Page Title

See also Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Motion for Judgment on Plaintiff's Claim of Sexual
Harassment
As discussed under MartinvHowardU, trial was finally held from April 3-28, 2006. The jury found that Prof.
Martin was harassed by the homeless, delusional stalker in her workplace, but oddly, and contradicting
Judge Hogan's finding of law in his 1999 decision, found that the found that the harassment was not based
on her sex The is set for was not "sexual" or on the basis of her sex. This conclusion led to a jury verdict for
the defendant, since Title VII jurisdiction only applies if the harassment is based on race, sex, color, national
origin or religion. Ms. Martin has filed motions for judgment on all of her claims, as a matter of law, asking
the Court to set aside the jury verdict. See Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Sexual Harassment Claim,
and Reply; Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on her Retaliation Claims and Reply; Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment on her Breach of Contract Claim and Reply. Howard has also filed motions for judgment on all
claims, even though the jury verdict was in its favor. See Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Judgment on Plaintiff's Sexual Harassment Claim; Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment
on her Retaliation Claims; Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on her Breach of
Contract Claim.

If Chief Judge Hogan does not set aside the jury verdict, Ms. Martin will appeal this decision. The verdict
clearly reflects a misunderstanding by the jury as to what constitutes sexual harassment or harassment on
the basis of sex. Judge Hogan held, in 1999 "It is clear from Mr. Harrison's own description of his search for
'Geneva Crenshaw" or 'Valerie Edwards' that he targeted women other than Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that Mr.
Harrison's pursuit of her as his 'wife' was inherently sexual in nature since it was clear that she would not
have been sought by Mr. Harrison as his wife if she were a man. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that she was
being stalked by Harrison and that stalking is primarily a crime against women, with sexual connotations ....
In this case, it is clear that Plaintiff was only the object of Mr. Harrison's attention because she was a female;
therefore, the alleged stalking activities do appear to have been "because of sex" eve if they were not
inherently sexual in nature." For Chief Judge Hogan's precedent-setting 1999 decision, see
Martin_v_HU_1999 and MartinvHUPressRelease.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____
                        )
Dawn V. Martin,                        )
                        )
v.                                 )
                        )        Case No. 1:99CV01175
Howard University, et. al.                )        Judge: TFH/AK
                        )
                        )

PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON HER SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM, PURSUANT
TO RULE 50(B), OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL, PURSUANT TO RULES 59 AND 60

Plaintiff respectfully renews her April 25, 2006 Rule 50(a) motion for judgment, as a st be filed within ten days of the Court’
s judgment or jury verdict. New trials granted under Rule 59 are based on errors of law, evidentiary errors, and/or error may
have influenced the jury’s decision. Ashcraft and Gerel v. Coady, 244 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The standard for whether
a new trial should be granted, pursuant to Rule 59, is whether there was “a clear miscarriage of justice.” Warren v.
Thompson, 224 F.R.D. 236, 238 (D.D.C. 2004), citing Webb v. Hyman, 861 F. Supp. 1094, 1109-110 (D.D.C. 1994);
Nyman v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp 1562, 1569 (D.D.C. 1997), quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268
(7th Cir. 1986)..

C.        Rule 60(b)(3)
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), a party may file a motion for a new trial based upon the adverse party’s commission of
fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct. Any such misrepresentation to the Court simultaneously constitutes a
violation of Fed. Civ. R. P. 11 (b)(1), which prohibits a party from:
1) making representations to the court “for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or
needless increase in the cost of litigation;” 2) asserting “claims and defenses and other legal contentions” that are not
“warranted by existing law” or are frivolous; 3) asserting “allegations and other factual contentions” that have no
“evidentiary support;” and 4) denying “factual contentions” that are not “warranted on the evidence.”
II.        Legal Precedent Set by Chief Judge Hogan’s 1999 Decision
The case at bar is significant for all working women and for all employers employing women, In Martin v. Howard
University, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516; 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 964; 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1587 (D.D.C. 1999),
Chief Judge Hogan, following the consistent law of all jurisdictions and EEOC regulations addressing the issue of sexual
harassment in the workplace by non-employees, set precedent for this Court by holding, as a matter of law, that:
an employer may be held liable for a hostile work environment that is created by a non-employee, including those non-
employees who were invited or permitted to remain on an employer's premises, citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897 (11th Cir. 1992) ("the environment in which an employee works can be rendered offensive in an equal degree by the acts
of supervisors, coworkers, or even strangers in the workplace") and 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (EEOC Guidelines) ("An
employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the
workplace").

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *7.

Plaintiff, Dawn V. Martin, began with Howard University as a Visiting Associate Professor at of law in July of 1996.
Beginning in November of 1997, Professor Martin was stalked in her workplace by Leonard Harrison, a homeless stranger
with a criminal record, a history of violence and a pattern of targeting African-American female professors and attorneys,
pursuing them as his “wife.” Prof. Martin immediately reported the stalking to the law school administration, Howard
security and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. She repeatedly asked the administration, particularly the Dean,
Alice Gresham-Bullock, to bar the stalker from campus, but the University took no reasonable steps to keep the stalker out
of the workplace, despite the availability of barring procedures already set in place by Howard University campus security.
Plaintiff endured a hostile work environment, pervaded by sexual harassment by the stalker, from November 20, 1997 until
the end of her employment with Howard University, in June of 1998.

Plaintiff continued to perform all of her teaching duties, taking certain precautions to protect her students, her teenage
daughter and herself from the stalker. Despite thirteen years of outstanding civil rights legal practice/policy-making, four
years of teaching equal employment law and torts, recognized scholarship in the area of equal employment law, excellent
student evaluations and student petitions and letters in support of her renewal, Plaintiff was not selected for a permanent
position or even a renewed visitorship. Plaintiff had left a permanent, tenure-track teaching position in Cleveland to return
to the Washington, D.C. area, based on representations that the visiting position would be converted to a permanent, tenure-
track position at Howard. This decision, made after the academic “hiring season,” left Plaintiff without a job, severely
damaged her reputation and tremendously limited her career opportunities.   Plaintiff seeks to be restored to the place that
she would have been absent the retaliation. She seeks reinstatement, as a full professor at Howard University, with tenure,
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorneys’ fees.

After eight years of litigation, a jury determined that Harrison did harass Prof. Martin in her workplace and that Howard
University failed to take reasonable measures to stop it; however, oddly, the jury also determined that this harassment was
not sexual in nature or based on Prof. Martin’s sex/gender – even though he pursued her to be his “wife.” The jury’s
conclusion reflects a misunderstanding of the law regarding sexual harassment that resulted, in part, from inadequate jury
instructions.
In addition to the legal implications of this case, it has strong social implications for women – and particularly African-
American women. Despite the jury’s specific finding that Prof. Martin was harassed by the delusional, homeless stranger in
her workplace, in closing argument, Howard’s outside counsel, a partner in the employment discrimination defense firm of
Venable, told jurors that Prof. Martin “played the sexual harassment card.”    The stalking of women in their workplaces
should never be so trivialized – nor should the woman stalked be so denigrated for asking that basic safety procedures
actually be implemented to keep a serial, delusional, homeless stalker with a criminal record out of the workplaces. The
outcome of this case will contribute to the standard set for employers in stalking workplace violence cases and merits the
attention of the Bar, as well as advocates for women’s rights and civil rights.

III.        Facts as Set Forth in Chief Judge Hogan’s 1999 Decision
Chief Judge Hogan denied Howard’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Martin v. Howard
University, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516; 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 964; 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1587 (D.D.C. 1999).
Judge Hogan summarized the facts, as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, as follows.
Plaintiff Dawn Martin was a Visiting Associate Professor at Howard University School of Law from July 1996 through
May 1998.
                             ….
Plaintiff alleges that she has been the victim of hostile work environment sexual harassment as a result of the conduct of Mr.
Leonard Harrison, a homeless person who resided in a shelter and was neither an employee nor a student of the University
but who regularly used Howard University's Law School library. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants knowingly
allowed Mr. Harrison, a man characterized by the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department as a "stalker" with a criminal record
and history of violence, free access to the law school campus and buildings, thereby facilitating his sexual harassment of
Plaintiff in her workplace. Due to this alleged inaction, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have violated both Title VII and the
DCHRA as well as caused her intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff also claims that due to her complaints,
Defendant Bullock took retaliatory measures, on five different occasions, to ensure that Plaintiff was not offered a
permanent professorship or a renewed visitorship at the Law School. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Howard
University and Howard University School of Law breached their contract with Plaintiff in failing to renew her contract or
selecting her for a tenure-track position in violation of Professor Taslitz's alleged oral promise to Plaintiff that she would
placed into a tenure track position as soon as one became available. And finally, Plaintiff claims that she was forcefully and
prematurely evicted from her office in retaliation for her filing of a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC").

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at 2-4.

Judge Hogan elaborated on the facts setting forth Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Harrison sent her two letters, left three voice mail messages for her and attempted three
personal visits to Plaintiff's office, all due to his conviction that she was his "wife." Plaintiff contends that these interactions
with Mr. Harrison convinced her that this "mentally unstable homeless stranger" had conducted research on her since he
knew her middle name and the name of a course which she taught in Cleveland. Moreover, Plaintiff refers to a letter written
by Mr. Harrison to Attorney Valerie Edwards in Canada as evidence that Mr. Harrison's pursuit of Plaintiff was sexual in
nature: "Verily, it appeared that this Valerie Edwards look-alike was actually a taller, more youthful, prettier and (forgive me
for saying) more voluptuous woman than the Valerie Edwards whom I had met and known at Lakeside. . . .The truth is, I had
never looked at Valerie Edwards full in the face, on account of painful bashfulness -- while enamored by her person and both
distracted and infatuated with her legs -- and so was not aware of her exact features."

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *9-10.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges eight instances of sexual harassment: two letters, hand-delivered to Plaintiff's office; three phone
calls to Plaintiff's direct line which were picked up by her voice mail; and three personal visits to Plaintiff's office, although
Plaintiff was out of her office during the first two visits and the Security Officer chased Mr. Harrison from her office at the
third visit.

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *12.
At trial, and even in the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the facts as alleged above were well-established by
the testimony of Howard’s own security officers, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department records and testimony, Plaintiff’s
testimony, letters written by Harrison, and even Howard’s Law School Dean and Associate Dean. The facts, as stated
above, were completely undisputed by any evidence presented by Howard.
IV.        The Jury’s Verdict Contradicts Judge Hogan’s Determination of Law, Howard’s Admissions of Fact and all
Relevant Undisputed Evidence of Record

1.        The Jury’s Verdict Form
The jury verdict form included the following questions and the following jury answers:
1. Did the Plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
a)        Mr. Harrison subjected her to conduct that was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
her employment?
__X___ YES        ______ NO
b)        Mr. Harrison’s conduct was unwelcome?
__X___ YES        ______ NO
c)        Mr. Harrison’s conduct was sexual in nature or because of Plaintiff’s gender?
______ YES        __X___ NO
d)        Howard University knew or should have know of the alleged conduct?
__X___ YES        ______ NO
e)        Howard University failed to take proper remedial action that was reasonably calculated to end the harassment?
__X___ YES        ______ NO

As discussed below, the jury’s response to “1C” directly contradicts: 1) Judge Hogan’s 1999 conclusions of law; 2) Judge
Hogan’s judicial notice during trial that the term “wife” has sexual implications   and the dictionary definition of the term
“wife;” 3) Howard’s own admissions that when Prof. Martin reported Leonard Harrison’s stalking of her on campus,
Howard understood Harrison’s conduct to pose the threat that Harrison would “stalk” or “harass” not only Prof. Martin,
but also “other women” on Howard’s campus. In short, the jury’s verdict cannot stand because it is unsupported, and
indeed, expressly and directly contradicted by all of the relevant, undisputed evidence of record, as well as Judge Hogan’s
conclusions of law.

The jury’s answer to the question of whether Harrison harassed Plaintiff based on her sex determined the disposition of this
case, both with respect to Plaintiff’s sexual harassment/hostile work environment case and her retaliation case, since both are
based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) and the D.C. Human Rights Act, which prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of sex. By determining that Harrison did harass Plaintiff in her workplace, to the
point of it being severe and pervasive, and that Howard University knew of the harassment and failed to take reasonable
measures to eliminate the hostile work environment. The jury found that Plaintiff endured this harassment in her workplace,
tolerated, if not facilitated by her employer; however, by concluding that the harassment was not on the basis of sex, or
sexual in nature, the jury left Plaintiff with absolutely no remedy for being harassed/stalked in her workplace by a delusional,
violent homeless stranger with a criminal record or for her non-renewal as a law professor in retaliation for her requests for
protection in her workplace.

Not only does the jury verdict result in substantial injustice to Plaintiff, with no remedy for egregious harm, but the verdict
conflicts with Judge Hogan’s holding, as a matter of law, as well as with the undisputed evidence of record.
2.        The Jury’s Notes to the Court, Requesting Additional Instructions on Sexual Harassment and Harassment on the
Basis of Sex Demonstrates the Jurors’ Confusion over the Law

The jury’s conclusion that Harrison’s conduct was not based on sex was based on its misunderstanding of the law with
respect to sexual harassment, as evidenced by the questions it sent to the Court requesting more detailed definitions and
instructions on the law.
On April 27, 2006, at 12:00 p.m., the jurors sent a note to the Court stating:
Jurors want an explanation under hostile work environment, 1.a.
(1)        what is meant by “the terms and conditions of her employment”?
(2)        p. 23 # 4 what constitutes “damages.” (sic)

The parties agreed on a definition of “damages” as “harm or injury, whether psychological, emotional, financial, or
physical.” This Court accepted this instruction and read it to the jury. The parties disagreed on the instructions for the
terms and conditions of employment. The Court modified this instruction to “The terms and conditions of her employment
means the performance of duties/work performance and her work environment,” without and explanation of the meaning of
“work environment.”
On April 28, 2006, at 11:30 p.m., the jurors sent a note to the Court stating:
“(1) Wives are typically female. Is # 1c an automatic ‘yes’ just because plaintiff is
female. (sic)
(2) Please define sexual harassment.”

The parties disagreed sharply on the instructions to be given the jury in response to both questions. Chief Judge Hogan was
not present because he was presiding over a judicial conference out of the District of Columbia. Judge Kessler presided in
Judge Hogan’s absence. When the parties arrived in Court, Judge Kessler had already written her proposed responses to the
jury questions as follows:
(1) “No, it is not an automatic “yes.” You must base your decision on the evidence presented to you;” and
(2) “Refer back to Instruction # 23, defining sexual harassment.”

Plaintiff opposed both of these instructions, pointing out that: 1) Judge Hogan held, as a matter of law, in his 1999 decision,
that Harrison’s pursuit of Plaintiff as his “wife,” constituted pursuit on the basis of sex or gender; 2) the dictionary
definition of “wife” clarifies that a wife is “a married woman” – thus, female by definition; 3) the answer could instruct the
jurors that if they found that Harrison pursued both men and women as his “wife,” then the answer to #1C would be “no,”
but if they found that Harrison pursued only women, or primarily women as his “wife,” then the answer would be “yes;”
and 4) that Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision included a more specific and clearer definition of sexual harassment than was
provided to the jury as Instruction # 23 and the jury’s question indicated that Instruction # 23 was not clear enough and
needed to be supplemented. Judge Kessler rejected all of Plaintiff’s suggested instructions.

Judge Hogan’s statement that it is “obvious” that the word “wife” has sexual connotations may well have been the reason
that the jury asked the question:
“(1) Wives are typically female. Is # 1c an automatic ‘yes’ just because plaintiff is
female. (sic)

The jury may well have perceived the words “obvious” and “automatic” as synonymous After Judge Kessler’s response
that the answer to #1c was not “automatic,” the jurors may well have perceived this instruction to invalidate Judge Hogan’s
comment from the bench.
Less than two hours after the jury received Judge Kessler’s instruction (referring them back to the instruction the jurors had
already deemed inadequate for them to resolve their differences), the jury returned a verdict for defendant, holding that
Harrison’s conduct, though creating a hostile work environment for Prof. Martin, which Howard failed to take reasonable
steps to eliminate, the harassment was not sexual in nature or based on Plaintiff’s sex/gender. This conclusion was clearly
based on a misunderstanding of the question and the law.

It also appears that Judge Kessler misunderstood the jury’s questions, without the benefit of the background in this case
over its eight year saga, the lengthy cross-motions for summary judgment, trial and deposition testimony, the hundreds of
exhibits produced at trial, or Judge Hogan’s comments at trial amounting to judicial notice. The jury’s note stating: “Wives
are typically female. Is # 1c an automatic “yes” just because plaintiff is female” indicates that the jury did find, as a matter
of fact, that Harrison did target Plaintiff as his potential “wife.” The second part of the jury’s question, answered in a
vacuum, might well be appropriately answered as Judge Kessler responded; however, since the question was preceded by
the jury’s specific statement that “Wives are typically female,” the meaning of the question is changed. The question,
preceded by the statement regarding wives as females, indicates that the jury found, as a matter of fact, that Harrison
pursued Prof. Martin to be his “wife.” Having reached this determination, at least some of the jurors apparently believed
that their job was done and wanted clarification from the Court to convince other juror(s) who refused to acknowledge that
pursuit of a woman as a potential wife necessarily constitutes pursuit of her based on her gender.

3.        The Court Held that “it is clear that Plaintiff was only the Object of Mr. Harrison's Attention because she was a
Female,” Precluding the Jury’s Verdict by Res Judicata and the Law of the Case

The jury verdict requires re-examination of Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision, the precise questions that it set for a jury trial and
the conclusions of law that it reached prior to trial. After identifying the undisputed factual question for the jury, whether
Howard responded appropriately to end the hostile work environment for Plaintiff created by Harrison, the Court then
proceeded to address Howard’s claim that Plaintiff’s allegations did not establish that Harrison’s conduct was sexual in
nature or on the basis of sex.

Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed solely at discrimination because
of sex. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998). Workplace
harassment is not automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations. Id. "The critical issue is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Id.

It is clear from Mr. Harrison's own description of his search for "Geneva Crenshaw" or "Valerie Edwards" that he targeted
women other than Plaintiff: "the only method available to me as far as finding Valerie was the most primitive means of
choosing the name 'Valerie' from within the vast array of academic category and pursuing it. Eventually, I had lost even the
name 'Valerie' and pursued others." Plaintiff argues that Mr. Harrison's pursuit of her as his "wife" was inherently sexual in
nature since it was clear that Plaintiff was being pursued as a woman and that she would not have been sought by Mr.
Harrison as his wife if she were a man. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that she was being stalked by Mr. Harrison and that
stalking is primarily a crime against women, with sexual connotations.

A hostile work environment may be established if the harassment is "because of sex," even if not sexual in nature. Spain v.
Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1999); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 971 (10th Cir. 1991); Hall v. Gus Const.
Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988). In this case, it is clear that Plaintiff was only the object of Mr. Harrison's attention
because she was a female; therefore, the alleged stalking activities do appear to have been "because of sex" even if they were
not inherently sexual in nature. (Emphasis added)

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *8-11.

4.        The Jury Verdict Contradicts Judge Hogan’s Judicial Notice During Trial and is Otherwise Unsupported by the
Undisputed Evidence of Record

As held in Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision, Harrison's pursuit of Plaintiff as his "wife" was inherently sexual, since the
relationship between a husband and a wife is expected to include sex. This fact was so obvious that the Court stopped
Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Otey, from continuing a line of questioning of Officer Sirleaf, to whether he perceived Plaintiff’s
complaint regarding Harrison as one that was “sexual in nature” or based on her sex.   Since Officer Sirleaf was an agent of
Howard, and the first Howard employee who recorded Plaintiff’s complaint in a written report, his understanding of
Plaintiff’s complaint as sexual, or based on her sex, is imputed to the University.

Officer Sirleaf testified that he did interpret Harrison’s conduct to be sexual in nature because he pursued her as his “wife.”
As Officer Sirleaf began to elaborate on his perception of a husband and wife relationship as inherently sexual, the Court
interrupted the witness and Plaintiff’s counsel, saying, “It’s obvious, move on.”   Despite Judge Hogan’s conclusion of law,
in 1999, “it is clear” that Harrison’s conduct was sexual in nature and/or based on sex, and judicial notice that the term “wife”
denotes that Harrison’s pursuit of Prof. Martin was sexual in nature, a jury has returned a verdict disposing of Plaintiff’s
entire Title VII and D.C. Human Rights Act claims, based on a contrary conclusion.
The jury’s verdict is contrary to all of the undisputed evidence of record, including: 1) rulings from the Court (oral and
written); 2) admissions of Howard’s binding witnesses, Deans Bullock and Newsom; and 3) statements by Prof. Taslitz,
Officer Sirleaf and Mrs. Bruner. The jury also overlooked the specific and common meaning of the word “wife,” as defined
in English language dictionaries; accordingly, the verdict must be set aside and judgment granted for Plaintiff on the issue of
sexual harassment/hostile work environment. As set forth in Plaintiff’s October 9, 2002 Motion for Summary Judgment,
incorporated by reference herein, the undisputed facts of record demonstrate that no reasonable juror could conclude that
Harrison’s conduct did not rise to a level creating a hostile work environment or that Howard took reasonable steps to
eliminate this hostile work environment. The jury’s findings of fact on these issues confirm that result.

The jury’s verdict is only faulty in that it was based on a misunderstanding of law with respect to sexual harassment and
harassment on the basis of sex. The jurors asked for additional instruction on these issues, but received none. Left to its
apparent conflicting juror views on this issue, the jury made an error of law and concluded that the harassment was not based
on sex – despite all undisputed evidence and judicial notice, from the bench, during trial, to the contrary.

5.        Criminal Stalking may Constitute Sexual Harassment under Title VII

Plaintiff repeatedly requested that the Court include in its jury instructions the definition of “stalking,” pursuant to the D.C.
Criminal Code, and specific language from case law establishing that criminal behavior, such as stalking, may also constitute
workplace sexual harassment. Plaintiff set forth these proposed instructions as #2 and #3 of her Proposed Special Jury
Instructions, submitted as part of her pre-trial statement in November of 2005 and requested for the last time on the last day
of trial, April 28, 2006. The Court rejected Plaintiff’s proposed instructions.

Howard argued that “stalking” is a criminal matter and does not constitute sexual harassment; however, most criminal acts
are also actionable in civil law, under comparable civil theories. If an employee is sexually assaulted in her workplace,
certainly, it is a crime; however, the employer is not permitted to dismiss it as a criminal matter and allow the employee who
committed the sexual assault to continue to work with the person whom he assaulted. The employer still has a duty, under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the D.C. Human Rights Act, to eliminate the sexual harassment in the
workplace.

Stalking is a form of sexual harassment, within the meaning of Title VII, where it is based on sex and the victim reasonably
perceives the stalker to have created a “hostile or abusive environment” in her workplace.
The legal definition of criminal “stalking,” as codified in D.C. Code Ann. § 22-404 (b) is:
(b) Any person who on more than one occasion … willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person,
is guilty of the crime of stalking. (Emphasis added)

(e) For purposes of this section, the term “harassing” means engaging in a course of conduct either in person, by telephone,
or in writing, directed at a specific person, which seriously alarms, annoys, frightens, or torments the person, or engaging in a
course of conduct either in person, by telephone, or in writing, which would cause a reasonable person to be seriously
alarmed, annoyed, frightened or tormented.

Without the definition of “stalking,” the jurors were without the legal reference to evaluate Howard’s repeated distinctions
between stalking and sexual harassment, and Howard’s specific accusations that Plaintiff never raises issues of “harassment”
prior to Howard’s December 18, 1997 decision not to offer her a permanent position or a renewed visitorship on its law
school faculty. In fact, in closing arguments, Howard’s outside counsel, Mr. Shwalb, accused Plaintiff of “playing the sexual
harassment card,” only after she was rejected for a permanent position on December 18, 1997, never having previously
mentioned sexual harassment.

If the jurors had realized that the D.C. stalking statute specifically incorporates “harassment” as part of its definition, the
jury would have clearly understood that Plaintiff first alleged that she was being harassed by Harrison, as his prospective
“wife,” no later than November 21, 1997, when she filed a “stalking” complaint against Harrison with the D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department. This realization would also have bolstered Plaintiff’s credibility with the jury, with respect to all of her
claims, since Plaintiff testified that she characterized Harrison’s behavior as “harassment” when she first reported it to Dean
Newsom and Officer Sirleaf on November 20, 1997. At that time, she had not yet met with the D.C. police officers and they
had not yet classified the harassment as stalking.

6.        The Jury Verdict Contradicts Admissions by Deans Bullock and Newsom Expressly Recognizing that Harrison Posed
a Threat to Plaintiff and “Other Women” on Campus

Associate Dean Newsom specifically admitted, both at trial and in his deposition, that Harrison’s pursuit of Prof. Martin
caused him concern about not only Prof. Martin’s safety, but also the safety of other women on campus. See Pl.’s MSJ at
12. In her July 1, 1998 memorandum to Norma Leftwich, General Counsel for Howard University, provided as an
attachment to Howard’s Position Statement to the EEOC in response to Plaintiff’s EEOC charge of sexual
harassment/hostile work environment and retaliation, Dean Bullock admitted that she was specifically aware, by no later
than December 1, 1997, that Harrison posed a threat of stalking and harassment too Prof. Martin and “other women” on
campus.

Associate Dean Newsom advised me that he thought that MPD should be called in to provide more manpower in tracking
down the individual not only to benefit Professor Martin, but also to prevent harm to other women whom this person might
stalk or otherwise harass. (Emphasis added)

Pl.’s Trial Ex. 8B and Ex. KKK-1 of Pl.’s October 9, 2002 Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ). Howard adopted Dean
Bullock’s statement in its December 8, 1998 Position Statement to the EEOC (Exhibit KKK-2 of Pl.’s M SJ ). On page 2 of
the same July 1, 1997 memorandum, Dean Bullock acknowledged that she was aware, as of December 1, 1997, that Harrison
had been characterized a “dangerous” and “crazy” and should only be approached by the police or University Security.
Throughout this case and at trial, Howard’s attorneys argued that Prof. Martin did not characterize Harrison’s conduct as
“harassment” or indicate that she believed that Harrison’s pursuit of her was sexual in nature or based on her status as a
woman. Howard maintained that neither Deans Bullock nor Newsom, nor any other of its agents understood Prof. Martin’s
reports to indicate her belief that she was being “harassed” or that such harassment was sexual in nature or based on her
gender. Howard has repeatedly referred to Harrison as “a gentleman” who was in search of his “estranged wife,” and that his
pursuit of Prof. Martin was a case of “mistaken identity;” yet, Howard’s administrators were well aware that this was no
“gentleman,” that there was no “estranged wife,” and that there could be no “mistaken identify” because there was no real
person, but only a fictional character in a book, to “identify.”

At trial, Howard wasted Court time attempting to elicit testimony from witnesses to this effect, when it had already
acknowledged, years earlier, in its statement to the EEOC, that Harrison’s conduct constituted harassment on the basis of
sex. Indeed, Howard has wasted Plaintiff’s, the EEOC’s and the Court’s time, for the past eight years, while draining
Plaintiff of her limited financial resources, depriving her of returning to her teaching career, and depriving her of the
reputation and income that she enjoyed prior to her termination from Howard, which allowed her to properly provide for her
daughter during the remaining years of her childhood and through college and graduate school.

The evidence is clear that Deans Bullock and Newsom, as well as Howard’s additional agent, Howard University Campus
Officer Sirleaf and Prof. Taslitz, always understood that Prof. Martin’s memoranda entitled “Security Problem on Campus”
and her conversations with them about Harrison, constituted complaints of harassment, based on her sex. The fact that the
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department characterized this sexual harassment as criminal stalking highlights the severity of the
harassment and certainly does not nullify it, as Howard argued.

Sexual harassment that rises to the level of criminal activity has been recognized as the most extreme form of sexual
harassment in the workplace. In Little v. Windemere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2001), the court found
that where an employee was raped by a client after a business meeting, this one incident was severe enough to create a
hostile work environment for the plaintiff in her workplace. See also Turnbull v. Topeka State Hospital, 255 F.3d 1238,
1243-1244 (10th Cir. 2001) (a single incident of sexual assault was “abusive, dangerous and humiliating” enough to create a
hostile work environment for the plaintiff, within the meaning of Title VII); Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th
Cir. 1995) (“Just as every murder is also a battery, every rape committed in the employment setting is also discrimination on
the basis of the employee’s sex.”)

Dean Bullock’s admission, repeating Dean Newsom’s admission that both Deans perceived Harrison’s stalking of Prof.
Martin on campus as “harass[ment]” that was directed as Prof. Martin and “other women” as women, demonstrates,
absolutely, that Howard’s entire “defense” was made in bad faith, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, constituting fraud,
misrepresentation and/or misconduct justifying a new trial or amended judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(B)(3). In
addition, Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate.

V.        The Jury’s Answers to Factual Questions Posed by Chief Judge Hogan’s 1999 Decision Require Judgment for
Plaintiff

Having determined, as a matter of law, that Harrison’s pursuit of Plaintiff and other women as his “wife,” clearly constituted
pursuit of her on the basis of her sex or gender, Judge Hogan permitted this case to proceed to trial for a jury to determine: 1)
whether Harrison’s conduct was severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment for the Plaintiff; and 2)
whether Howard University knew or should have known of Harrison’s creation of a hostile work environment and failed to
take proper remedial action.

Plaintiff has alleged, and the Defendants do not appear to dispute, that she subjectively felt threatened by Mr. Harrison's
behavior; however, to prevail on a sexual harassment claim, Plaintiff must also show that a reasonable female would have
found these actions to be severely hostile or abusive. Whether or not Mr. Harrison intended his behavior to be abusive or
threatening is irrelevant to this inquiry. See Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1029 ("The reasonable victim standard classifies conduct
as unlawful sexual harassment even when harassers do not realize that their conduct creates a hostile work environment. . . .
Therefore, the alleged harasser's intent is unimportant and "compliments" are not a defense.")

The alleged incidents in this case may or may not be sufficiently severe or pervasive to amount to actionable sexual
harassment. However, they certainly amount to more than the "mere utterance of an epithet." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 ("mere
utterance of an. . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee would not affect the conditions of employment
to a sufficient degree to violate Title VII). Whether or not a reasonable victim would find them sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of Plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working environment is appropriately an
issue of fact for the jury, not one which this Court can summarily adjudicate. See Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1029 (holding that
whether two incidents of verbal abuse -- "great tits" and "great legs" -- and three incidents of staring by non-employees
constituted sexual harassment of plaintiff was a triable issue of fact).

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *7-8.

Therefore, since the Court finds that Mr. Harrison's conduct could be considered sexual harassment and that the question of
whether this behavior was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable is a jury question, and since Defendants admit
that there is a material dispute regarding whether the University took appropriate actions in connection with Mr. Harrison,
the Court must deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment with regard to the Hostile
Work Environment claim.

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 at *14.

The jury answered the two questions posed by Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision by finding that 1) Harrison’s harassment was
severe and pervasive, causing a hostile work environment for Prof. Martin; and 2) Howard failed to take reasonable steps to
end the hostile work environment. Plaintiff has therefore proved her claim of sexual harassment/hostile work environment
and is entitled to a verdict in her favor.

VI.        Plaintiff Supplements and Renews her October 9, 2002 Motion for Summary Judgment

The trial testimony, particularly of Deans Bullock and Newsom, directly contradicting Howard’s December 8, 1998 Position
Statement to the EEOC and Dean Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memorandum to Howard’s General Counsel, demonstrates the
validity of what Plaintiff argued to the Court in her October 9, 2002 Motion for Summary Judgment, incorporated by
reference herein, with respect to her sexual harassment claim. This case never should have gone to trial. Plaintiff should have
been granted summary judgment years ago. Plaintiff’s dispositive motion was denied by Magistrate Judge Facciola, on
October 20, 2003, based on conclusions of fact and law that were so replete with errors that even Howard University
declined to oppose Plaintiff’s motions to amend and vacate it.

In its Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Howard refused to file a Statement of Material Disputed
Facts, even after Plaintiff pointed out to Howard that it had failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.1 and this Court’s
Local Rules and consented to Howard’s motion to allow it to amend its Opposition to Plaintiff’s dispositive motion to
comply with the Rules. As Plaintiff argued in her Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Howard never filed a disputed statement of facts, with citations to the record supporting its factual allegations
because it could not do so.

Howard never had any evidence to support any arguments that it attempted to make for any of the ever-changing defenses
that has put forth over the past eight years. Instead, Howard has simply asserted lie after lie, for eight years, with no proof
of the facts asserted. Instead of being subject to Rule 11 sanctions, as Plaintiff has repeatedly requested, Howard has been
able to violate rule after rule and order after order of this Court, with impunity, and ultimately, to benefit from its
wrongdoing with a jury verdict in its favor for a trial that never should have taken place. Howard never had any valid
defense to Plaintiff’s claim, but has relied only on arguments that it concocted years into the litigation, with no evidence to
support any of them.

In addition to Dean Bullock’s false statements at trial, contradicting her July 1, 1998 admission that she and Dean Newsom
specifically understood that Harrison’s stalking of Prof. Martin constituted “harassment” that posed a threat to her and
“other women,” on the basis of their sex, Dean Bullock made several other statements regarding her purported efforts to
eliminate the hostile work environment for Prof. Martin – all of which she, Dean Newsom, and/or other security officers
and/or Plaintiff refuted, without challenge, during trial.

I learned that Dawn Martin believed she was being “stalked” on December 1, 1997, upon reading her memorandum dated
November 25, 1997, I immediately contacted Dean Newsom to determine what he knew of the matter. He told me that he
had advised Ms. Martin to contact the University Security Office and the Metropolitan Police Department regarding what
she should do in connection with her personal safety.

KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 1.

At trial, however, Dean Bullock never claimed that she called Dean Newsom or asked him anything about the matter.
Instead, Dean Bullock testified only that she placed a call to Security Director Lawrence Dawson and left a voicemail
message for him which was never returned. Dean Bullock admitted that she never called Dawson again about the matter.
Mr. Dawson testified that he never received a message from Dean Bullock.

Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:
Associate Dean Newsom advised me that he thought that MPD should be called in to provide more manpower in tracking
down the individual not only to benefit Professor Martin, but also to prevent harm to other women whom this person might
stalk or otherwise harass. In that regard Associate Dean Newsom arranged a meeting in the West Campus security office
with Professor Martin, representatives of Campus Security and of MPD, and himself. Campus Security and MPD stated
that they would take the necessary action to end the harassment. (Emphasis added)

KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 1, adopted in Howard’s EEOC Position Statement, page 2 (KKK-2 of Pl.’s M SJ )

At trial, former Officer Sirleaf, Plaintiff and Dean Newsom all testified that Plaintiff and Officer Sirleaf, not Dean Newsom,
called the police. Plaintiff testified, unchallenged, that Dean Newsom refused to assist her in calling the police. Both
Plaintiff and former Officer Sirleaf testified, unchallenged, that Officer Sirleaf was the only representatives of Campus
Security present at the meeting with the police. Plaintiff and Officer Sirleaf testified, unchallenged, that Plaintiff called Dean
Newsom while MPD was present on campus and convinced him to appear for a portion of the meeting.
Plaintiff testified, unchallenged, that Newsom refused to file any complaint on behalf of the University, but left Plaintiff to
file the complaint alone, and that Newsom yelled at Plaintiff in the security office, with her students looking on through the
glass encasing of the Security Office. Both Officer Sirleaf and Plaintiff testified, unchallenged, that Dean Newsom stayed
only approximately ten minutes. Dean Newsom testified that he had no contact with MPD officers or discussions with any
Howard Security Officer about the matter after his brief appearance at the November 21, 1997 meeting in the Security
Office.

Both Plaintiff and Officer Sirleaf testified, unchallenged, that the result of the November 21, 1997 meeting was the agreement
and expectation that Howard would issue a Bar Notice, banning Harrison from campus, and that if he returned to campus, he
would be detained for police and arrested, pursuant to the stalking complaint taken by MPD officers. Officer Dowdy
testified that no Bar Notice was issued for Harrison and that he escorted Harrison off campus, on November 25, 1997,
because he did not know that Harrison was stalking Prof. Martin or that a stalking complaint had been taken by MPD.

Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:

On or about the following day, I transmitted a copy of Ms. Martin’s report and my response to her to Mr. Dawson,
Director of Security via a memorandum asking him to advise law school security officers of the need to be alert to Ms.
Martin’s concerns.
KKK-1of Pl.’s M SJ, page 2, adopted in Howard’s EEOC Position Statement, page 3 (KKK-2 of Pl.’s M SJ ).
At trial, former Dean Bullock admitted that she never made any attempt to contact Mr. Dawson beyond her purported
December 1, 1997 voicemail message, which Dawson never returned. Howard never produced any memorandum from Dean
Bullock to Mr. Dawson or to any other member of Howard’s security force, referring, in any way, to Prof. Martin or to
Leonard Harrison. Mr. Dawson testified that Dean Bullock never told him anything about Prof. Martin or Leonard Harrison
and that he had no knowledge of the stalking at all while it was occurring in 1997-1998. Howard has offered absolutely no
explanation for why this purported memo was never produced. Clearly, then, no such memo was ever written.
In her July 1, 1997 memorandum, former Dean Bullock claimed that, in response to Prof. Martin’s December 2, 1997
memorandum documenting Harrison’s attempt to enter her office on December 1, 1997, and Officer Dowdy’s “chase” of
Harrison, from her office, down five flights of steps, out of the building, off campus and into the woods, she took the
following action.
I asked the security officer on duty what were they doing regarding the “stalker.” I am not certain, but I believe it was
Officer Sirleaf that I spoke to. He told me that the day before (or there about) another officer ran after the man believed to
have been “the stalker.” The officer had chased after the man down to and across Connecticut Avenue, I believe Sirleaf told
me. He also advised me that the security office had advised Ms. Martin to let them know when she would be on campus
and they would accompany her to class and guard her office while she was on campus.

KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 2-3, adopted in Howard’s EEOC Position Statement, page 4 (KKK-2 of Pl.’s M SJ ).
At trial, Dean Bullock admitted that she never had this or any other conversation with Officer Sirleaf or any other security
officer regarding Prof. Martin, Leonard Harrison, the “stalker” or any chase by Officer Dowdy.   At trial, Dean Bullock
never made any claim that she ever had any belief that security was to provide Prof. Martin with a guard in her office or
while she was teaching or otherwise while she was on campus.
Dean Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:

Within a few days of speaking with the security officer I telephoned Mr. Dawson’s office and left a message (he was not in)
that I was calling about security issues at the law school.

KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 3.

Again, at trial, Dean Bullock never even alleged that she made any attempt to contact Mr. Dawson beyond the one message
that she claimed she left him on December 1, 1997 (which Mr. Dawson denied receiving) – prior to receiving Prof. Martin’s
December 2, 1997 memorandum. On the stand, Dean Bullock admitted that she never did anything in response to Prof.
Martin’s December 2, 1997 memorandum.

Dean Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memo continues:
My office – I and Associate Dean Newsom – gave written and oral notice of Ms. Martin’s stalking report to University
Security and requested security assistance for her. Apparently neither Campus Security nor MPD posted notices in the
security office or in the library describing the stalker, and Associate Dean Newsom requested the Campus Security Office to
post notices. Since he did not have a description of the stalker and Professor Martin did, he asked her to prepare a
description to be included in notices to be posted. My efforts were directed at getting security assistance because no one
else at the law school is equipped to protect an employee who may be in danger.

KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ, page 3, adopted in Howard’s EEOC Position Statement, pages 4-5 (KKK-2 of Pl.’s M SJ ).

At trial, Dean Bullock or Newsom admitted that she never spoke to anyone in Howard Security about Prof. Martin or
Leonard Harrison. Newsom admitted that, other than his brief appearance in the Security Office on November 21, 1997, in
response to Prof. Martin’s request that he be present, he never spoke to anyone in Howard Security about Prof. Martin or
Leonard Harrison or asked for “security assistance” for Prof. Martin. Dean Bullock admitted that she never asked for
“security assistance” for Prof. Martin, other than her one time instruction to her assistant, Barbara Smith, on December 1,
1997, when Prof. Martin refused to return to her office or her classroom without protection, due to the frightening voicemail
message that she had just received from Harrison, announcing his plans to visit her in her office that afternoon. Officer
Dowdy testified that he had seen and talked with Harrison -- and checked his homeless shelter identification – on November
25, 1997, when he escorted him off campus, not knowing that there was a stalking complaint on him or that Officer Sirleaf
had requested that a Bar Notice be issued against him. Prof. Martin had already provided Deans Bullock and Newsom with
all of the information that she had gathered on Harrison, in her memoranda of November 25 and December 2, 1997. Since she
had only seen Harrison for a second, before Officer Dowdy chased him from her office on December 1, 1997, Officer Dowdy
was in a much better position to provide a description of Harrison than was Prof. Martin.

Contrary to Dean Bullock’s assertion, Dean Newsom did not just ask Prof. Martin for a written description of Harrison, but
asked her to draft the Alert Notice herself, to be posted, despite her statement that she did not know the format used by
Howard’s security for such Notices and that it would be best drafted by Security. Neither Deans Newsom or Bullock ever
requested that Security draft an alert notice for Harrison. In addition, Deans Newsom and Bullock did not have to
“ascertain” that no notices were posted because they were the persons who would post or and/or approve the posting any
notice posting on the West Campus, otherwise known as the law school, which stands alone on Van Ness Street, off of
Connecticut Avenue, far from the main campus on Georgia Avenue where Dean Newsom purportedly sent the request that
the notice be posted.

The December 22, 1997 memorandum purportedly sent by Dean Newsom to Campus Security was entitled “Stalking of
Prof. Dawn Martin, Vagrants in the Lounge and Missing Printer in the West Campus.” (Joint Trial Exhibit 80 and Exhibit
GG in Pl.’s MSJ) It appears then, that the stalking of Prof. Martin was equated with a missing printer and was not even
worth of its own memo. Deans Bullock and Newsom admitted that they never received any response from Security to the
Notice, that they never called Security to follow up on the purportedly sent memo and that the Notice was never posted,
although they could easily have posted the notice themselves on the law school premises rather than sending it across town
to main campus to request that someone from main campus come across town to post the notice. Finally, Howard’s
Security former Director, Mr. Dawson, and the Deputy Chief, Mr. Armstrong, testified that they never saw this memo
before being deposed in this case. Howard never produced the memo as part of the Security Office files and Mr. Armstrong
testified, in his deposition, that in his search of the Security files, he did not find any such memo from Dean Newsom.

Plaintiff hereby renews her motion for summary judgment, with respect to all of her claims, as supplemented by the recent,
controlling case law decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The recent stream of cases flowing from the
U.S. Court of Appeals from the D.C. Circuit clarifying, expanding and re-evaluating the definition of “adverse action” within
the meaning of Title VII, demonstrates that Plaintiff’s repeated warnings that MJ Facciola’s grant of summary judgment on
these claims constituted reversible error were based on sound legal principles. This trend began with Holcomb v. Powell,
433 F.3d 889 (D.C. C. 2006) (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Jan.10, 2006), holding that adverse actions included acts that affected future
employment opportunities.   It next progressed to Rochon v. Gonzales, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5028 (D.C. Cir. 2006),
holding that Title VII makes unlawful any act of retaliation by an employer that well might dissuade a reasonable employee
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination pursuant to Title VII – whether it is related to current employment
opportunities, future employment opportunities, or even potentially adverse consequences completely unrelated to
employment. Its most recent holding on the issue is Chappelle-Johnson v. Powell, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 6600 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (March 17, 2006), holding that an adverse action includes the denial of an opportunity to compete for a vacant
position.   These holdings, independently, and together, demonstrate that Dean Bullock’s conversation (or feigned
conversion) of a position and withholding of vacant positions, for which Plaintiff qualified, constituted an adverse action
within the meaning of Title VII, as defined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.

VII.        Punitive Damages
The Court denied Plaintiff’s request to allow the jury to consider punitive damages in this case. The Supreme Court has
rejected the argument that employers are not liable for punitive damages unless their conduct is egregious or outrageous.
Passantino v. Johnson and Johnson Consumer Products, Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 515 (9th Cir. 2000) ("in general, intentional
discrimination is enough to establish punitive damages liability"). Retaliation is, by its nature, intentional discrimination.
Punitive damages are particularly appropriate where the discriminating or retaliating official attempts to conceal his/her
wrongdoing or lies about his/her conduct. Connolly v. Bidermann Industries U.S.A., Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 360 (S.D.N.Y.
1999). As discussed in Section IV, above, since Howard misrepresented the facts, in writing, to a United States government
agency, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in its December 8, 1998 Position Statement (KKK-2 of Pl.’s
M SJ ), based on Dean Bullock’s July 1, 1998 memorandum, in which Dean Bullock lied, in writing, to Howard’s General
Counsel (KKK-1 of Pl.’s M SJ), this case is a perfect example of a case meriting punitive damages.   It is particularly
disgraceful that these lies were perpetrated by the female Dean of a national law school touting its legacy of civil rights.

In addition, punitive damages are appropriate where the employer has acted with "malice or with reckless indifference” to
the employee’s Title VII rights. Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). Dean Bullock callously and
recklessly refused to provide the reasonable protection from Harrison that Howard’s own security policy mandated.

Bullock even lied by stating, in writing, that she was consulting with the Director of Security, Lawrence Dawson, when, in
fact, she had never consulted with Dawson or any other Howard University Security Officer or D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department officer regarding Prof. Martin or Harrison. As set forth in Pl. MSJ at 16, Dean Bullock made specific
statements exhibiting extreme hostility toward Plaintiff in response to her requests that Howard take reasonable steps to bar
a serial stalker, with a criminal record, from the law school. Dean Bullock told the EEOC:
Martin did not seem satisfied with my response. I was left with the impression that she wanted me to wrestle the stalker
down. (Emphasis added)

Dean Bullock told Prof. Taslitz that she was having a “bad day” and had “a lot to do” with respect to Prof. Martin’s
complaints about being stalked by Harrison at the law school (Pl. MSJ at 16-17); yet, Bullock did not even take the most
basic steps to keep Harrison from Martin in her workplace. Howard’s security force consisted of armed special police
officers. Howard’s policies and procedures required that, under the circumstances presented by Harrison, University
procedures required posting an “Alert” notice, issuing a bar notice to Harrison, requesting an additional security officer to
guard the entrance to the law school to stop Harrison from entering the law school building and other measures designed to
keep Harrison off the law school premises and assure his arrest if he returned to campus. Pl. MSJ at 7, 8, 10.   Dean Bullock
told Taslitz that Prof. Martin had “bad judgment,” but would not provide even one example of such alleged bad judgment,
even though Prof. Taslitz asked for one, several times. MSJ at 18.

Under the facts presented at trial, which are consistent with the presentation of the facts as stated in Judge Hogan’s 1999
decision, as well as in Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff is entitled punitive, as well as compensatory
damages for her intentional subjection of Prof. Martin to the hostile work environment created by Leonard Harrison and
fostered by Dean Bullock.

VIII.        Bifurcation
Finally, if there is a new trial in this case, Plaintiff renews her request that this case be bifurcated, by claim, if tried again
before a jury.   As Plaintiff previously argued, the claims for sexual harassment, retaliatory non-renewal/termination and
breach of contract require different elements of proof. Trying them together did confuse the jury, required repetition of
evidence that was presented weeks earlier and created four hours of closing arguments and hundreds of documents that the
jury had to assess at the end of four weeks. Clearly, the jury was unable to sift through those hundreds of documents within
the day and a half that they deliberated, to identify the documents that were even directly related to Plaintiff’s sexual
harassment claim to even to understand that Dean Bullock admitted years ago, that she and Dean Newsom always
understood Plaintiff’s complaint about Harrison to be one of harassment, based on her gender.

This case presents a case of first impression in this jurisdiction, with respect to employer liability for the sexual harassment
of an employee by a non-employee. This issue is significant enough to be heard by itself, uncontaminated by credibility
contests, attempts at character assassination, irrelevant and prejudicial testimony, hundreds of documents, many of which
are related to matters of tenure and publication, and other issues that unnecessarily complicated the sexual harassment/hostile
work environment claim.

With the benefit of hindsight, Plaintiff respectfully modifies her request for bifurcation to request that the breach of contract
claim be saved for last, rather than tried second. If Plaintiff is granted judgment, as a matter of law, on her sexual harassment
and retaliation claims, she will already be entitled to the same remedy that she could obtain through her breach of contract
claim, which would eliminate the need to try the breach of contract claim, unless the Court’s judgment on the retaliation
claim was reversed on appeal. In addition, since the retaliation claim is directly related to the sexual harassment claim, it is
logical to follow the sexual harassment evidence directly with the retaliation evidence rather than interrupt the evidence with
the completely separate evidence of breach of contract.

CONCLUSION
Since the jury did determine that Harrison did harass Plaintiff in her workplace, to the point of it being severe and pervasive,
and that Howard University knew of the harassment and failed to take reasonable measures to eliminate it, the jury has
answered the factual questions posed by Judge Hogan in a manner that compels judgment for Plaintiff, as a matter of law,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). Plaintiff respectfully request that this Court grant Plaintiff judgment, as a matter of law,
set the case for a new trial on damages for her sexual harassment claim, and direct the jury to determine compensatory and
punitive damages for the claim. In the alternative, Plaintiff should be granted a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b)
and of 60(b)(3).

Since Plaintiff’s retaliation claims were also dismissed due to the jury’s erroneous determination that there was no protected
activity under Title VII or the D.C. Human Rights Act since the harassment was not based on sex, Plaintiff is entitled to a
new trial on her retaliation claims, if not granted judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to her accompanying motion regarding
those claims.

Respectfully submitted,

Dawn V. Martin, Esquire
                Law Offices of Dawn V. Martin
1090 Vermont Avenue, N.W, Suite 800
                Washington, D.C. 20005
                (202) 408-7040 telephone; (703) 642-0208 facsimile
DVMARTINLAW@yahoo.com
www.firms.findlaw.com/dvmartinlaw

Martin v. Howard University
Motion for Judgment on Plaintiff's Claim of Sexual Harassment