence, but is
compelled by the undisputed evidence of record.
B. The Jury Properly Found that Howard Failed to Take Reasonable Measures to Eliminate the Hostile Work
Environment
In her July 1, 1998 memorandum to Howard’s General Counsel, Dean Bullock made several statements regarding her
purported efforts to eliminate the hostile work environment for Prof. Martin – all of which were demonstrated to be false,
during trial.
I learned that Dawn Martin believed she was being “stalked” on December 1, 1997, upon reading her memorandum dated
November 25, 1997, I immediately contacted Dean Newsom to determine what he knew of the matter. He told me that he
had advised Ms. Martin to contact the University Security Office and the Metropolitan Police Department regarding what
she should do in connection with her personal safety.
Exhibit KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 1, , adopted in Howard’s EEOC Position Statement, page 3 (KKK-2 of Pl.’s M SJ ) (See
Docket # 330).
At trial, however, Dean Bullock never claimed that she called Dean Newsom or asked him anything about the matter.
Instead, Dean Bullock testified only that she placed a call to Security Director Lawrence Dawson and left a voicemail message
for him which was never returned. Dean Bullock admitted that she never called Dawson again about the matter. Mr.
Dawson testified that he never received a message from Dean Bullock.
Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:
Associate Dean Newsom advised me that he thought that MPD should be called in to provide more manpower in tracking
down the individual not only to benefit Professor Martin, but also to prevent harm to other women whom this person might
stalk or otherwise harass. In that regard Associate Dean Newsom arranged a meeting in the West Campus security office
with Professor Martin, representatives of Campus Security and of MPD, and himself. Campus Security and MPD stated
that they would take the necessary action to end the harassment. (Emphasis added)
Exhibit KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 1.
At trial, former Officer Sirleaf, Plaintiff and Dean Newsom all testified that Plaintiff and Officer Sirleaf, not Dean Newsom,
called the police. Plaintiff testified, unchallenged, that Dean Newsom refused to assist her in calling the police. Both
Plaintiff and former Officer Sirleaf testified, unchallenged, that Officer Sirleaf was the only representatives of Campus
Security present at the meeting with the police. Plaintiff and Officer Sirleaf testified, unchallenged, that Plaintiff called Dean
Newsom while MPD was present on campus and convinced him to appear for a portion of the meeting.
Plaintiff testified, unchallenged, that Newsom refused to file any complaint on behalf of the University, but left Plaintiff to
file the complaint alone, and that Newsom yelled at Plaintiff in the security office on November 21, 1997, with her students
looking on through the glass encasing of the Security Office. Both Officer Sirleaf and Plaintiff testified, unchallenged, that
Dean Newsom stayed only approximately ten minutes. Dean Newsom testified that he had no contact with MPD or
discussions with any Howard Security Officer about the matter after his brief appearance on November 21, 1997.
Both Plaintiff and Officer Sirleaf testified, unchallenged, that the result of the November 21, 1997 meeting was the agreement
and expectation that Howard would issue a Bar Notice, banning Harrison from campus, and that if he returned to campus, he
would be detained for police and arrested, pursuant to the stalking complaint taken by MPD officers. Officer Dowdy
testified that no Bar Notice was issued for Harrison and that he escorted Harrison off campus, on November 25, 1997,
because he did not know that Harrison was stalking Prof. Martin or that a stalking complaint had been taken by MPD.
Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:
On or about the following day, I transmitted a copy of Ms. Martin’s report and my response to her to Mr. Dawson,
Director of Security via a memorandum asking him to advise law school security officers of the need to be alert to Ms.
Martin’s concerns.
Exhibit KKK-1of Pl.’s M SJ, page 2.
At trial, former Dean Bullock admitted that she never made any attempt to contact Mr. Dawson beyond her purported
December 1, 1997 voicemail message, which Dawson never returned. Howard never produced any memorandum from
Dean Bullock to Mr. Dawson or to any other member of Howard’s security force, referring, in any way, to Prof. Martin or
to Leonard Harrison, let alone any specific request to “advise law school security officers to be alert to Ms. Martin’s
concerns.” Mr. Dawson testified that Dean Bullock never told him anything about Prof. Martin or Leonard Harrison and that
he had no knowledge of the stalking at all while it was occurring in 1997-1998. Howard has offered absolutely no explanation
for why this purported memo was never produced. Clearly, then, Dean Bullock never wrote such a memo.
In her July 1, 1997 memorandum, former Dean Bullock claimed that, in response to Prof. Martin’s December 2, 1997
memorandum documenting Harrison’s attempt to enter her office on December 1, 1997, and Officer Dowdy’s “chase” of
Harrison, from her office, down five flights of steps, out of the building, off campus and into the woods, she took the
following action.
I asked the security officer on duty what were they doing regarding the “stalker.” I am not certain, but I believe it was
Officer Sirleaf that I spoke to. He told me that the day before (or there about) another officer ran after the man believed to
have been “the stalker.” The officer had chased after the man down to and across Connecticut Avenue, I believe Sirleaf told
me. He also advised me that the security office had advised Ms. Martin to let them know when she would be on campus and
they would accompany her to class and guard her office while she was on campus.
Exhibit KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 2-3.
At trial, Dean Bullock admitted that she never had this or any other conversation with Officer Sirleaf or any other security
officer regarding Prof. Martin, Leonard Harrison, the “stalker” or any chase by Officer Dowdy. At trial, Dean Bullock
never made any claim that she ever had any belief that security was to provide Prof. Martin with a guard in her office or
while she was teaching or otherwise while she was on campus.
Dean Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:
Within a few days of speaking with the security officer I telephoned Mr. Dawson’s office and left a message (he was not in)
that I was calling about security issues at the law school.
KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 3.
Again, at trial, Dean Bullock never even alleged that she made any attempt to contact Mr. Dawson beyond the one message
that she claimed she left him on December 1, 1997 (which Mr. Dawson denied receiving). On the stand, Dean Bullock
admitted that she never did anything in response to Prof. Martin’s December 2, 1997 memorandum.
Dean Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:
My office – I and Associate Dean Newsom – gave written and oral notice of Ms. Martin’s stalking report to University
Security and requested security assistance for her. Apparently neither Campus Security nor MPD posted notices in the
security office or in the library describing the stalker, and Associate Dean Newsom requested the Campus Security Office to
post notices. Since he did not have a description of the stalker and Professor Martin did, he asked her to prepare a
description to be included in notices to be posted. My efforts were directed at getting security assistance because no one else
at the law school is equipped to protect an employee who may be in danger.
KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 3).
At trial, Dean Bullock or Newsom admitted that she never spoke to anyone in Howard Security about Prof. Martin or
Leonard Harrison. Dean Newsom admitted that, other than his brief appearance in the Security Office on November 21,
1997, in response to Prof. Martin’s request that he be present, he never spoke to anyone in Howard Security about Prof.
Martin or Leonard Harrison or asked for “security assistance” for Prof. Martin. Dean Bullock admitted that she never asked
for “security assistance” for Prof. Martin, other than her one time instruction to her assistant, Barbara Smith, on December 1,
1997, when Plaintiff refused to return to her office or her classroom without protection, due to the frightening voicemail
message that she had just received from Harrison, announcing his plans to visit her in her office that afternoon. Dean Bullock’
s testimony again raises ethical questions. See fn. 13.
Officer Dowdy testified that he had seen and talked with Harrison -- and checked his homeless shelter identification – on
November 25, 1997, when he escorted him off campus, not knowing that there was a stalking complaint on him or that
Officer Sirleaf had requested that a Bar Notice be issued against him. Prof. Martin had already provided Deans Bullock and
Newsom with all of the information that she had gathered on Harrison, in her memoranda of November 25 and December 2,
1997. Since she had only seen Harrison for a second, before Officer Dowdy chased him from her office on December 1, 1997,
Officer Dowdy was in a much better position to provide a description of Harrison than was Prof. Martin.
Contrary to Dean Bullock’s assertion, Dean Newsom did not just ask Prof. Martin for a written description of Harrison, but
asked her to draft the Alert Notice herself, to be posted, despite her statement that she did not know the format used by
Howard’s security for such notices and that it would be best drafted by Security. Neither Dean Newsom nor Dean Bullock
ever requested that Security draft an Alert Notice for Harrison. Again, Bullock’s testimony raises ethical questions. See fn.
13. In addition, Deans Newsom and Bullock did not have to “ascertain” that no notices were posted because they were the
persons who would post or and/or approve the posting any notice posting on the West Campus, otherwise known as the law
school, which stands alone on Van Ness Street, off of Connecticut Avenue, far from the main campus on Georgia Avenue
where Dean Newsom purportedly sent the request to post the notice.
The December 22, 1997 memorandum purportedly sent by Dean Newsom to Campus Security was entitled “Stalking of
Prof. Dawn Martin, Vagrants in the Lounge and Missing Printer in the West Campus.” (Joint Trial Exhibit 80 and Exhibit
GG in Pl.’s MSJ) In Dean Newsom’s estimation, then, the stalking of Prof. Martin was equated with a missing printer and
was not even worth of its own memo. Deans Bullock and Newsom admitted that they never received any response from
Security to the Notice, that they never called Security to follow up on the purportedly sent memo and that the Notice was
never posted, although they could easily have posted the notice themselves on the law school premises rather than sending it
across town to main campus to request that someone from main campus come across town to post the notice. Finally,
Howard’s Security former Director, Mr. Dawson, and the Deputy Chief, Mr. Armstrong, testified that they never saw this
memo before being deposed in this case. Howard never produced the memo as part of the Security Office files and Mr.
Armstrong testified, in his deposition, that in his search of the Security files, he did not find any such memo from Dean
Newsom.
Dean Bullock knowingly, callously and recklessly refused to provide the reasonable protection from Harrison that Howard’s
own security policy mandated. Bullock even lied by stating, in writing, that she was consulting with the Director of
Security, Lawrence Dawson, when, in fact, she had never consulted with Dawson or any other Howard University Security
Officer or D.C. Metropolitan Police Department officer regarding Prof. Martin or Harrison. As set forth in Pl. MSJ at 16,
Dean Bullock made specific statements exhibiting extreme hostility toward Plaintiff in response to her requests that Howard
take reasonable steps to bar a serial stalker, with a criminal record, from the law school. Dean Bullock told the EEOC:
Martin did not seem satisfied with my response. I was left with the impression that she wanted me to wrestle the stalker
down. (Emphasis added)
Dean Bullock not only callously and deliberately decided not to provide Prof. Martin with the very protection that Howard’s
security policies and procedures required, but she mocked Prof. Martin and trivialized the stalking, even more than a year
later, to the EEOC, after Prof. Martin filed her charges of sexual harassment and retaliation. Dean Bullock demonstrated
extreme animosity toward Prof. Martin after the stalking and made plain to the most influential and active member of the
APT Committee, her desire to remove Prof. Martin from the faculty. Dean Bullock told APT Committee Vice Chair, Prof.
Taslitz, that Prof. Martin had “bad judgment,” but would not provide even one example of such alleged bad judgment, even
though Prof. Taslitz asked for one, several times. MSJ at 18. Dean Bullock told Prof. Taslitz that she was having a “bad
day” and had “a lot to do” with respect to Prof. Martin’s complaints about being stalked by Harrison at the law school (Pl.
MSJ at 16-17); yet, Bullock did not even take the most basic steps to keep Harrison from Martin in her workplace.
Under these circumstances, not only did the jury properly find that Howard failed to take reasonable measures to end the
hostile work environment created by Harrison for Prof. Martin in her workplace, but the undisputed evidence of record
compelled this factual conclusion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion must be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Dawn V. Martin, Esquire
Law Offices of Dawn V. Martin
1090 Vermont Avenue, N.W, Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 408-7040 telephone
(703) 642-0208 facsimile
DVMARTINLAW@yahoo.com
www.firms.findlaw.com/dvmartinlawfound that the harassment was not based on her sex and was not "sexual" in
nature.
| Martin v. Howard University Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on her Sexual Harassment Claim |
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